Waltz

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT C. TUCKER, Professor of Politics and Director of the Program in Russian Studies at Princeton, is a Faculty Associate of the Center of International Studies. His recent publications include *The Soviet Political Mind* (1963) and, with his co-editor Stephen Cohen, *The Great Purge Trial* (1965). As a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for 1964-65 he is at work on a study of Stalin.

CHARLES D. TARLTON, who has been a member of the Department of Political Science of the University of California at Berkeley, will this fall join the faculty, as Assistant Professor, of the University of Victoria in British Columbia. His major field of interest is political theory and American political thought, and he is now working on a study of "Creativity and Political Theory."

WILLIAM D. COPLIN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University in Detroit. He is now engaged in a study of current theories of international law in relation to the Inter-Nation Simulation developed by Dr. Harold Guetzkow at Northwestern University, and is also preparing a book on the functions of international law.

CHARLES E. FRYE is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bryn Mawr College. He is currently working on a study of conservatism in the Weimar Republic.

PAUL Y. HAMMOND, a member of the research staff of the Social Sciences Department of The RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, is the author of *Organizing for Defense* (1961), co-author of *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (1962), and a contributor to *American Civil-Military Decisions* (1963). He is completing a study of the implications for policy-making of the operational character of American foreign policy, and is also at work on a study of nuclear proliferation.

BERNARD BRODIE has been since 1951 a Senior Staff Member of The RAND Corporation, and since 1963 has also been a Visiting Lecturer, with the rank of Professor, at the University of California at Los Angeles. Among his published works are *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959) and, with Fawn M. Brodie, *From Cross-Bow to H-Bomb* (1962).

ARTHUR LEE BURNS is a Professorial Fellow in Political Science at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. At the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1958-59 and 1961, he wrote on nuclear politics and strategy. He has since worked on arms control, the politics of the European Community, UN peacekeeping, and the Indo-Pacific nuclear question, and has collaborated on *International Stability* (1964). He is now writing a book on formal theories of world politics.

A. A. FATOUROS, Assistant Professor of Law at Indiana University in Bloomington, is the author of *Government Guarantees to Foreign Investors* (1962) and co-author, with R. N. Kelson, of *Canada's Overseas Aid* (1964). He is currently engaged in research on the legal aspects of international development.

KENNETH N. WALTZ, Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, is the author of *Man, the State, and War* (1959). He is presently completing a book on politics and foreign policy in the United States and Great Britain.

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THE DICTATOR AND TOTALITARIANISM

By ROBERT C. TUCKER*

I

SIGNIFICANTLY, we have few if any studies of the totalitarian dictator as a personality type. It may be that we are little closer to a working psychological model of him than Plato took us with his brilliant sketch of the ideal type of the "tyrant" in *The Republic*. The contemporary literature on totalitarianism does, of course, contain materials that are relevant to the problem of characterization of the totalitarian dictator.[1] Yet no frontal attack appears to have been made upon the problem. The purpose of the present article is to argue the need for one, and to do this in the context of a critical reexamination of the theory of totalitarianism. In the course of it I shall put forward some ideas of possible use in developing a conception of the dictator as a personality type.

First, a word on the use of the term "totalitarianism." Starting in the late 1930's and 1940's, a number of thinkers, mostly of European origin, evolved a theory of "totalitarianism" or the "total state" in an effort to account for the new type of dictatorship that had made its appearance in Germany under Hitler, Russia under Stalin, and perhaps also in Italy under Mussolini.[2] Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia were viewed as the two principal and indubitable manifestations of the novel political phenomenon. While the difficulty of precisely defining or describing this phenomenon was recognized, moreover, these writers felt that they were dealing with something qualitatively quite specific. It was not so much a form of political organization as a form of outlook and action, a peculiar mode of political life. Thus Hannah Arendt, whose *Origins of Totalitarianism* was in many ways

* I am much indebted to Professor Fred I. Greenstein for critical comments on the original draft of this article.

[1] See, for example, G. M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship* (New York 1950); Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York 1942), chap. 2; C. J. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), chap. 2; and A. Inkeles, "The Totalitarian Mystique," in C. J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954).

[2] The important earlier contributions include Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution*; Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses* (New York 1940); Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York 1942); and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York 1951).

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a culminating synthesis of this entire trend of theory in the first stage, did not treat Lenin's Russia as genuinely totalitarian. She saw the original Bolshevik system as a "revolutionary dictatorship" rather than a totalitarian one, and 1929, the year of Stalin's advent to supreme power and the start of the great collectivization campaign, as "the first year of clear-cut totalitarian dictatorship in Russia."[3] Accordingly, Soviet totalitarianism was treated as preeminently a phenomenon of the Stalin era. Again, Mussolini's Italy was considered by some to be a totalitarian state. But others, including Arendt, did not feel that it fully merited this designation even though Mussolini himself had been the first, or among the first, to use the term "totalitarian" and had applied it to the Fascist conception of the state. The treatment of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia as the prime representative expressions of totalitarian dictatorship has remained characteristic of this school of thought, at any rate until recently. I intend to follow this usage here, meaning by "totalitarianism" the special kind of dictatorship or political phenomenon that existed in Germany under Hitler, in Russia under Stalin and, though perhaps only marginally, in Italy under Mussolini. The possibility that this special political phenomenon may have existed or may yet come into existence elsewhere is not, however, meant to be excluded.

There is a large biographical literature on the totalitarian dictators. These works are typically political biographies that tell the story of the subject's life and career against the background of his time and the politics of his country. The biographies of Stalin by Souvarine, Deutscher, and Trotsky are representative examples. Although they contain frequently very penetrating passages of psychological characterization, these biographies and others like them generally avoid any attempt at a systematic analysis of the personality of the dictator under consideration. A notable exception to this rule is Alan Bullock's *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, which essays, in its well-known chapter on "The Dictator," an extended character portrait of the mature Hitler. Bullock depicts Hitler's obsessive hatred of the Jews, his craving to dominate, his need for adulation, his grandiose fantasies, and his extraordinary capacity for self-dramatization and self-deception (his *Wahnsystem*, as the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, called it). But he also sees Hitler as an astute practical politician of very great ability, and suggests that the defining characteristic of his political personality lay in the "mixture of calculation and fanati-

[3] *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 391.

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cism."[4] Some elements of this characterization of Hitler may be of use in defining the totalitarian dictator as a personality type. But it is notable that the biographer does not view his subject in comparative perspective or note the broader implications of his analysis of Hitler's personality.

We should not underestimate either the difficulty of "typing" the totalitarian dictator or the resources available to us for dealing with this task. On the first point, it is clear that the dictators significantly differ from one another. Thus Hitler lacked Stalin's administrative talent and associated psychological traits, whereas Stalin was lacking in Hitler's remarkable oratorical powers and the qualities of personality that went along with them. A conception of the totalitarian dictator as a personality type would have to be sufficiently broad to transcend these differences and embrace only those decisively important characteristics that were shared. On the other hand, it would have to be sufficiently specific to enable us, in principle, to discriminate between the authentic totalitarian dictator on the order of Hitler or Stalin, and others, such as Lenin, Tito, Franco, and Perón, who may belong to different dictatorial classifications. The requisite combination of breadth and specificity will obviously not be easy to achieve. On the other hand, the present-day social scientist has impressive resources of data and ideas to draw upon in dealing with this problem. A rich store of factual information on the totalitarian dictators and others is available to us now. And work done in recent decades on personality and politics has yielded general concepts that may serve as useful tools of analysis. In his classic study of *Psychopathology and Politics*, to take the most important example, Harold Lasswell laid the groundwork for a "functional" politics that would focus prime attention not on political office as such but on political personality types, such as the "agitator," "theorist," and "administrator." Lasswell did not include the "dictator" among the original group of types, nor has he, to my knowledge, undertaken in later writings to define the totalitarian dictator as a personality type. But he has enunciated concepts and propositions that may be of great help in this enterprise. Notable among them is the proposition that "Political movements derive their vitality from the displacement of private affects upon public objects," and the closely related thesis that such displacement involves certain "processes of symbolization" whereby collective symbols are made proxy for self-symbols.[5] We shall have occasion in what follows to apply these ideas.

[4] *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (rev. edn., New York 1962), 375.
[5] *Psychopathology and Politics* (New York 1960), 173, 186.

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Also noteworthy in the present context is the literature that has developed around the theme of the "authoritarian personality." Having originated in Germany, this idea was introduced to the English-speaking public by Erich Fromm in his *Escape from Freedom* (1941). Fromm's thesis was that German National Socialism and other Fascist movements in Europe derived much of their mass appeal from the widespread incidence among the lower middle classes in these countries of a personality structure that he labeled "sado-masochistic" or the "authoritarian character." The authoritarian character combined a craving for power over others with a longing for submission to an overwhelmingly strong outside authority. Hitler himself, as revealed in *Mein Kampf*, was treated as an example, an "extreme form" of the authoritarian character. Continued research in this field led to the path-finding work by T. W. Adorno and his associates, *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), which presented as a central theoretical construct the notion of an "F-syndrome" or potential fascism in the personality. A whole literature of criticism and discussion of this work has since arisen. The relevance of the theory and of research on the "authoritarian personality" (and related conceptions) to the study of totalitarian dictators as a personality type is obvious. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the conception of the authoritarian personality has grown out of efforts to improve our understanding of the psychology of authoritarian *followership*, and that the specific question of leader psychology has not been a conscious concern in much of this work. The researchers have primarily been interested in learning why large numbers of people in modern societies may be receptive to the appeals of authoritarian or totalitarian movements. The great importance of the problem is undeniable. But it cannot be taken for granted that the motives or personality traits that lead some persons to become followers of a totalitarian movement are the same as those which cause others to become its organizers and leaders. In this connection it appears to be a defect of Fromm's study mentioned above that it fails to reckon explicitly with the possibility that the personality needs which cause some people to want to lose their freedom are not the same as those which cause a Hitler, for example, to want to take it away from them. The relationship between the needs of the leader and the needs of the followers might well be one of complementarity rather than similarity.

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Hardly less significant than the absence of a clear idea of the totalitarian dictator as a personality type is the absence of any resulting widespread sense that a need of political science is going unfulfilled. For evidence that this is so, and also for an explanation of why it is so, we may profitably turn to the literature of the recent past on the totalitarian dictatorship as a political system. Two overlapping stages may be distinguished in the growth of this literature. The first, extending from the late 1930's to the end of the 1940's, saw the emergence of the conception of the totalitarian state as a new, distinctively modern or non-traditional form of authoritarianism represented particularly in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. The second stage, coinciding with the growth of Soviet studies as an established branch of academic scholarship in postwar America, saw the detailed application of this conception to the Soviet system in its late Stalinist form, and also attempts at a kind of codification of the theory of totalitarianism.[6] It is only natural, of course, that in the late 1940's and early 1950's the attention of American scholars should have gravitated from the defunct Nazi case to the still very live totalitarianism of Stalin's Russia, and that in their studies of the latter they should have relied heavily upon the model of a totalitarian polity that had already been worked out in the first stage.

It is no monolithic doctrine that we find reflected in the literature on totalitarianism. We are confronted, rather, with a variegated body of thought developed over an extended period by thinkers of diverse intellectual background and research interest among whom differences of emphasis and opinion exist. Still, there are certain recurring themes, certain basic ideas that tend to be shared by various representatives of the school and may be taken as typical.

First, the totalitarian dictatorship is viewed as being, unlike most traditional forms of authoritarian rule, a dictatorship with a mass social base and having a popular or pseudo-popular character. "The totalitarian state is the state of the masses," wrote Emil Lederer, and other theorists have followed him in taking modern "mass society" or "mass-men" as a foundation or recruiting ground of totalitarian movements that speak in the name of the masses and assert their affinity with them.[7] On the road to power, totalitarian parties strive to create

[6] See, in particular, Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); Z. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism;* and Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.*

[7] *State of the Masses,* 45. See also Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism,* chap. 10,

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mass movements that indoctrinate their followers with the party's ideology by propaganda and agitation. Once in power in the single-party state, however, the totalitarian elite imposes upon its mass social constituency an unprecedented tyranny, under which political power emanating from a single source penetrates every pore of the social organism and all the resources of modern technology are used for control purposes. Autonomous social groups are destroyed, giving way to the controlled mass organizations that serve as the elite's transmission belts to the now "atomized" masses of the population.

"Modern totalitarianism, unlike the more traditional dictatorships, is a highly bureaucratized system of power."[8] This sums up a second characteristic theme in the literature on the totalitarian dictatorship. In *Behemoth*, for example, Franz Neumann depicts the Nazi dictatorship as a system ruled, albeit chaotically and competitively, by four great bureaucratic machines—the ministerial bureaucracy and the bureaucratized leaderships of the Nazi Party, the armed forces, and industry. The same basic theme receives a somewhat different emphasis from Arendt, who distinguishes "totalitarian bureaucracy" from bureaucracy of the traditional kind on the score of the former's "radical efficiency."[9] Both, however, share with other theorists of the school the view that totalitarianism carries the process of bureaucratization to its farthest extreme in modern society. There is, in fact, a tendency to regard the totalitarian state as a great bureaucratic monster functioning with machine-like impersonality in pursuit of its aims. Such an image is suggested, for example, by Arendt's later book, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, which pictures the erstwhile director of operations in the

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and William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1959). Franz Neumann, while agreeing that the transformation of men into "mass-men" is completed under totalitarianism, disagreed with the position of Lederer according to which the totalitarian state is a state *of* the masses. On this point, see *Behemoth*, 365-67.

[8] Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 19.

[9] *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 245. For Franz Neumann's view, see *Behemoth*, 372-73. He writes there that "National Socialism must carry to an extreme the one process that characterizes the structure of modern society, bureaucratization." The thesis about the "radical efficiency" of totalitarian as distinguished from traditional bureaucracy appears to have been conclusively disproved in the light of what is now known about both the Nazi and the Stalinist bureaucracies. Bullock's investigations have led him to the conclusion, for example, that "The boasted totalitarian organization of the National Socialist State was in practice riddled with corruption and inefficiency under the patronage of the Nazi bosses. . . . At every level there were conflicts of authority, a fight for power and loot, and the familiar accompaniments of gangster rule, 'protection,' graft, and the 'rake-off' " (*Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, 676). In *The German Occupation of Russia* (New York 1957), Alexander Dallin reaches a similar conclusion with regard to Nazi administration of the occupied territories. The speeches of Nikita Khrushchev and other official Soviet sources of the post-Stalin period provide a mass of illuminating detail on the inefficiency of the Stalinist totalitarian bureaucracy.

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Nazi "final solution" as a *kleiner Mann* of banal character who in supervising the murder of millions of Jews was dutifully carrying out his instructions as a higher functionary, a cogwheel in the totalitarian bureaucracy.

A third fundamental theme that has been both widely and heavily emphasized in the literature on totalitarianism has to do with systematic terror. Governmental use of terror is not itself held to be something distinctively new in the present age or peculiar to the totalitarian form of dictatorship. What distinguishes totalitarianism, according to the theorists, is rather the kind and degree of terror that is practiced, and also the characteristic predilection of totalitarian regimes for certain particular methods of spreading terror, such as the concentration camp and violent purges. Arendt, for example, differentiates "dictatorial terror," which is aimed against authentic opponents of the given regime, from an all-pervasive "totalitarian terror" that destroys not only actual political opponents but great numbers of wholly harmless people in purges, mass liquidations, and concentration camps; and she expresses the view that terror of the latter kind is "the very essence" of totalitarian government.[10] This view has found wide acceptance in the literature. Terror has variously been described, for example, as "the most universal characteristic of totalitarianism,"[11] "the linchpin of modern totalitarianism,"[12] and "the vital nerve of the totalitarian system."[13] So far as the question of the motivation of totalitarian terror is concerned, this is best considered under the next heading—the dynamics of totalitarianism.

The theorists of totalitarianism are in general and rather emphatic agreement that the totalitarian state is, in addition to its other characteristics, an extremely dynamic phenomenon. Sigmund Neumann, author of an outstanding work on the subject, saw the dynamics of the total state as revolutionary, and the political process in the totalitarian system as one of "permanent revolution." Others have used phrases like "permanent purge" and "permanent war" to describe es-

[10] *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 315, 335. This distinction appears to be of use in explaining why Mussolini's Italy was only marginally a totalitarian state: the terror was of the "dictatorial" rather than of the "totalitarian" variety.

[11] Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge*, 27. Brzezinski adds, in support of a view expressed by Arendt, that "terror within the totalitarian system actually must increase both in scope and in brutality with the growing stability of the regime," and further: "It is also a constant and pervading process of mass coercion, a continuum which persists throughout the totalitarian era" (*ibid.*).

[12] Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, 1st edn., 354.

[13] Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 132. They add: "The total scope and the pervasive and sustained character of totalitarian terror are . . . its unique qualities" (*ibid.*, 137).

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sential aspects of the totalitarian dynamism in internal and external affairs. But why do totalitarian systems act in such ways? Whence their dynamics? The literature gives two kinds of answer to such questions. First, the characteristic behaviors of totalitarian regimes are explained by reference to postulated system-needs or functional requisites of totalitarianism itself as an operating socio-political system. A specimen of such reasoning is provided by Brzezinski when he writes, for example, that "The purge, arising as a combination of the rational motivations of the totalitarian leadership and the irrational stresses of the system, satisfies the need of the system for continued dynamism and energy," and further: "Totalitarianism is the system of the permanent purge. It promotes mobility and instability within totalitarianism. It necessitates constant reshuffling, and prevents the formation of too rigid lines of power demarcation within the system."[14]

A second and related line of explanation of the dynamics of totalitarianism stresses ideological motivation. The totalitarian ideology itself or the leaders' presumed obsession with it is treated as the source of the characteristic behavior of totalitarian regimes. Thus Friedrich describes Hitler's destruction of the Jews as "ideologically motivated."[15] On a higher plane of generality Arendt explains the action of totalitarian regimes by reference to a "supersense" that drives the leaders to demonstrate at all cost the validity of their ideological world-image. "The aggressiveness of totalitarianism," she goes on, "springs not from lust for power, and if it feverishly seeks to expand, it does so neither for expansion's sake nor for profit, but only for ideological reasons: to make the world consistent, to prove that its respective supersense has been right."[16] The postulate of an ideological fanaticism as the driving force of totalitarian conduct reappears in Inkeles' conception of the "totalitarian mystique," which he sees as the defining characteristic of the totalitarian leader himself. The "mystique" is pictured as a compulsion in the leader and his lieutenants to force reality into conformity with an ideologically given "higher law" or ideal plan for man and society: "One may fruitfully view the dictatorial leader as the man who sees himself as the essential *instrument* of the particular mystique to which he is addicted."[17] In an application of this mode of reasoning,

[14] *The Permanent Purge*, 30, 36. Brzezinski's argument here appears to be, in part, an elaboration of the suggestion by Arendt that the Stalinist purge, as distinguished from earlier Bolshevik purges, was a means of maintaining a "permanent instability" in Soviet society, such instability being interpreted in turn as a functional requisite of totalitarianism as a system (*The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 376n.).

[15] *Totalitarianism*, 55.

[16] *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 431-32.

[17] Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism*, 88, 91, 95-96. It may be noted that Inkeles views the

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Friedrich and Brzezinski seek to explain totalitarian terror by ideological fanaticism. Having said that the terror is the "vital nerve" of the totalitarian system, they write: "This system, because of the alleged ideological infallibility of its dogma, is propelled toward an increase of terror by a violent passion for unanimity." Such passion, they go on to suggest, is what makes the terror totalitarian: "It aims to fill everyone with fear and vents in full its passion for unanimity. Terror embraces the entire society, searching everywhere for actual or potential deviants from the totalitarian unity. . . . Total fear reigns."[18]

Turning to the question of the dictator, it cannot be said that the theorists of totalitarianism have overlooked his presence in the system. It is true that the dictator's role has, on occasion, been explicitly disparaged. Thus Franz Neumann argued that despite its proclamation of the *Führerprinzip* and cult of the ruler, the totalitarian state should not be seen as a *Führerstaat*. For the doctrine of one-man rule was "merely a device to prevent insight into the operation of the social-economic mechanism," and this mechanism, in turn, was one in which "The decisions of the Leader are merely the result of the compromises among the four leaderships."[19] Nor do we find the role of the dictator singled out in the various efforts to define what has been called the "totalitarian syndrome," the cluster of elements that characterizes the totalitarian system as a distinctive political formation.[20] Most of the theorists, however, recognize at some point the reality of dictatorial rule by a single individual in a fully totalitarian system. Friedrich and Brzezinski, for example, refer to the Nuremberg trials and Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956 as sources of evidence for the view that

"mystique" as a way of characterizing the totalitarian leader as a "psychological type." However, he seems to mean by "totalitarian leader" not solely the dictator but the whole higher leadership or ruling elite. And he explicitly discounts the need to penetrate beyond the ideological "mystique" into the psychology of the dictator as an individual. Indeed, he describes any attempt to trace the dictator's actions "to caprice, to paranoia, or some similar deviant personality manifestation" as a "residual category" type of explanation that can and should be avoided, e.g., by the "mystique" hypothesis (*ibid.*, 93).

[18] *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 132, 137.

[19] *Behemoth*, 366, 469.

[20] In "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship," Franz Neumann found five essential factors in the modern totalitarian dictatorship: a police state, concentration of power, a monopolistic state party, totalitarian social controls, and reliance upon terror (*The Democratic and Authoritarian State* [Glencoe 1957], 244-45). In 1953 C. J. Friedrich proposed the following five features: an official ideology, a single mass party ("usually under a single leader"), a near-complete monopoly of control of all means of effective armed combat, similar control of all means of mass communication, and a system of terroristic police control (*Totalitarianism*, 52-53). In *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (pp. 9-10) a sixth feature—central control and direction of the economy—was added to the "syndrome."

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Mussolini, Hitler, and probably Stalin too were "the actual rulers of their respective countries," and they conclude that the totalitarian dictator "possesses more nearly absolute power than any previous type of political leader."[21] Much earlier Sigmund Neumann described the dictator as the "moving spirit" of the total state, and Arendt writes of "the absolute and unsurpassed concentration of power in the hands of a single man" who sits in the center of the movement "as the motor that swings it into motion."[22]

But "chief cogwheel" would have expressed more accurately the way in which she and others among the theorists actually seem to conceive the dictator's role. She ascribes to the Leader's lieutenants the view that he is "the simple consequence of this type of organization; he is needed, not as a person but as a function, and as such he is indispensable to the movement."[23] This also seems to be Arendt's own view, arising out of the general conception of the totalitarian system as a mechanistic leviathan operating under pressure of its own system-needs and the "supersense." Thus she depicts the all-powerful dictator as essentially a chief executive whose role is to bind the totalitarian system together into a unity and, by assuming blanket responsibility for everything done in the name of the regime, to relieve all the lesser functionaries of any sense of individual responsibility for their actions. Hitlers, as it were, are needed by totalitarian states in order to enable Eichmanns and others to perform their genocidal and like deeds in good conscience. The system-needs remain basic, according to this way of thinking; *Führers* are functional requisites of totalitarianism as a peculiar kind of system.

"Not as a person but as a function"—this phrase takes us to the heart of an issue that particularly needs pursuing. We cannot say that the dictator is missing from the model of the totalitarian state that has been elaborated. But he is present in it rather as a function than as a person. This helps to explain why the theorists, while taking cognizance of the dictator, accord him no more than secondary importance in the theory of totalitarianism. He is seen as fulfilling certain needs of the system, which of course he does. But the system, or its politics, is not in turn seen as fulfilling certain personal needs of his. Insofar as the theorists take a psychological view of him at all, they see him simply as sharing with the rest of the leadership the postulated

[21] *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 17, 18, 26.

[22] *Permanent Revolution*, 43; *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 361, 392.

[23] *Ibid.*, 374. She writes further that "the Leader is irreplaceable because the whole complicated structure of the movement would lose its *raison d'être* without his commands" (*ibid.*, 362).

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supersense or totalitarian mystique. The assumption of a generalized ideological fanaticism takes the place of psychological analysis of the dictator as an individual personality. His political motivations consequently are not really appraised in psychological terms; his manner of displacing "private affects" upon "public objects" remains outside the purview of the theory of totalitarianism. And this, in my view, is a very great deficiency of the theory.

III

A sense of the theoretical inadequacy of the conception of totalitarianism seems to have been growing in American political science in the 1960's. Increasingly the complaint is heard that this construct is too narrow and limited to serve as a useful basic category for comparative analysis of contemporary one-party systems. It leaves out of view the nationalist single-party systems that share very many significant characteristics with the Fascist and Communist systems. It does not fare well in the face of the recent growth of diversity among Communist systems themselves. Furthermore, the politics of post-Stalin Russia have become more and more difficult to analyze in terms of the theory of totalitarianism, the fall of Khrushchev being only one in a long series of events that do not easily find places in the model of a totalitarian polity; and efforts to modify the model so that it will fit contemporary Soviet communism—e.g., by introducing the idea of a "rationalist totalitarianism"—seem of little avail. And owing to the tendency to see totalitarian systems as examples of what might be called government without politics, with a unitary elite controlling an atomized population by organization and terror, the theory of totalitarianism has obstructed rather than facilitated awareness of the intra-elite politics of factional conflict and policy debates that rage constantly behind the scenes of the Soviet and other Communist systems, despite their official pretensions to monolithic unity and their claims that factions are forbidden. For these and other reasons, some students of the comparative politics of modern authoritarianism have become dissatisfied with the concept of totalitarianism and have begun to formulate alternative basic categories, such as "movement-regimes," "mobilization systems," and the like.[24]

[24] For the concept of a "rationalist totalitarianism," see Z. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," *American Political Science Review*, L (September 1956), 751-63. Examples of recent criticisms of the concept of totalitarianism are A. J. Groth, "The 'Isms' in Totalitarianism," *ibid.*, LVIII (December 1964), 888-901; and this writer's "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *ibid.*, LV (June 1961), 281-89.

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But are we now to discard the concept of totalitarianism as an obsolete or obsolescent category in modern political science? Considering it an essential part of our theoretical equipment, I for one would not like to see this happen. In order to prevent it from happening, however, it appears necessary to carry out a more radical critique of the theory of totalitarianism than has yet been made, rather as medicine may have to resort to a more radical form of treatment in order to save a patient. So far criticism has concentrated upon the deficiencies of the theory in application to systems or situations that were not in view or in existence at the time the theory was devised. The more radical critique must address itself to a different question: How valid was the theory as a representation of political reality in the two historical cases that it was particularly devised to explain—Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia? The time is now especially propitious for pursuing this question, since we have far more documentary and other information on the two cases than was available in earlier years. Here the question will be considered only in the aspect relating to the role of the dictator in the system.

When we confront the theoretical model of a totalitarian polity with what we now know about the factual situation in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, it appears that the model was seriously deficient in its omission of the personal factor from the dynamics of totalitarianism, its obliviousness to the impact of the dictator's personality upon the political system and process. For not only do Hitler and Stalin turn out to have been, as already indicated, autocrats who at many crucial points individually dominated the decision-making process and behavior of their governments. The factual evidence likewise supports the further conclusions that (1) in both instances we have to do with individuals whose personalities would be classified somewhere on the continuum of psychiatric conditions designated as paranoid; and (2) in both instances the needs of the paranoidal personality were a powerful motivating factor in the dictatorial decision-making. The dictator did not, so to speak, confine the expression of his psychopathological needs to his private life while functioning "normally" in his public political capacity. Rather, he found a prime outlet for those needs in political ideology and political activity. In terms of Lasswell's formula, his psychopathological "private affects" were displaced onto "public objects." As a result, the dynamics of totalitarianism in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia were profoundly influenced by the psychodynamics of the totalitarian dictator. The Soviet case is particularly instructive in this

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regard. For while our factual knowledge is less complete, we have here a system that survived the totalitarian dictator and thus some possibility of assessing the impact of his personality by studying the difference that his death made.

Before coming to power Hitler set forth in *Mein Kampf*, with its doctrine about a world-wide Jewish conspiracy to subvert the master race, a private vision of reality showing very strong parallels with psychiatric descriptions of a paranoid delusional system. Subsequently the vision began to be acted out inside Germany in the anti-Jewish terror, of which Hitler himself was the single most powerful driving force. Still later, when World War II was precipitated by the German invasion of Poland in 1939, it was Hitler's furiously insistent determination to (as he put it) "annihilate my enemies" that drove him, in the face of widespread apathy toward war in his own society and even in his own government, to push the world over the brink; and the story of his actions and reactions on the eve and in the uncertain early days of the conflict is like a page out of a case history of paranoia, save that this was likewise a page of world history. During the war the internal terror continued, now on the scale of occupied Europe as a whole. It was Hitler's own will to genocide that generated the relentless pressure under which Himmler's terror machine proceeded during the war to carry out the murder of European Jewry: "Himmler organized the extermination of the Jews, but the man in whose mind so grotesque a plan had been conceived was Hitler. Without Hitler's authority, Himmler, a man solely of subordinate virtues, would never have dared to act on his own."[25]

Stalin's career differed from Hitler's, among other ways, in that he did not come to power as the recognized leader of his own movement but gradually took over from above a movement that had come to power much earlier under other leadership, mainly Lenin's. Certain other differences flowed from this. Whereas Hitler's personal dictatorship was established rather easily through the blood purge of June 1934, which took no more than a few hundred lives, Stalin's arose through the veritable conquest of the Communist Party and Soviet state in the Great Purge of 1936-1938, in which an estimated

[25] Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, 703. On Hitler's hysterical outburst on the eve of the war about annihilating his enemies, see Birger Dahlerus, *The Last Attempt* (London 1948), chap. 6; also Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship*, 301. For a full account of Hitler's actions and reactions during the entire crucial period of the war's beginning, see Bullock, chap. 9, esp. 536-59. Also of interest in this general connection is Ivone Kirkpatrick's account of the psychological motivations underlying Mussolini's decision to embark upon the Abyssinian war (*Mussolini: A Study in Power* [New York 1964], 320).

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five to nine million persons were arrested on charges of participation in an imaginary great anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary conspiracy. In this case the dictator's private vision of reality was not set forth in advance in a bible of the movement, but was woven into the pre-existing Marxist-Leninist ideology during the show trials of 1936-1938, which for Stalin were a dramatization of his conspiracy view of Soviet and contemporary world history. The original party ideology was thus transformed according to Stalin's own dictates into the highly "personalized" new version of Soviet ideology that was expressed in the Moscow trials and in Stalin's *Short Course* of party history published in 1938. Contrary to the above-reviewed theory of totalitarianism, the Great Purge of 1936-1938 was not a product of the needs of Soviet totalitarianism as a system. Apart from the fact that it was only in the course of this purge that the Soviet state finally became a fully totalitarian one, especially in the sense of being the scene of permanent and pervasive terror, we have it now on highest Soviet authority that the purge was extremely dysfunctional for the Soviet state since it greatly weakened the ability of the country to withstand the coming test of total war. Not system-needs but the needs of Stalin, both political and psychopathological, underlay to a decisive degree the terror of 1936-1938.[26]

As in Hitler's case, we see in Stalin's the repetitive pattern, the subsequent reenactment in foreign relations of psychopathological themes and tendencies expressed earlier in the internal sphere. It was mainly in the postwar era of Soviet cold war against the West, against Tito, and so forth, that Stalin's psychological needs and drives found relatively uninhibited outlet in the field of external relations. Contributing factors included, on the one hand, the fact that an older and more deeply disordered Stalin was now less able to exercise restraint save in the face of very grave external danger, and, on the other hand, the capacity of a relatively more strong and less threatened Soviet Union to make its weight felt internationally with a large degree of impunity. We have the testimony of Khrushchev in the 1956 secret report that now "The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions concerning the internal life of the country but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union," and that Stalin "demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness not only in rela-

[26] For a detailed elaboration of this argument, along with an analysis of the ideology of the purge trials in terms of the analogy with a paranoid system, see the introduction to R. C. Tucker and S. F. Cohen, eds., *The Great Purge Trial* (New York 1965). It is significant that the conspiracy themes that Stalin incorporated into the Marxist-Leninist ideology have largely lapsed or subsided in post-Stalin Russia.

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tion to individuals in the U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations." The latter point is illustrated with a vivid recollection of Stalin in 1948 deciding on the break with Tito in a state of blind fury, exclaiming: "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."[27] Other postwar Soviet acts or policies that were influenced, if not directly caused, by Stalin's psychological needs include the imperious demands upon Turkey in 1945; the shutting down of cultural contacts and general isolationism of the 1947-1953 period; the extension of blood purges and show trials to Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe; the suspicion shown toward nationalist revolutions in Asia and elsewhere; and the unprecedentedly extreme Soviet psychological warfare of 1949-1953 against the West as manifested, in particular, in the savage propaganda campaign about alleged American germ warfare in Korea. There was, finally, the extraordinarily significant affair of the Kremlin doctors in January-February 1953, which had a vital bearing upon Soviet foreign policy as well as upon internal affairs. The way in which Stalin's psychopathology found expression in this final episode of his career will be discussed below.

In both Germany and Russia, then, the dictatorial personality exerted its impact originally in ideology and the internal life of the country, and later found a major field of expression in foreign relations as well. The internal impact was felt, among other ways, in the form of terror; the external, in a special sort of aggressiveness that may best be described, perhaps, as an externalization of the terror. In other words, domestic terror, which may be viewed under the aspect of "internal aggression" against elements of the population, was followed by foreign aggression, which may be viewed as a turning of the terror outward upon the world. Parenthetically, since this temporal order of priority was and generally would be conditioned by objective factors in the situation (e.g., the necessity for the dictator to capture complete control of his own society before he can channel his personality needs into foreign policy), there may be a basis for relatively early identification of a rising totalitarian dictator of the type of Stalin or Hitler. This suggests, moreover, that the international community might possibly develop a politics of prevention based on stopping the dictatorial personality at the stage of "internal aggression." However, this would necessitate a modification of the traditional doctrine of non-intervention insofar as it sanctions the unlimited right of a nation-state to deal with its own population as the ruler

[27] Nikita Khrushchev, *Crimes of the Stalin Era* (New York 1956), 48.

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or regime sees fit, provided only that it continues to observe the accepted norms of international law in relations with other states. Upon the willingness and ability of the international community to recognize this problem, and to institute means of preventing individuals of paranoid tendency from gaining or long retaining control of states, may hang the human future. Were Hitler and Stalin, for example, dictators of their respective countries in the 1960's instead of the 1930's, the probability-coefficient of civilization's survival would be very low.[28]

The evidence disclosed by the Stalin and Hitler cases on the connection between dictatorial psychopathology and the politics of totalitarianism strongly suggests that the personal factor should be included in the theoretical model of a totalitarian system. On the basis of the factual record in these cases, as just summarized, the contribution of the dictator's personality to the dynamics of totalitarianism should be recognized as one of the regular and important components in the "syndrome." Such a conclusion appears all the more compelling in view of the extremely heavy emphasis that the theory has placed, as noted earlier, upon pervasive and permanent terror as the very essence of totalitarianism. For in the Soviet and Nazi cases, the dictators themselves, driven by pathological hatred and fear of what they perceived as insidiously conspiratorial enemy forces operating at home and abroad, were responsible to a very significant extent for the totalitarian terror that did in fact exist in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia. The Soviet case is especially instructive since it reflects the relation of Stalin to the Stalinist terror, not only positively in the form of direct evidence of his determining role, but also negatively in the form of the decline of terror that began to be felt almost immediately after his death and has since continued. As late as January-February 1953, it may be said on the basis of the present writer's personal observations in Russia at that time, Soviet society was almost paralyzed with terror as preparations for another great purge developed to the accompaniment of ominous official charges that an

[28] The menace of the paranoid in the nuclear age has been strongly emphasized by Lasswell. Pointing out that "All mankind might be destroyed by a single paranoid in a position of power who could imagine no grander exit than using the globe as a gigantic funeral pyre," he goes on: "Even a modicum of security under present-day conditions calls for the discovery, neutralization and eventual prevention of the paranoid. And this calls for the overhauling of our whole inheritance of social institutions for the purpose of disclosing and eliminating the social factors that create these destructive types" (*Power and Personality* [New York 1948], 184). My own remarks above are meant to suggest that, pending the requisite systematic attack upon the problem, it may be possible to devise interim means of dealing with developing situations of this kind before it is too late.

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anti-Soviet conspiracy, with threads leading to foreign intelligence services, was or had been abroad in the land. Stalin's death at that time not only cut short the purge operation but inaugurated the subsiding of the internal terror that had developed in a wavelike movement of advance and partial retreat ever since his rise to supreme power in 1929. Soviet citizens insistently refer to the subsiding of the terror as perhaps the most significant single expression of change they have experienced in post-Stalin Russia; and most foreign observers and scholars specializing in Soviet studies appear to agree with them on this point. Insofar as terror has continued to exist in post-Stalin Soviet society, it has become, to use Arendt's distinction, terror of the "dictatorial" rather than the "totalitarian" variety.

Given these facts and the premises of the theory of totalitarianism, certain conclusions concerning both Russia and totalitarianism would seem to follow. First, if total terror is the essence of totalitarianism, then a Soviet political system in which such terror has ceased to exist and in which terror generally has greatly subsided over a substantial period of years should be pronounced, at least provisionally, post-totalitarian. Second, if the terror in Hitler's Germany was connected in considerable degree with Hitler as a personality, and that in Stalin's Russia with Stalin as a personality, then the explanations of totalitarian terror in terms of functional requisites of totalitarianism as a system or a general ideological fanaticism in the ruling elite would appear to have been basically erroneous—a conclusion which derives further strength from the fact that the ruling elite in post-Stalin Russia remains committed to the Communist ideology. Third, the theory of totalitarianism should not only bring the dictator and his personality into the "syndrome," but also should give specific recognition to the role of the dictatorial personality in the dynamics of totalitarian terror.

The theory of totalitarianism has not, however, moved in this direction. The indicated critical post-mortem on earlier interpretations of the dynamics of totalitarian terror has not appeared. The evidence from Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia on the relation of the dictator as a terroristic personality to the practice of totalitarian terror, and for such peculiarly totalitarian characteristics of it as its tendency to grow over time, has been generally disregarded. And instead of provisionally pronouncing post-Stalin Russia to be post-totalitarian on the ground that the terror has subsided, some theorists specializing in Soviet studies have taken the very different path of eliminating terror from the definition of totalitarianism. This leads to the thesis

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that what we see in Russia after Stalin is a system of "totalitarianism without terror." Thus Brzezinski, who had earlier viewed terror as the "most universal characteristic" of totalitarianism, writes that we seem to be witnessing the emergence in post-Stalin Russia of a "voluntarist totalitarian system" and that terror must now be seen not as something essential to a totalitarian system but only "as a manifestation of a particular stage in the development of the system." In explanation of this point he states further: "Terror and violence may be necessary to change a primitive, uneducated, and traditional society rapidly. Persuasion, indoctrination, and social control can work more effectively in relatively developed societies."[29]

But such a view of the causation of the terror is open both to the objections already leveled against explanations running in terms of system-needs, and to others in addition. It is debatable, and nowadays increasingly being debated, whether the terrorism of forced collectivization and industrialization in 1929-1933 was a necessity for Soviet communism in achieving its goals of modernization. Such a prominent Communist theorist and politician as Nikolai Bukharin was profoundly convinced that there was no such necessity, and many others in Russia at that time shared his view. Moreover, some Western specialists on Russia and even, apparently, certain people in present-day Soviet Russia are increasingly of the opinion that his view was correct on the whole.[30] But even if we leave this question open, allowing for the possibility that terror and violence were in fact necessities of the modernization process in the Soviet case, the heightened terror by purge that was directed against the Communist Party and Soviet managerial elite between 1934 and 1939 and was mounting again in 1949-1953 cannot be explained by the need to "change a primitive, uneducated, and traditional society rapidly." By 1934 collectivization was a *fait accompli* and generally accepted as such even by the peasantry, the pace and rigors of industrialization had slackened, and there was no serious resistance among the population or within the ruling Party to the continuing process of modernization.

[29] *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York 1962), 80, 88-89. Fainsod, who in the 1953 first edition of his study of Soviet government had called terror the "linchpin of modern totalitarianism," in the 1963 edition revises this sentence to read: "Every totalitarian regime makes some place for terror in its system of controls" (*How Russia Is Ruled*, 2nd edn., 421). See also Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 558-75.

[30] See, for example, "Was Stalin Really Necessary?" in Alec Nove, *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics* (New York 1964). Soviet second thoughts have been expressed, albeit very cautiously, in the form of criticism of unnecessary "excesses" in the implementation of the collectivization policy by Stalin.

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Certainly there was no opposition to it on such a scale that it required to be quelled by terroristic means. And just at this time, when any need for terror and violence for modernization purposes had subsided, a vast new intensification of it occurred on Stalin's initiative and under his personal direction. Moreover, terror rose again in a post-war Soviet Union which, despite the devastation visited upon it by the Second World War, was basically the urbanized and industrialized country that we know in our time. These facts do not square with the thesis that the terror was a manifestation of a particular stage in the development of the Soviet system connected with forced modernization. Nor does this thesis explain why the postulated stage in the development of the system should have lasted as long as Stalin lived and ended with his death or very soon after. In actuality, what this fact and other positive evidence indicate is that the Stalinist terror was in large part an expression of the needs of the dictatorial personality of Stalin, and that these needs continued to generate the terror as long as he lived. In my view, the instinct that originally led the theorists of totalitarianism to treat total terror as belonging to the very essence of this phenomenon was a sound one. But if their insight is to be salvaged, it will be necessary to reckon in a new way with the personal factor in the totalitarian terror and the dynamics of totalitarianism in general.

IV

We seem to be confronted with a resistance to the idea that the personality of the dictator may play a decisive part in the politics of totalitarianism. In conclusion it may be useful to explore its intellectual sources, examining both sides of some issues involved. Such an analysis of underlying issues is all the more pertinent in view of indications that the position taken by various theorists of totalitarianism reflects not simply the views of this school of theory but a rather broad spectrum of thinking among practitioners of contemporary social science. The thinking in question has to do with the influence of personality, and especially psychopathology, in decision-making and action in large-scale organizations, governments in particular.

Social scientists generally reject the "great man" theory of history as obsolete on the ground that historical phenomena are to be explained by social, political, and economic conditions and processes rather than by actions of individual leaders, who themselves are constrained by these conditions and involved in these processes. And many may be inclined to deny a major determining role to the dic-

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tatorial personality in totalitarian systems in part because of a feeling that to do otherwise would mean going back to an outmoded theory of the way in which history is made. However, no such implication follows. We do not face here a choice between explaining history by reference to leader-personalities or assigning them no importance at all. Historical explanation in the social sciences requires multiple approaches and a flexible willingness to vary them in accordance with the nature of the individual problems under consideration. To recognize that the influence of an individual personality on political events may be very great in certain special circumstances—most notably, those obtaining in a totalitarian dictatorship—is not to argue that this is a common phenomenon or that no other factors than the individual personality need be considered even in explaining events in this particular kind of case.

Secondly, some scholars are opposed to highlighting the dictator and his psychological motivations on the specific ground that to do so is to divert attention from the features of the totalitarian system that make it possible for him to act as he does. Objecting, for example, to the attempt to explain Stalin's Great Purge as resulting from the "aberrations of one man," Professor Leonard Schapiro writes, *inter alia*, that such an explanation fails to illuminate "the reasons which enabled one man to impose his will on so many millions."[31] It will hardly be disputed that an explanation of the behavior of a totalitarian dictator should take account of such situational factors as the structure of the political system within which he operates. But it does not follow that psychological explanations should be avoided. The investigator who finds in "aberrations of one man" a major determinant of the actions of a regime need not—and should not—concentrate exclusive attention upon this one determinant to the exclusion of other relevant factors. Nor does the location in the dictator himself of supreme personal responsibility for certain events absolve his associates and subordinates of their share of responsibility for carrying out the instructions that they received from him.

[31] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York 1959), 428-29. Marshall D. Shulman goes farther and questions "how far 'the system' can be absolved of responsibility for Stalinism, whatever may have been the condition of Stalin himself." He continues: "Perhaps 'the system' bore the main brunt of policy formation. It is reasonable to suppose that, even in a dictatorial society, much of what is done in the name of a leader is necessarily the product of a bureaucracy, and may imply any degree of responsibility from his active guidance to his inattention" (*Stalin's Foreign Policy Reconsidered* [Cambridge, Mass., 1963], 261). This is to disregard the factual evidence from post-Stalin Soviet sources, including Khrushchev's secret report, on the actualities of decision-making in Stalin's final years. The evidence may, of course, be incomplete and faulty, but it cannot simply be dismissed.

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We come, finally, to a number of complex issues arising out of what I propose to call the theory of organizational rejection of aberrant personalities from leadership positions. It may be that nobody has ever advanced this theory as a whole. In any event, no formulation of it as a single connected argument has come to my attention, although individual elements of it appear here and there in the contemporary literature of political science. It begins with the proposition that modern society, owing to what has been called the "organizational revolution," has increasingly come to be dominated by large bureaucratic organizations, among which national governments themselves are of foremost importance. It may be recalled in this connection that totalitarian systems have been described as those in which the organizing of social life and the process of bureaucratization have gone farthest of all. Now it is held that the behavior of individuals, including leaders, in the structured social situations obtaining in large bureaucratic organizations is regulated to such a degree by the nature of the patterned roles that they play, the role expectations of others, and what may be called the rules of the game, that the influence of individual personality factors is, if not nullified, at any rate greatly circumscribed. As one political scientist expresses it, referring specifically to foreign policy elites, they operate in bureaucratic social situations and are subject to conditions that "tend to inhibit the impact of personality-oriented pressures." He infers that in dealing with the behavior of nation-states as actors within the international system, "non-logical explanations, while not completely irrelevant, are of little use."[32] Taking a similar position, and again with special reference to officials representing nation-states in international relations, another political scientist writes: "The individuals who represent these entities are constrained by colleagues, decision-making processes, and role expectations."[33]

If the effect of personality-oriented pressures is in general limited by constraints inherent in the structured social situations obtaining in organizations, a logical next step in the argument is to hold that individuals with serious emotional disorders will be even less likely than well-integrated personalities to express personality-oriented pressures in organization action. For such disorders will normally inca-

[32] Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics*, XVI (October 1961), 105. "Non-logical explanations" are here defined as those referring to unconscious psychological pressures in the decision-making individuals.

[33] Morton A. Kaplan, "Old Realities and New Myths," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 359.

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pacitate individuals from successful leadership careers in the big bureaucratic organizations, since these persons will lack the stamina, the ability to work cooperatively with others, the trust in others, and so forth, which such leadership demands. And if, in the exceptional case, such an individual comes close to the pinnacle of decision-making power, counterpressures are generated within the organization that will greatly limit or even nullify his influence.[34] And such considerations may well seem applicable to totalitarian as well as other organizational settings. Moreover, it has been suggested that the peculiarly trying conditions of political life at the upper levels of a totalitarian state create an added obstacle to success of individuals with personality disorders. "So intense and continuous are the anxieties in a garrison-police state," writes Harold Lasswell, "that it is reasonable to suggest that only personalities who are basically integrated can endure. They must be in sufficient control of themselves to avoid over-suspiciousness, or they cannot identify confederates upon whom they can rely for common purposes."[35] Elsewhere Lasswell hypothesizes that while "anxiety-ridden persons" may be suitable for lower administrative niches in totalitarian systems, those in the top elite must have "relatively few internal conflicts" and be "comparatively free to make realistic appraisals of the environment," so that "It is probable that *a basically healthy personality is essential to survive the perpetual uncertainties of political life.*"[36]

The argumentation just outlined has merit; the question is, how much? Does it, in particular, warrant a conclusion that individuals with strong paranoid tendencies should not be expected to achieve and retain positions of supreme power in totalitarian movements and

[34] This is one of the themes, for example, of Arnold Rogow's important study of the career of James Forrestal as an instance of an emotionally disturbed personality rising close to the pinnacle of power. Rogow writes that beyond a certain point counterpressures were generated inside the military establishment that Forrestal headed: "As Forrestal's behavior became more and more tense, he was consulted less by his associates and involved less in decisions." As part of the explanation for this, Rogow states: "Bureaucracies, whether governmental, corporate, or academic, do not welcome in their ranks those who are odd, deviant, or excessively nonconformist in behavior, and the military bureaucracy was no exception" (*James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* [New York 1963], 350).

[35] "Political Constitution and Character," *Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review*, XLVI, No. 4 (Winter 1960), 16.

[36] "The Selective Effect of Personality on Political Participation," in R. Christie and M. Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe 1964), 223. See also in this volume the essay by E. A. Shils, who argues that American "nativist leaders," generally characterized by "strong paranoid tendencies," are unable to develop "the flexible self-control required to build the administrative machinery in their organizations" and for this and other personality-associated reasons have had a "hard row to hoe" (*ibid.*, 46).

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systems? I do not believe that it does. For the considerations that have been adduced here must be balanced against a series of countervailing considerations that appear to outweigh them. The countervailing considerations have to do with organizations, personality, and their interrelationships.

First, it seems inadvisable to discuss the problem on the plane of organization or bureaucracy in general. For distinctions between different sorts of organizations are quite important in assessing the likelihood that a given personality type or trait will be resisted, particularly if the type or trait falls in the category of psychopathology. We must distinguish, for example, between organizations that *are* bureaucracies, such as civil services, and organizations that merely *have* them, such as political parties. For psychological characteristics that might be a decided hindrance to success in the professional bureaucracy might be much less so, might in fact be a help, in a non-bureaucratic organizational milieu. Thus a Hitler would in all probability not have had a successful career in the *Reichsbank* under Hitler, who early in life rebelled against his father's wish that he become a civil servant and lacked many qualities requisite to success as one; but Hitler himself functioned in the very different organizational medium of the National Socialist movement and, later, of the higher Nazi leadership. Again, we must differentiate organizations in terms of their relative militance or non-militance, recognizing that at one extreme we find among political organizations some that are so militant in aim and outlook, so committed to political and psychological warfare as a mode of activity, that they may accurately be called "fighting organizations." Various revolutionary and extremist organizations would be cases in point—and cases that need to be considered because, as historical experience shows, under certain circumstances they achieve political power and furnish the leadership of modern states. Much of what has been said about organizational rejection of aberrant personalities is not applicable to organizations falling in this special category. Indeed, some of the very psychological characteristics that might tend to incapacitate an individual for a major role in other kinds of organizations may be potent qualifications for leadership of a fighting organization.

This organizational milieu is, in particular, favorable for the emergence in leadership positions of individuals of a type that may be called the "warfare personality." Hitler and Stalin were examples who also happened to be, in their respective ways, men of outstanding leadership ability. The warfare personality shows paranoid char-

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acteristics as psychiatrically defined,[37] but what is essential from the standpoint of this discussion is that it represents a *political* personality type. The characteristically paranoid perception of the world as an arena of deadly hostilities being conducted conspiratorially by an insidious and implacable enemy against the self finds highly systematized expression in terms of political and ideological symbols that are widely understood and accepted in the given social milieu. Through a special and radical form of displacement of private affects upon public objects, this world-image is politicalized. In the resulting vision of reality, both attacker and intended victim are projected on the scale of large human collectivities. Consequently, in proclaiming the imperative need to fight back against an enveloping conspiratorial menace, the warfare personality identifies the enemy not as simply his own but as the society's and, in particular, the organization's. His particular vision of reality may therefore furnish potent ideological inspiration for a fighting organization, especially at a time of acute social malaise and crisis when conspiracy-centered outlooks show a certain plausibility and have an appeal to very many in the membership of the organization and in its wider social constituency. There is thus a possible close "fit" between the needs of a fighting organization *qua* organization for militant orientation and leadership, and the needs of a warfare personality *qua* personality for a leadership role and a life of unremitting struggle against enemies. Paradoxically, the very enemy-fixation that would help incapacitate the individual for leadership of most other organizations is here the key to the confluence of organizational and personal needs.

There are other ways too in which psychopathological tendencies may prove highly "functional" for the warfare personality, both on the road to power in a fighting organization and also in his possible subsequent position as political ruler in a system of totalitarian character. Especially noteworthy is an extraordinary capacity for self-dramatization and self-deception. The presence of this quality in Hitler's personality has been mentioned above. We see it also in Stalin, and it appears to be a basic attribute of the warfare personality who is sufficiently gifted to qualify as a totalitarian dictator. He shows an

[37] The official handbook of the American Psychiatric Association describes paranoia as "characterized by an intricate, complex, and slowly developing paranoid system, often logically elaborated after a false interpretation of an actual occurrence," and adds: "The paranoid system is particularly isolated from much of the normal stream of consciousness, without hallucinations and with relative intactness and preservation of the remainder of the personality, in spite of a chronic and prolonged course" (*Mental Disorders* [Washington, D. C., 1952], 28).

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outstanding ability, as it were, to project *mein Kampf* as *unser Kampf*, to pass himself off as merely the spearhead of the endangered group's resistance in a country-wide and ultimately world-wide struggle against the conspiratorial menace (however the latter is defined). What enables him to be so convincing in this capacity is his self-dramatization, which in turn is serious rather than playful. He carries conviction because he has conviction. He is like an actor who lives his role while in the process of playing it, with the difference that he rarely if ever stops playing it. He is—if the cases of both Hitler and Stalin as subsequently documented are indicative—extremely egocentric as a personality, yet able to project himself with signal success as utterly group-centered, as a person for whom self is nothing and the organization or the movement or the system is all; and he can do this because he himself is so persuaded of the fact, being the first to believe in himself in his own role. He thus appears, but deceptively, as a peculiarly selfless prisoner of an abstract "ideological supersense" or "totalitarian mystique." The psychological reality is much more complex. We may, then, hypothesize that a capacity for what may be called sincere simulation, for effective masking of his own psychological needs as those of the organization or system, is a characteristic of the totalitarian dictator as a personality type. And it may be in part for this reason that scholarly students of totalitarianism have, as argued earlier here, unduly emphasized "system-needs" as motivating forces of totalitarianism and left out of account the impact of the needs of the dictatorial personality. They too have been deceived by him.

In the career of a totalitarian dictator a time may come, of course, when his vision of reality loses its persuasive power within the leadership of the movement, when he can no longer successfully project his psychological needs as needs of the system, when simulation fails. This is what appears to have happened toward the close of Stalin's life, and it is one of the reasons why his case is so extraordinarily instructive for theoretical analysis. Owing to his psychological rigidity on the one hand and postwar changes in objective conditions of the Soviet state on the other, a rift opened up in his last years between his policy views and those held by others in the inner circle of top leaders. By about 1949 the Soviet state could no longer really be said to exist in a hostile external environment, and even the world beyond the limits of the great new surrounding belt of Communist-dominated states remained dangerously hostile only insofar as Soviet acts and attitudes served to sustain the prevalent fear, suspicion, and unfriendliness. To some forces high in the leadership it appeared that these new circumstances permitted,

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and Soviet interests dictated, a diplomacy of international *détente* in the cold war. In presenting this view to Stalin, they apparently argued that the old "capitalist encirclement" was a thing of the past now that the USSR had a "socialist borderland" composed of friendly states.[38] However, Stalin, who for psychological reasons was obsessed with the omnipresence of "enemies" and convinced of the need to press the cold war in perpetuity, saw a diplomacy of *détente* as criminal folly, and relaxation of East-West tension, save on a momentary tactical basis, as out of the question.

In rejecting the *détente* policy, he put forward the psychologically very significant argument that the ideological postulate of a hostile capitalist encirclement must not be understood in "geographical" but rather in "political" terms, meaning that Soviet Russia must be seen as ringed with hatred and hostility even under the new circumstances when she had a "socialist borderland." And largely in order to demonstrate graphically that the hostile capitalist encirclement "still exists and operates," as the Soviet press put it at the time, he staged in the last year of his life the affair of the Kremlin doctors, which must be seen not simply as an "internal affair" but in its connection with Stalin's foreign policy. Analysis of this final (and probably fatal) episode in Stalin's political career shows that he was using the alleged Anglo-American-Jewish conspiracy for medical murder of Soviet leaders as a telling *riposte* against the high-level Soviet advocates of relaxation of international tension, and also as a basis for getting rid of these men and others with a new blood purge. The doctors' trial, which was apparently about to start at the very moment when Stalin providentially became "gravely ill," was to have dramatized—as the propaganda buildup for it in January-February 1953 showed—the continuing hostile machinations of what Stalin saw as a diabolical external enemy whose agents were operating internally in Russia, and even in the Kremlin, in the guise, for example, of Soviet doctors. All talk of a decrease of international tension, of improving relations with adversaries, would thus be exposed as a political absurdity. This interpretation of the affair is, incidentally, supported by Khrushchev's statement in the 1956 secret speech that Stalin, after distributing protocols of the doctors' confessions to members of the Politburo, told them: "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen without me? The country will perish because you do not know how to recognize

[38] For a public formulation of reasoning to this effect, see, in particular, the beginning of Malenkov's address of November 6, 1949 (*Pravda*, November 7, 1949).

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enemies."[39] Stalin's politics of the "doctors' plot" were politics of paranoia. They represented the desperate effort of an aged warfare personality to continue acting out his private vision of reality and his bellicosity in the politics of his regime at a time when the vision had lost its credibility among the dictator's own entourage and the bellicosity endangered the system and all its beneficiaries.

If Stalin, as seems quite possible, was finally put out of the way so as to cut short the politics of paranoia on which he was engaged, this could be taken as evidence that even a totalitarian political organization has certain powers and a tendency to resist an aberrant personality in the role of dictator. But it would seem more reasonable to conclude that the developments toward the close of Stalin's life show how fearfully weak these powers and this tendency can be. If action was taken against him, this happened only at the eleventh hour when the very lives of those who took the action were immediately and unmistakably endangered by his further survival. It speaks against, rather than for, the theory of organizational rejection of aberrant personalities, in application to the totalitarian leader, that an aged dictator who had lost much of his erstwhile vigor and flexibility, who no longer (as was the case in the 1930's) had the advantage of being able to deceive likely victims as to his intentions, and whose psychopathological symptoms were flagrantly apparent to those around him, nevertheless managed to carry through to the final stage his preparations for a violent purge of—among others—close associates. From this viewpoint, the cases of both Stalin and Hitler emphasize a failure of the theory of organizational rejection to consider to what extent a totalitarian dictator may be able to emancipate himself from those very constraints, decision-making processes, structured situations, and role expectations that the theory treats as operative in governments generally. The point easily overlooked is that structured situations can be restructured, role expectations confounded, and roles themselves decisively remolded to fit the needs of the dictatorial personality.

By subordinating the terror machine directly to himself, as both Stalin and Hitler managed to do, by using it to terrorize associates as well as citizens at large, and by various other devices, a dictator, particularly if he is still sufficiently young and vigorous, may be able personally to dominate decisions and policy to an extraordinary degree in the organizational setting of totalitarianism. Not least among the

[39] *Crimes of the Stalin Era*, S49. The evidence for the interpretation that has been offered here of the division over foreign policy at the close of Stalin's lifetime, and of the political meaning of the affair of the Kremlin doctors, has been presented in greater detail and with documentation in my *Soviet Political Mind* (New York 1963), chap. 2.

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means of nullifying institutional constraints is deliberate disorganization of higher decision-making bodies. In speaking, for example, of the personal character of Hitler's decision in August 1939 to attack Poland, Bullock points out that by then there was no longer in operation any supreme organ of government that might have organizationally constrained Hitler's power of making one-man decisions: "No Cabinet had now met for two years past, and anything that could be called a German Government had ceased to exist."[40] Stalin too, in his last years, disorganized the higher decision-making machinery of the Soviet Communist Party as a means of keeping himself in a position to decide important questions on his own. Plenary sessions of the Party's Central Committee were no longer convened after 1947 or 1948, and the normal functioning of the Politburo appears to have terminated in early 1949. Policy problems were assigned to powerless *ad hoc* Politburo commissions variously called "quintets," "sextets," "septets," and so forth, with the result, according to Khrushchev, that the work of the Politburo itself was disorganized and some members were kept away from participation in reaching decisions on the most important state matters. One of the members, Voroshilov, was usually excluded from the occasional meetings of the Politburo that occurred because of Stalin's suspicion that he was a British agent.[41]

The foregoing considerations do not speak in favor of the theory of organizational rejection of aberrant personalities from leadership positions in totalitarian movements and systems. An individual who might be psychologically disqualified for successful leadership in very many large-scale organizations need not be so in the very special context of a fighting organization, in which his very psychopathology may be "functional" for leadership purposes. And insofar as the personality disorder would in other ways be a serious handicap to the individual in the social role of supreme leader in a totalitarian system, this incapacitating effect would show up more strongly in his later years, when autocratic power may already be securely in his grasp, than in the critically important earlier years when he comes to power. We may recall in this connection that Stalin had emerged as Soviet supreme leader by 1929, when he entered his fiftieth year; that Hitler turned

[40] *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, 548. A similar view is presented by H. R. Trevor-Roper, who writes also that Nazi Germany's leading politicians "were not a government but a court—a court as negligible in its power of ruling, as incalculable in its capacity for intrigue, as any oriental sultanate" (*The Last Days of Hitler* [New York 1947], 1).

[41] This description of the situation under Stalin is based on Khrushchev, *Crimes of the Stalin Era*, S61-S62. See also the note by Boris Nicolaevsky, *ibid.*, S61.

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fifty as his power approached its zenith in 1938; and that Mussolini, much earlier, had become the head of the Italian government at the age of thirty-nine. Finally, we need to bear in mind that the bureaucratization of modern and especially of totalitarian society can foster as well as hinder the impact of personality. In particular, given a situation in which a warfare personality has managed, despite all obstacles, to climb to autocratic power in a totalitarian system, the very bureaucratic machinery that might resist personality-oriented pressures at lower levels may transmit them with terrifying results when they come from the very top. The bureaucratic organizations of the system then may become a conduit of the dictatorial psychopathology, so many machines for effectuating his will, serving his emotional needs, and acting out his private vision of reality.

For various reasons the repetition of this pattern, especially in modern states of major importance, may not be very likely at present. Organizational resistances are not, after all, negligible. Experience with totalitarian dictators is itself a force working against repetition, particularly in the countries that had the experience. Soviet leaders, for example, maintain that measures have been taken in the political system of the USSR to prevent a recurrence of uninhibited personal rule on the order of Stalin's and the kinds of "errors" associated with it; and the fall of Khrushchev is only the most convincing of a long series of indications that the Soviet dictatorship after Stalin has not again become an autocracy. Moreover, it may be that the combination of outstanding leadership talent with the full range of psychological characteristics that mark the potential totalitarian dictator as a personality type is an extreme rarity in modern societies. But even if it should follow from these and other considerations that the phenomenon with which we have been concerned here would only occur in the rare exceptional case, the conclusion would not be a very happy one. For we live in a time when even a single case may be one too many. One thing that political scientists can usefully do under these circumstances is to improve our understanding of the totalitarian dictator as a personality type, and of the personal element in the dynamics of totalitarianism.

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THE STYLES OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT

Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann

By CHARLES D. TARLTON

I

BECAUSE of heightened involvement of the United States in world affairs during the period between the Spanish-American War and World War I, American political thought expanded to include the dimension of international politics. In the process three different styles of thought emerged. Each style was equipped with its characteristic view of the nature of international politics, the nature and role of war, views of human nature, a method of social and political analysis, and proposals for dealing with the problems of world politics.

One was deterministic, pessimistic, and realistic. It viewed man from the point of view of his limitations, and politics from the point of view of power and force. The second was utopian, optimistic, and moralistic. It tended to emphasize the role of morality in politics, and to stress the perfectibility of man. It sought to achieve a world without war, a political "heaven on earth." It was soft-hearted and democratic, and, if the first style was sometimes crusty and cranky, this second style was not infrequently naïve and platitudinous.

The third style was pragmatic, sociological, and almost scientific in its approach. It was neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic. It put its faith in knowledge and analysis, recognizing the role of power in political life, but tempering that awareness with concern for the equally important ethical and emotional dimensions of politics.

The existence of these three styles simultaneously in American thought has, in part, reflected the fluctuations in American international relations. The Deterministic style was conservative and tough-minded. From Theodore Roosevelt to John Foster Dulles it has, on and off, held sway in American life. The Utopian style was reform-oriented, reflecting in large part a basic populism frequently recurring in American politics. From Woodrow Wilson to the Women's March for Peace, Utopianism has been characteristic of a large part of American attitudes toward world affairs. Pragmatism in world affairs has only recently assumed major proportions in American foreign affairs. John

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F. Kennedy, William Fulbright, and Adlai Stevenson have recently given expression to this style of thinking about international politics.

The purpose of this essay is to develop the major dimensions of these three styles of thought by examination of the writings of early, model proponents. It will deal in detail with the international political thought of three men—Alfred Thayer Mahan, William Jennings Bryan, and Walter Lippmann. A hypothesis can be suggested, however, which might put the bulk of this essay into better perspective. The initial American response to involvement in world affairs was largely either positive or negative. One was either for or against it, either internationalist or isolationist. Soon, however, among those who accepted involvement there grew up two further alternative attitudes. One was either for preparedness and expansion or for pacificism and against imperialism. After a time, and after Americans grew more used to the realities of world affairs, there appeared a more careful, more problem-oriented posture.

In recent years the first two responses have waned, while the third, the "pragmatic" approach, taking hold in a period of growing complexity and imperativeness of American foreign affairs, has tended to command the greater acceptance among scholars and statesmen. The ascendance of pragmatism in American theories of world politics can be explained by the fact (which it is hoped this essay will suggest) of its inherent superiority and "realism." The pragmatic style is modern. It makes an effort to tap the resources of modern social knowledge in its treatment of world politics. It avoids the extremes of both moralism and militarism.

II

Alfred Thayer Mahan was characteristically disposed to view politics in terms of force, whose efficacy was qualified only by inexorable natural and moral laws. The most conspicuous feature of social life, for Mahan, was the pervasiveness of physical force. The units of social organization always existed in a competitive relation, from which struggle and conflict necessarily derived. Among nations this struggle was particularly acute.

International conflict was determined by rules and laws whose application was unavoidable. In Darwinian terms these were laws of survival. Only the fittest nations could successfully sustain themselves in the constant grappling. Fitness was measured in terms of national strength. This national strength was characteristically viewed,

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by Mahan, in military terms. It depended, in turn, on the moral and martial fiber of the population.

Important to any overall assessment of Mahan's international political ideas is the military "prepossession" which permeates his writings.[1] Mahan was a military man. He admits to a certain repugnance toward discussions whose central purpose was the diminution of a profession with which his life had been identified. "I have been conscious," he wrote, "and seek ever to bear in mind that professional prepossession cannot but constitute in me a bias, against which I must be continually on guard, in viewing the origin and progress of the various attempts to substitute other processes for the attainment of the objects which hitherto have been effected largely by war; the study of which, with the consequent absorption of military sympathies, has been the principal engagement of my life experience."[2]

Characteristic also of Mahan's approach to political life was his insistence that a military regimen provided virtues necessary to maintain civil life. Universal military service could render the nation many benefits beyond those of military strength: "Is it nothing, in an age when authority is weakening and restraints are loosening, that the youth of a nation passes through a school in which order, obedience, and reverence are learned, where the body is systematically developed, where ideals of self-surrender, of courage, of manhood, are inculcated, necessarily, because fundamental conditions of military success?"[3] Military life and the bias of the military man go some way in accounting for Mahan's ideas. Himself a naval officer, born at West Point where his father taught, and dedicated to a career on the sea, his ideas about the necessity of increased naval strength and his characterization of the warlike condition of the world are logically conformable with his character and background.

(a) INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS

An overview of Mahan's image of the international arena would show the modern nations of Western Europe and the United States locked in a vital and endless economic struggle intensified by political and military problems, the slow but more and more evident emergence

[1] The most important of Mahan's writings on international affairs are contained in the following of his books: *The Problem of Asia* (Boston 1900); *Retrospect and Prospect* (Boston 1903); *Some Neglected Aspects of War* (Boston 1907); *The Interest of America in International Conditions* (London 1910); *Armaments and Arbitration* (New York and London 1912); *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston 1897, 1918); and *Lessons of the War with Spain* (Boston 1898-1899, 1918).

[2] Mahan, *Armaments and Arbitration*, 38.

[3] Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, 232.

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of the civilizations of the East and the other "backward" areas, a gradual shrinking of the world through advances in communication and transportation, and, giving a similar hue to all the tones of the painting, the underlying "power" relations, the "struggle among forces."

The relations among the powers of the world were characterized, for Mahan, by a deep and "ominous" restlessness. Borders, frontiers, and seacoasts became points of exposure and potential danger. The world was one of "struggle and vicissitude." "All around us now is strife; 'the struggle of life,' 'the race of life,' are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others."[4]

Mahan often viewed the nations as struggling "economic corporations," each striving for economic victory. The markets of the world, the resources of Africa, Latin America, and the Far East tempted the nations of Europe, and the competition which resulted was filled with danger for the nation not capable of sustaining itself in the race. The expansion of national boundaries, the extension of national influence abroad, and all the other manifestations of international conflict reflected this underlying economic struggle. The world of international affairs was dominated by a "simple contest of forces, determined by considerations of conflicting national interests."[5] Each nation, in attempting to get as much as possible from the finite supply of the world's wealth, was locked with every other nation in a struggle over the very stuff of national life. The stakes in this struggle were high; the ability of the nation to compete successfully was essential; and the lengths to which the nation would go in the struggle were almost without limit. The struggle was founded upon force, and force could manifest itself in many ways, not the least important or frequent of which was international war.

The condition of international affairs partly resulted from human nature. Attempts to eliminate violence from international affairs failed to take this into account. Man's following of self-interest led to permanent conflict. The natural laws of selection had resulted in inequalities among all things. Among the nations differences of capacity, population, wealth, opportunity, virility, and determination led to economic dissatisfaction and dissension. The nations struggled to maintain or to better their position in the world. The less a nation

[4] *Ibid.*, 18.
[5] Mahan, *The Interest of America in International Conditions*, 89.

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had, the more apt it was to exert itself in extreme ways. The more a nation had, the more danger there was that it would slip into complacency and enter upon the path to its downfall.

(b) WAR AND POLITICS

Within the general context of Mahan's political thought, the merging of war and politics played a significant role. International politics was characteristically analyzed in terms of tactic and strategy. Political success or failure in the international context turned on questions of strategic judgment. International politics was subject to the same principles of analysis as warfare itself. Areas of protection and vulnerability, advantages of position, lines of supply, access to resources, and other military concepts loomed large in the political vocabulary. In international relations every nation faced the possibility of defeat or victory. Diplomacy was but the settlement of problems related to these considerations.

War was an essential element in the growth and development of modern civilization. In the struggles and conflict which characterize world politics, war played a political role of no small dimension. According to Mahan: "The progress of the world from age to age, in its everchanging manifestations, is a great political drama, possessing a unity, doubtless, in its general development, but in which, as act follows act, one situation alone can engage, at one time, the attention of the actors. Of this drama war is simply a violent and tumultuous political incident."[6]

Closely related to the connection between war and politics in Mahan's thought was the role assigned to force in the ordering and maintenance of all social and legal arrangements. Efforts to substitute other processes for force were both unnatural and undesirable. Interestingly enough, Mahan pointed out, the chief arguments against war depended upon the substitution of law for force in international relations. Such a position seemed illusory to him, and he considered it futile to ignore force, even in discussions of law and justice: "Law itself, which its extreme advocates desire to see installed in place of war, is, in the last analysis, simply force regulated—a most desirable end—but inadequate for the very reason that it is only one manifestation of a power which is manifold in its exhibition. Not only does law for its efficacy depend upon force, as is shown by the entire paraphernalia of justice from the single policeman to the final court of appeal, but under law and within law force continually controls."[7]

[6] Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, 171.
[7] Mahan, *Armaments and Arbitration*, 106.

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Mahan emphasized force in all his analyses of politics and law. The efficacy (or rather the lack of it) of international law required a world power, either legislature or police, to enforce it. Law, of itself, was inadequate for the regulation of human affairs, especially in the international arena. What was needed was force, organized force, in the form of political institutions and coercive power.

The work of diplomats in discussing and solving problems among nations was always backed by force. Successful diplomacy would be impossible if a nation did not possess the capacity to back up its demands and rights.[8] Of the various manifestations of force in international relations, the final arbiter and the most extreme application was war. In this sense, war was for Mahan a normal and necessary incident of diplomacy and of the relations of states in general.

(c) WAR, MORALITY, PRACTICALITY, AND CHRIST

Mahan's writings on the topic of war evidences a serious concern in finding justifications for war as a legitimate and useful tool in the achieving of human goals. Thus, in three essays gathered together under the title *Some Neglected Aspects of War*, his concern was with its moral, practical, and Christian aspects. War was morally justified on the basis of the inviolability of national conscience and the existence of moral truths. It was practically justifiable because there was no workable alternative. It was justified from the Christian standpoint because violence exercised in the pursuit of righteousness is safely within the limits of Christian virtue.

The Moral Aspect of War. In the relations among nations war stood, for Mahan, as an essentially moral element. Being at bottom but one expression of organized force, it was the last resort of the morally imperiled nation. The nation which, in conscience, felt morally insulted or morally threatened must fight; the ignoring of one's own conscience, whether by the individual man or by the nation, was many times over more immoral than fighting.

The ethics which Mahan brought to this discussion stressed the issue of conscience. Whatever the individual believed in conscience to be right carried with it the moral obligation to act in its behalf. Whether right or wrong in an objective sense, once the conscience was committed moral obligation ensued.

Although the principle of conscience and the moral obligation to obey it even in violation of duly constituted law was a revolutionary

[8] For a detailed discussion of the various applications of force in diplomacy, see his *Armaments and Arbitration*, especially chap. 3, "Navies as International Factors."

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doctrine within political society, in the anarchy which Mahan saw in the international arena it carried no such revolutionary connotations. In a world dominated by force and the aggressiveness of nations, the conscience of the nation provides a moral justification for war. The nations were moral agents, for Mahan, and their responsibilities to the consciences of their population were total and complete: "Even if mistaken, the moral wrong of acting against conviction works a deeper injury to the man, and to his kind, than can the merely material disasters that may follow upon obedience. Even the material evils of war are less than the moral evil of compliance with wrong."[9]

War, then, could be the means of fulfilling a moral obligation on the part of the nation. It became the extreme expression of the nation's commitment to morality. "A state, when it goes to war," Mahan insisted, "should not do so to test the rightfulness of its claims, but because, being convinced in its conscience of that rightfulness, no other means of overcoming evil remains."[10]

Further, in the international system there was no force capable of compelling the nations to submit to law or court decisions even if they were conceivable. The nation-states were sovereign, and the exercise of the moral responsibility of sovereignty determined the worth of the nation and tested the fiber of its population.

The point of Mahan's elaborate discussion of morality, both individual and national, was to provide a basis for criticism of the movement for compulsory arbitration. The plan to get all nations to agree to arbitrate potentially dangerous international issues represented, for Mahan, an understandable attempt to solve the problem of "unnecessary wars" on the one hand, but, on the other, it posed a danger to the morality of nations. It would deprive the nations of their moral responsibility to make decisions in conscience. Both practically and morally this was undesirable.

In the first place, Mahan argued, the nations were not likely to adopt any such approach. Although states were certainly disposed to avoid war when possible and to look to an impartial judge to determine many questions, ". . . there is an absolute indisposition, an instinctive revolt, against signing away, beforehand, the national conscience, by a promise that any other arbiter than itself shall be accepted in questions of the future, the import of which cannot yet be discerned."[11]

In the second place, to do so would be morally evil. The state had retained the power of making moral decisions for itself. It could never

[9] *Ibid.*, 31. [10] *Ibid.*, 30. [11] *Ibid.*, 34.

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abandon that responsibility. No tribunal, "however solemnly constituted, [can] liberate a state from its obligation to do right. . . ."[12]

The Practical Aspect of War. "The practical aspect of war . . . ," Mahan wrote, "is that it is a means, possibly crude and partial in operation, but for which as yet no satisfactory alternative has been devised, whereby a nation enforces a claim to what it considers essential interest or national honor."[13]

In the competitive, restless international system, nations were in a continual process of acquiring material gains, expanding their territory and, in the process, running counter to the interests and activities of other nations. This contact produced disputes, disagreements, potential and actual conflicts. The sources of these disputes were translated into the national interests and national honor of the countries involved. This for Mahan was an important consideration. Out of the real economic, political, social, racial, and geographic interests of the nations were derived their rights.

This situation had a relation to the internal operation of the economic, political, and social activities of the individual nation. The disputes which arose in industry, in finance, and in other parts of the economy were real. They were regulated, however, within the nation, by the organized force of the national or other governments, and by the law and the enforcement of law which existed there. In the international situation no such system of regulation existed. The disputes which occurred in international politics could not be readily settled by appeals to law, to justice, or to the police. In international politics there is no corresponding means of keeping law or order.

Mahan saw the lack of international authority or international law as part of the practical justification of war. If, he seemed to say, there were a suitable set of international rules, clearly defined and agreed to by all the nations and enforced by an adequate authority, then war as a means of settling international disagreements would dwindle through disuse. But he was careful to stress that "at present" no such development seemed likely. "Law, strictly so called, presupposes a law-maker; and for international law the law-maker has not yet come into existence."[14] Thus the only seriously recognized practical alternative to war as a method for settling international disputes was relegated to the limbo of an unsure future, when a world law-maker would come into existence.

Moreover, as a natural phenomenon, war was closely related to the facts and forces of international political life. It derived from the

[12] *Ibid.*, 39. [13] *Ibid.*, 64. [14] *Ibid.*, 59.

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instincts of human nature, from the intensity of international conflicts, and from the advantages which accrue to the victor in war. In the processes of continual adjustment and readjustment which characterized the life of the nations, war was a very natural form of regulation. In Mahan's view: "War is the regulator and adjuster of those movements of the peoples, which in their tendencies and outcome constitute history. These are natural forces, which from their origin and power are self-existent and independent in relation to man."[15] War, too, was the expression, in the face of the problems which arose in international affairs, of the force that underlay all social organization and life. All organized force was, to a degree, war, and "upon organized force the world so far has progressed and still progresses."[16]

War from the Christian Standpoint. The capstone of Mahan's attempt to defend war as a necessary and desirable aspect of international politics involved justifying it within the context of Christian doctrine. In the face of what he called "an uneasy feeling that War, because of the painful incidents attending it, cannot in any way or in any degree be reconciled with the profession and practice of Christianity,"[17] Mahan set out, by means of an exploration of Scripture, to show that war as a means of dealing with evil was entirely allowed by the teachings of Christ.

Essentially Mahan's answer turned on the distinction between war as potentially or necessarily evil. "Christianity deplores War as *an* evil," he argued; "it does not, as exemplified by its highest exponents, reject it as necessarily evil."[18] Thus, depending upon the objectives for which war was waged, it could be regarded as morally sound and religiously useful.

Mahan's defense of war in the context of religious principles depended to no little extent upon a conception of human nature which emphasized its baseness. War in Mahan's mind was a method of remedying the evilness of man: "This feeling, that War is irreconciliable with Christianity, if it becomes conviction, rejects implicitly the proposition that War is remedial; for so far as this proposition is true, viz., that War is a remedy for greater evils, especially moral evils, War is justified. War, in short, is justified as an element of human progress, necessitated by a condition of mankind obviously far removed from Christian perfection, and, because of this imperfection, susceptible of remedy."[19]

In a world in which the inhabitants readily, because of their moral

[15] *Ibid.*, 92. [16] *Ibid.*, 89. [17] *Ibid.*, 97.
[18] *Ibid.*, 98. [19] *Ibid.*, 99.

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condition, inflicted wickedness upon one another, war served as a means of controlling evil. War, in fact, was but the result of bringing physical force to bear on the existence of evil. War, in these circumstances was righteous and justified, even by the principles of the church. Further, it was morally natural and "evidently a law of progress, however we explain its origin; whether that be in the ordinance of God, or in the imperfection of man."[20]

(d) NATIONALISM AND CIVILIZATION

In simple terms, Mahan considered the nation the chief source of material and spiritual progress in Western civilization. He considered the struggle among the nations as conducive to the preservation of virility and strength in the Western world, and continual struggle as the source of the strength necessary to preserve that civilization from the expansion of the civilizations of the East.

The modern nation-state was, for Mahan, the most significant element in the progress of Western civilization in the post-medieval period. It represented one of the great steps in human social organization which moved the world away from the attempts at world domination characteristic of both the Roman Empire and the Papal expansion. Nationalism had "played [a] great and beneficent part in the history of European civilization for the past four hundred years."[21]

Competition among the various nations produced material progress in much the same way as competition among individuals led to a betterment of the race and a raising of social standards. The struggle for survival among the nations bred a better and stronger national type. The sense of "personal incentive" was as necessary in international relations as it was within an individual society.

To interfere with the elements which accounted for the strength of European civilization would be to court disaster. The races of the non-European world represented a threat to Mahan. He predicted their eventual triumph over Western civilization and argued that the moral and cultural obligation of the West was to keep itself virile and militant in order to hold back for as long as possible the inevitable triumph of the East. Christianity, he thought, must be preserved, and it could be preserved only if the West remained strong long enough to pass on its religion to the rising barbarisms of the backward parts of the world.

If the threat posed by the East could be dealt with only by the preservation of warlike qualities in the West, these in turn could be preserved

[20] *Ibid.*, 114.

[21] *Ibid.*, 1.

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only through the competition of nations, through "occasional" war. "In the rivalries of nations, in the accentuations of differences, in the conflict of ambitions, lies the preservation of the martial spirit, which alone is capable of coping finally with the destructive forces that from outside and from within threaten to submerge all the centuries have gained."[22]

What was best in the future of man would be found, not in dreams of universal harmony or peace, but rather in continual competition and conflict among nations. War and the warlike fiber it built into nations were the best hope of Western civilization. Only by preserving its ability to employ force for the achievement of its ends could Western society hope to continue in existence. And only by fighting among themselves could the Western nations hope to preserve their collective ability to use that force.

III

Silver versus Gold, Banker versus Farmer, War versus Peace, Love versus Hate, God versus the Devil (and Darwin, one might add)—these were the divisions of Bryan's world, and his side in the battle was always clear and utterly moral in nature. Thus any analysis of Bryan's ideas about the nature of world politics, the causes of war, its prevention, and the chances of peace must keep constantly in mind the totality of his social views. Bryan was a prophet, a golden-tongued prophet, enlisted in the cause of Good and Right. This was as true with respect to his international ideas as to his domestic ones.

The dimensions of Bryan's international thought were not imposing. Because of this, any analysis of that thought can be limited to a few ideas. He took for granted or ignored many of the factors other men might think most important in international relations. He spent no time in his writings and speeches with the problem of the complexity of the international order, the difficulties and techniques of political success, or the human characteristics which might make war at least partially a natural phenomenon.

War was to be done away with by the moral, intellectual, and democratic uplifting of the world. The force of human love would be injected into international politics and would, in combination with a complicated arrangement of international treaties of arbitration, remove the opportunities and the propensities that nations have to make war on other nations. If killing was evil, then the moral condemnation

[22] Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, 122.

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of war was easy. If man was moral, then by simply having pointed out to him the error of his ways he would be persuaded to cease killing. For Bryan, killing was indeed evil, and man certainly moral.

The details of Bryan's thought about international affairs can be examined under the following topics: (1) the evils of imperialism, (2) the causes of war, (3) the necessary bases of world peace, (4) the Thirty Treaties, and (5) the role of force in schemes for peace.

(a) THE EVILS OF IMPERIALISM

For Bryan, imperialism was the extension of political control by one people over another without their consent. It was immoral within the context of the democratic ethic, and it violated the principles upon which the government of the United States was founded and which held out the greatest promise for the world's future. Democracy, peace, and progress were all inextricably bound up in Bryan's mind, and imperialism stood as a moral and practical threat to all three.

". . . the real question," he wrote, "is whether we can, in one hemisphere, develop the theory that governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed, and at the same time inaugurate, support and defend in the other hemisphere a government which derives its authority entirely from superior force."[23] Again, "Wars of conquest have their origin in covetousness, and the history of the human race has been written in characters of blood because rulers have looked with longing eyes upon the lands of others."[24] Or, "Imperialism might expand the nation's territory, but it would contract the nation's purpose. It is not a step forward toward a broader destiny; it is a step backward, toward the narrow views of kings and emperors."[25]

The democratic principles of American life were the principles of the Declaration of Independence and, most importantly, the idea that all just government rests on the consent of the governed. That imperialism violated this principle was not open to question for Bryan. Rule by military governors, the suppression of independence movements, and the economic exploitation of the Philippine Islands were denials of democracy.

Part of Bryan's deep resentment of the drift toward imperialism was directly related to the major issues which he crusaded for in domestic politics. The issue of the gold standard had as its counterpart in the international sphere the issue of imperialism. The monied classes, ship-builders, and exploiters were behind both: "Imperialism finds its

[23] William J. Bryan, *Republic or Empire?* (Chicago 1899), 19.
[24] *Ibid.*, 26.
[25] *Ibid.*, 27.

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inspiration in dollars, not in duty. It is not our duty to burden our people with increased taxes in order to give a few speculators an opportunity for exploitation; it is not our duty to sacrifice the best blood of our nation in tropical jungles in an attempt to stifle the very sentiments which have given vitality to American institutions. . . ."[26]

The glittering phrases in which the imperialists couched their appeals seemed brazen and cynical to Bryan. The mission of America, the "white man's burden," "manifest destiny," and "the spread of Christianity" were, to him, attempts to exploit the American people, to pull over their eyes a veil of forgery and deceit. In attacking Secretary Gage's espousal of the slogan "Philanthropy and five-percent," Bryan contended that "The one chloroforms the conscience of the conqueror and the other picks the pocket of the conquered."[27] More strongly condemning imperialist practices, he said in a Jackson Day Speech in Chicago in 1899: "Shame upon the logic which locks up the petty offender and enthrones grand larceny. Have the people returned to the worship of the Golden Calf? Have they made unto themselves a new commandment consistent with the spirit of conquest and the lust for empire? Is 'thou shalt not steal upon a small scale' to be substituted for the law of Moses?"[28]

Many who desired imperial expansion or who saw in it the fulfillment of manifest destiny argued that the low level of development in the Philippines and the incapacity of its people for self-government made United States tutelage there mandatory. David Starr Jordan had argued, of course, that because the Filipinos were incapable of self-government, the United States should get out as soon as possible anyway. Bryan's democratic faith would permit of no such resolution. To him the situation was clear. "We are told that the Filipinos are not capable of self-government; that has a familiar ring. Only two years ago I heard the same argument made against a very respectable minority of the people of this country. The money lenders, who coerced borrowers, did it upon that theory; the employers who coerced their employees did it for the same reason. Self-government is a constant education; the capacity for self-government increases with participation in government."[29] The same principles of democratic faith, the same sense of concern for the underdog which Bryan's morality expressed in domestic politics in regard to the plight of the farmer and the laborer, here found expression in connection with the Filipinos and their desire for freedom and independence. This is Jeffer-

[26] *Ibid.*, 17. [27] *Ibid.*, 24. [28] *Ibid.*, 25.
[29] *Ibid.*, 24.

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sonianism at its logical best: idealistic and principled, but ignoring major elements of the problem at hand.

Whatever obligations the United States might have in the Philippine archipelago, it was not the obligation to deny it free self-government. The true mission of America was the spread of democracy, and Bryan demanded in the name of that mission the creation of Filipino-controlled democratic institutions: "The American people cannot apply the European and monarchial doctrine of force in the subjugation and government of alien races and at the same time stand forth as defenders of the principles embodied in our Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. A man may lead a double life when only one of his lives is known, but as soon as his duplicity becomes manifest to the world he can lead but one life, and that the worst."[30] The United States had an opportunity, because of its uniqueness, to lead in bringing democracy and peace to the world. To maintain authoritarian control over the Philippines in violation of its principles would be to diminish its effectiveness in this role and to contribute to the putting-off of man's desperate hopes.

(b) THE CAUSES OF WAR

War, for Bryan, was evil. It was a violation of the commandment of God—"Thou shalt not kill." It was bred out of greed and covetousness. ". . . for when we get down to the bottom of war," he said, "we find that back of war is usually the desire to get some material advantage."[31] War was also bred of ignorance, impatience, unreason, moral inadequacies, and the lack of popular control in too many of the governments of the world. The two forces in the world most conducive to war were militarism and imperialism. These, in combination with the inability of the people to combat the war-seekers, resulted in the continual strife of human history.

Bryan's analysis of the sources of war among nations was built upon an oversimplification. Nations and men were equated in questions of behavior, motivation, and moral responsibility and evaluation. There was, he felt, no difference between the image of a man committing aggression and the image of a nation doing so (and it could be added that he saw no difference on the score of just why the aggression was committed). Nations, for Bryan, were but large groups of men, subject to the same principles and the same laws: ". . . and I

[30] *Ibid.*, 32.

[31] Bryan, "The Forces That Make for Peace," *World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series*, No. 7, Part III (October 1912), 19.

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know no way of judging nations except to apply to nations the rules that we apply to individuals. I know of no limitation that can be placed on a moral principle. I know of no moral principle that applies to one human being that does not apply to a group, no matter how large it is."[32]

Naturally, then, when Bryan came to the task of identifying the reasons for war, he looked to the same kind of factors one would look to in explaining a fight between two men. A quarrel between nations was war in Bryan's terms. Whatever could lead to a quarrel among men could lead to a quarrel among nations. And the question of who was right or wrong was the same between nations as between men. Most generally it would be, in Bryan's mind, a matter of temporary loss of reason, an irrational, passionate argument erupting into a fight. In any case it was wrong, either for men or for nations; the more evil for nations because of the large numbers of people killed or made unhappy.

More circumstantially, Bryan insisted that militarism and preparedness led directly to war. A large army, then, was one of the major causes of war, as was a large navy. In reply to men like Roosevelt or Mahan, Bryan condemned the concept of preparedness. He blamed the movement for increased national armaments, especially for a larger navy, on the ambitions of military men and "ship-builders." The demand for a large navy was not moral, for Bryan, because the navy was desired in order to collect foreign debts, to frighten the rest of the world, or simply to make war. None of these were important to the people, but merely the concerns of particular interests—foreign investors and militarists.

Once the interests in military development were aroused, he argued, a spiral effect occurred, with each nation in turn increasing its strength as they perceived others doing so. The eventual outcome could only be one of two things: either the nations would bankrupt themselves in the expenditure of large sums of public money for an unproductive and unnecessary burden such as a navy; or the armaments produced in such large quantities would certainly be used. The outcome of large military establishments was that they eventually were used to fight. "Now that is the race of the world, my friends,—that is the mad race of the world."[33]

[32] *Ibid.*, 9.

[33] *Ibid.*, 11.

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(c) "THE FORCES THAT MAKE FOR PEACE"

The forces behind the peace movement were, for Bryan, "universal, . . . continuous in their operation . . . and irresistible."[34] That the movement would someday be successful was a belief which Bryan predicated upon these characteristics of the forces behind it. In addition, these "forces" were buttressed by faith: "Those who believe in the coming of the day when nations shall not rise up against nations and when peoples shall learn war no more,—those who look forward to the coming of this day have faith, and they have something for the faith to rest upon."[35]

Bryan's "faith" in this great day coming was founded upon three developments in international life: the peace of the world would be guaranteed by intellectual, moral, and democratic progress the world over. Everywhere Bryan saw evidences of a growing intellectual development. Schools and education were growing by leaps and bounds. The upshot of this intellectual development was an unfettering of men's minds which must necessarily lead to peace. "Now if it be true," he wrote, "that everywhere there is intellectual progress, if it be true that everywhere the minds of men are becoming unfettered, if it be true that everywhere people are rising intellectually and taking a larger survey of their relations to the world, it must necessarily follow that with this intellectual growth there must come a greater demand for peace; for, the more intelligent a man is, the more clearly he discerns that might cannot make right, the more clearly he discerns that no moral question can be settled by force. . . . The best force, therefore, that makes for peace is the world's intellectual progress."[36] This comment illustrates clearly Bryan's penchant for the simple solution. War is simply stupid, and once mankind is elevated to a high enough intellectual level it will cease to exist. One looks in vain for a sense of analytical sophistication.

Further, the coming of the day of peace was foreshadowed by the growth of democracy. ". . . the progress of the world toward popular government . . . is just as marked and just as universal as the progress of the world in education. In this world-wide and continuous contest between aristocracy and democracy, democracy is gaining and aristocracy is dying; and with this growth of popular government there must necessarily come the discouragement of war."[37] Until "now," Bryan was saying, kings had engaged in wars for private reasons, and although the burden of paying and dying was upon the masses, they

[34] *Ibid.*, 3. [35] *Ibid.*, 4. [36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, 5.

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had no avenue of protest. Democracy would provide that access and the people of every country would revolt against war.

Lastly, Bryan identified the moral progress of mankind as a force working toward the disappearance of war. He called attention to the growth throughout the world of altruism, selflessness, and generosity. This moral growth was bringing with it a new sense of brotherhood among men of all nations. The churches were gaining in membership, the shelves of libraries were filling up with books on the "application of religion to life." This, he prophesied, would lead inevitably to the end of war.

But more basically, Bryan's prediction of peace, and his directions for taking the right road to it, depended upon the concept of "love." Tolstoy, Merle Curti maintains, influenced Bryan in this direction and instilled in him a belief in the power of love among men as a necessary basis of peace. In Bryan's words, ". . . permanent peace must be founded in justice, and justice is impossible without the full recognition of our relations and duties to others and the full performance of them. This depends upon a realization of the brotherhood of man, an appreciation of the value of love of life, the prevalence of love among the peoples of all countries. Permanent peace and justice depend upon the manifestation of love in all hearts, so that we would be horrified at the thought of the taking of life by the people of one country at war with the people of another."[38]

Human behavior was simple and utterly predictable. Supply the moral refurbishing, for Bryan, and the end of war was imminent. That such a characterization of Bryan's thought is true is amply demonstrated by the following statement, which he made to the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration in 1910: "I believe that this nation could stand before the world today and tell the world that it did not believe in war, that it did not believe that it was the right way to settle disputes, that it had no disputes that it was not willing to submit to the judgment of the world. If this nation did that, it not only would not be attacked by any other nation on the earth, but it would become the supreme power in the world."[39] War was an aberration for Bryan, a deviation from the path of true virtue and Christianity.

[38] Bryan, "The Path to Peace," *Independent*, LXI (1906), 487; quoted in Merle Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," *Smith College Studies in History*, XVI (April 1-July 1, 1931), 135.

[39] Bryan, "The Forces That Make for Peace," 12.

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(d) THE THIRTY TREATIES

Of Bryan's contributions to the peace movement in the United States, the most characteristically utopian was his support of "cooling-off" treaties. They represented his belief in the ability of men to avoid war once the light of cool reason was applied, and illustrated his faith in the powers of public opinion to stay the aggressive attitudes of political leaders.[40]

Bryan's idea, simply stated, was to negotiate and have every other nation negotiate bilateral arbitration treaties covering all issues which might arise between the two nations concerned. Each treaty would create a commission to handle the arbitration and there would be a mandatory period of inaction pending settlement of the questions involved. Thus, these "cooling-off" treaties would provide a period of time in which tempers could calm down and the facts of the case could come more readily to light. "I am not afraid of war after investigation," Bryan said; "I am afraid of war before investigation. I am not afraid of war deliberately entered into: I am afraid of war commenced in passion, the war that is undertaken because something has been done that arouses resentment and before the peace forces of a nation have a chance to be felt and heard."[41]

At the American Conference of the Interparliamentary Union, Bryan defended the treaties by pointing out what he thought to be their three major advantages. The first was their investigatory aspect. Investigation would help to separate the facts from the "honor" involved. Just this simple, objective determination of what was *really* involved in a quarrel between nations would make the "chances . . . 100 to 1 that you can settle both the fact and the question of honor without war."[42]

The second advantage of the treaties was that they provided "time for calm consideration." Thought, reflection, and deliberation would allow men and nations to overcome their passions. Once a period of thoughtful analysis had begun, the conscience of the nations could come to the top and settle or help settle the issue.

The last advantage which Bryan listed was that such treaties would allow "public opinion" to come into full operation. Given Bryan's views of the morality and wisdom of the "common man," this advantage must have been of considerable importance to him. Once the people were involved in the settlement of a question which might

[40] Curti, chap. 2.
[41] Bryan, "The Forces That Make for Peace," 14.
[42] Bryan, *Speeches*, II, 226ff.; quoted in Curti, 146.

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lead to war, the power of popular antagonism to war would dictate peaceful settlement.

(e) FORCE AND PEACE

In Bryan's scheme of things, force and peace were totally incompatible. The conscience and morality of mankind ought to be the objects toward which peace appeals were made; non-resistance, an idea Bryan got from Tolstoy, was a suitable avenue to peace. The use of force to achieve peace was self-contradictory. The world had been at war many times in the cause of peace, but nonetheless at war. The solution to the problem was, for Bryan, to be found in the creation and release of the conscience of mankind. Christian brotherhood and love were the alternatives to war. In this light Bryan attacked the preparedness movement, the League to Enforce Peace, and later the Covenant of the League of Nations. In his view, to employ military power in the maintenance of peace was futile, in the sense that it ignored the major problem, which was the inculcation into international affairs of love, duty, brotherhood, democracy, intelligence, and morality.[43]

Bryan was close to the idea that more reasonable and permanent solutions to international antagonisms were necessary when he denied the effectiveness and the desirability of forcing peace upon the world. He could not make himself go further to formulate the need for finding the real causes of war, those causes rooted in the human personality, in the nature of human associations and their relations. But this was true to form. In domestic politics Bryan's "populist" mentality prevented him from seeing the nature of the problems which were upsetting his beloved agrarian life and preventing the realization of the dreams of labor and agriculture. The evil bogies of the trusts, Wall Street, and international financial conspiracies found counterparts in the munition-makers and ship-builders. In both cases reform was demanded. But in both cases that reform was moralistic, unrealistic and, unfortunately, futile.

IV

Optimism and a recognition of the complexity of social questions were complementary themes in Walter Lippmann's early political thought. The optimism was evident in his repeated insistence that political problems, national and international, were solvable through

[43] Curti, 223-25, 248, 249.

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the application of human ingenuity. A realization of complexity qualified his optimism and resulted in a denial of the possibility of simple solutions. Social arrangements, he felt, especially political ones, ought to be the product of imaginative experimentation and pragmatic progressivism.

To solve the problems of political life in the twentieth century, Lippmann argued that a forward-looking and thoroughly modern set of political values was necessary. "We cannot expect to meet our political problems with a few inherited ideas, uncriticized assumptions, a foggy vocabulary, and a machine philosophy. Our political thinking needs the infusion of contemporary insights."[44] But the newness of the problems, the complexity of the factors involved, and even the seriousness of the consequences attached to failure should not discourage us from trying. In the solution of social problems, although many factors and conditions were inevitable, nothing was entirely determined. "There is always some choice," Lippmann insisted, "some opportunity for human direction."[45]

The complexity of political matters, an optimism about human ability to deal with them, and the recognition of a variety of opinions as to what the issues were and how to solve them were synthesized in Lippmann's practical insistence that even halfway solutions were better than none. If the complexity of political life meant that we did not have all the answers, the solution rested in the application of existing knowledge so as to allow for later improvement. The importance of doing something now overrode the fact that all the answers were not known: "We cannot wait in politics for any completed theoretical discussion of its method: it is a monstrous demand."[46] There must be action, courageous action. "Experience itself will reveal our mistakes; research and criticism may convert them into wisdom. But we must act, and act as if we knew the nature of man and proposed to satisfy his needs."[47]

Lippmann defended the experimental method and the acceptance of less-than-final solutions because "there is no prospect of a time when our life will be immutably fixed. . . . We shall, therefore, have to go on inventing."[48] What was required in social science was a way of going about the solution of problems, a "method" rather than the discovery of any final solution. "Politics is not concerned with prescribing the ultimate qualities of life. When it tries to do so by

[44] Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics* (New York and London 1914), 29.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid.*, 88.
[47] *Ibid.*, 84.
[48] *Ibid.*, 56.

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sumptuary legislation, nothing but mischief is involved. Its business is to provide opportunities, not to announce ultimate values."[49]

As Lippmann applied his views of social problems and social reform to the arena of world affairs, he developed an outlook on world politics which, for purposes of analysis, can fruitfully be viewed in terms of the following four components. First was a view of the nature of nationalism and of the factors which make antagonism among nations so easy. Second was his interpretation of the causes of imperialism and its role in precipitating war. Third was a prescription for dealing with what he argued were the causes of war. And fourth was his discussion of the long-range problems facing the world in the twentieth century, including the question of eventual world government and the elimination of conflict through the application of education to the conduct of foreign affairs.

(a) NATIONAL SEPARATISM AND WORLD CONFLICT

"A frontier is necessary to organized fighting."[50] With this statement Lippmann presented in capsule form his view that division, territorial and ideological, was the ideal condition for war. Where group pressures intersected, or where class divisions overlapped political divisions, all-out fighting was made difficult. For war to break out, antagonism had to meet with little argument and across their frontiers those engaged in the fighting had to look with fear, ignorance, and hatred. "That is why governments can indulge in supreme violence. The opponent is an alien, and the territorial division is as strategically perfect as diplomacy can make it. Two nations don't have to 'break' as a family does; they are already 'broken' and proud of it. . . . The more perfect the spiritual division of the two nations the better is their military morale."[51]

In world politics the conditions of separation were ideally fulfilled, primarily owing to the separatism implicit in the nation-state and the simple kinds of identification which the individual could make with it. People accepted patriotism and eulogized their own nation largely out of ignorance of the rest of the world, but also because in the nation were found satisfactions of the most basic and primitive of human instincts. Irrational though they might be, certain human needs were genuinely satisfied by identification with the nation.

[49] *Ibid.*, 152-53.
[50] Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York 1915, 1932), 39.
[51] *Ibid.*, 39-40.

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Nationality was "at bottom a cluster of primitive feelings, absorbed into a man and rooted within him long before conscious education begins."[52] So basic were these feelings of attachment that when they were questioned, as were the feelings of German-Americans over the question of their homeland's war guilt, the national roots of these people were challenged and they were left without "the basis of assurance." The individual German hyphenate became an "interloper in the world."[53] Thwarted nationality was a "kind of homelessness upon the planet, a homelessness which houses of brick can obscure but never remedy."[54]

In the nation-state, patriotism destroyed objective thinking about foreign affairs which would have tended to diminish the effects of separatism. "When we deal with a foreign people," Lippmann wrote, "our passion is not diluted by opposition. . . . Ideas which are agreed to by everyone we know, ideas which are sanctioned by all the authorities we have ever followed, are sovereign ideas. . . . To disagree with them, then, is to attack us, to deny our right to sovereignty."[55]

The nation, then, provided a symbol of authority and security, in which the basic needs of the human being were fulfilled. The individual obtained a sense of identification and purpose through his membership in the nation-state, and in the primitive associations found the basic security to which men reverted in times of stress. Nationalism, or patriotism (the words were used interchangeably by Lippmann), was the attachment of the individual to ideas and impressions which gave him strength and meaning in a confused world. To such symbols everybody was attached, and because the units which receive this sentiment were separated physically and culturally, the world was cursed with a separatism, dangerous because of its irrationality and because it was compounded and confused with economic issues.

(b) IMPERIALISM AND WAR

Imperialism, the exploitation of the "backward" areas of the world, represented for Lippmann a natural, even necessary, activity. But when compounded with the political chaos of the backward areas and the irrationality of patriotism and "national honor," it was a chief factor in the causes of modern warfare. Imperialistic competition led to national conflict, Lippmann believed, and patriotism intensified the conflict and projected it into war.

As modern industrialism sought new markets and new sources of

[52] *Ibid.*, 60. [53] *Ibid.*, 62. [54] *Ibid.*, 62-63.
[55] *Ibid.*, 53.

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raw materials, traders and concessionaires entered the backward areas. These areas were undeveloped and lacked political efficiency. They were essentially lawless regions where men from the Western world competed economically. When trouble arose, these areas were not capable of maintaining order and of protecting the interests of the foreign residents. Thus, appeal was always made to the home nation, in the name of national honor, national interest, and patriotism. "The flag follows trade" was then brought into play as a convenient slogan by which to justify the taking of action by the mother nation to protect the interests of her citizens abroad. When more than one nation became involved, the result was international tension and the probability of war. "The anarchy in the country furnishes not only a justification but a pretext, too, and some kind of intervention takes place."[56]

Some such series of events, Lippmann argued, was at the bottom of the causes of World War I. Europe was fighting not for any particular privilege in the Balkans or in Africa, but because "Europe had been divided into two groups which clashed again and again over the organization of the backward states of the world."[57] Each clash between European nations involved considerations of prestige and honor. "Each question involved the standing of the Powers, each question was a test of relative strength."[58] Diplomatic victory or defeat and the inflation or deflation of the national ego became more important than any concrete issues. "The struggle had hardened the governing mind to a point where stubborn insistence and uninventive appeals for peace were all that was left. The mind of Europe collapsed. The appeal to arms was the result of that criminal recklessness which decides to hack its way through when no other solution presents itself to the mind."[59]

"The chief, the overwhelming problem of diplomacy seems to be the weak state—the Balkans, the African sultanates, Turkey, China, and Latin America. . . ."[60] For Lippmann it was these areas, combining "natural resources, cheap labor, markets, defenseless, corrupt and inefficient government,"[61] that were the major sources of national irritation which led to war. Because these areas were so weak, political imperialism had accompanied economic imperialism and become points of friction over which the national interests of European countries clashed.

When the nations encountered one another in these areas, the populace at home retreated into its primitive patriotism. The issues of inter-

[56] *Ibid.*, 162. [57] *Ibid.*, 124. [58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*, 125. [60] *Ibid.*, 87. [61] *Ibid.*, 93.

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national politics were never faced. The "stakes of diplomacy," the wealth of the backward areas, were never openly recognized as issues in the quarrel. What was thought to be involved was national pride, a reaction on the part of a militant people to insult or derision. Colonies, trade concessions, and other imperialistic activities were interpreted by the people as "our trade" or "our colonies," and they wanted to see "our business men" make wealth in these areas. The same impulse which made an American traveling in Tibet delight in the sight of an American-made sewing machine made these patriotic citizens react strongly to interference with nationals abroad. National pride overpowered the intellect, and the average man ignored the fact that only a few of his countrymen gained from overseas exploitation. He saw in it only a source of national pride, of his nationals outdoing other nationals.

When the issue hardened into real conflict, the citizen was critical of the diplomat who would compromise national honor. Fear and hatred rose in the home populace and war was demanded. The foe was looked upon as mysterious, as alien and untrustworthy. War was waged out of a sense of personal injury.

(c) SOLVING THE PROBLEM

On the surface Lippmann's solution to the problem seemed simple. Given the nature of patriotism and the condition of the backward areas, it was necessary, he argued, to alter the unit to which patriotic sentiment attaches and to provide efficient political control of the backward areas. This could be accomplished by the creation of regional authorities to provide government for those areas. Education of public opinion in the true nature of the "stakes of diplomacy" would encourage interest in and allegiance to these units of government and prepare the way for the eventual internationalization of world politics.

The tension arising from conditions in the backward areas of the world, in which "the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife," was the "world problem upon which all schemes for arbitration, leagues of peace, reduction of armaments must prove themselves."[62] With this consideration in mind, Lippmann recommended the creation of world conferences, commissions, or other organizations of a permanent nature. "The important point is that there should be in existence permanent international commissions to deal with those spots of the earth where world crises originate."[63] In

[62] *Ibid.*, 127.

[63] *Ibid.*, 135.

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his view, there should be several such commissions—one for each of the trouble spots of the world. They should be independent of the nations involved in the struggle there. They would provide effective political authorities to which people involved in these areas could appeal. They would provide laws and law enforcement. They would create order and security out of chaos and confusion. By affording real solutions to the problems in the backward areas, they would attract the interest and allegiance of the powerful economic groups concerned with the development of the resources of these areas.

Lippmann defended his plan as being "not over-ambitious." He felt that "It represents an advance along the line that governments, driven by necessity, have been taking of their own accord. What makes it especially plausible is that it grasps the real problems of diplomacy, that it provides not a panacea but a method and the beginning of a technique. It is internationalism, not spread thin as a Parliament of Man, but sharply limited to those areas of friction where internationalism is most obviously needed."[64]

Important economic interests were the stuff of effective government. The formation of the United States and the adoption of the Constitution provided Lippmann with a useful analogy. The condition of the United States in 1789 was not unlike that of the backward areas in the twentieth century. Order and security were needed. But behind the movement for order were the important economic interests of the country, without which that order would not have been achieved. "These unifying economic interests are the forces which any state-builder has to rely upon. If enough powerful people can be given a stake in the union, a true basis for it has been laid."[65] When individuals had such a stake in the union they developed an allegiance to it, they became "patriots of the union."[66] The task of anyone proposing the creation of supranational governments was "to attach enough loyalty to the immature World State to enable it to weather the inevitable attacks."[67]

Lippmann was concerned with political problems of the first order. He sought an answer to a basic question of all political organization: how do you instill the loyalty and attachment necessary for success in the creation of a government? To this question he responded with a mixture of Madisonian practicality and Freudian sophistication. Control of economic interests and a concern for psychological drives and instincts characterized his approach. Loyalty was created by laying the foundation for economic involvement and by removing, through

[64] *Ibid.* [65] *Ibid.*, 183. [66] *Ibid.*, 184. [67] *Ibid.*

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greater international contacts and communication, the ignorance and fear which turned patriotism into xenophobia. The effect of the creation of these regional authorities under international control would be to "blur frontiers, to diminish the sense of sovereignty, and weaken separatism."[68] The creation of "regularized" commerce in the backward areas would result in greater and greater exchange of ideas and opinions. The seclusion and insulation of the nation-state would be weakened as individuals came into contact with other individuals in a climate of cooperation and peace. Criticism and discussion would destroy the egoism of nationalism and the result would be a general lessening of tension the world over. When tension was thus reduced, and when the incidences of conflict became fewer and fewer, then the conditions necessary for dealing with the greater international problems would exist.

(d) MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS

Like nearly every American liberal, Lippmann was concerned with the problems of modern life in a world of nation-states. He prognosticated the eventual decline of the nation-state, its supersession by larger, more inclusive units, and the democratization of world relations through the education of public opinion in the ways of world politics.

Criticizing schemes for arbitration and disarmament as ignoring the real sources of world problems, Lippmann was quick to identify himself with plans for world government and a peaceful millennium. He was critical, however, of unreasoned plans, and concerned himself more with the obstacles to such a utopia and with the solution of the problems that those obstacles involved. He was realistic in his determination to find the real causes of political problems and then apply human reason and ingenuity to their solution.

Speaking of the dream of a Federation of the World, with a Parliament of Man, World Police, World Courts, and World Officials, he maintained that "it is a valiant dream which will be realized if this planet is to fulfill man's best hopes."[69] He recognized its difficulties, though, and tried to supply approaches for overcoming them.

The Hague Plan he criticized because it "lacks the essentials of government—legislative and executive power."[70] The concept of a world state he thought too ambitious for the time. Nationalism was a powerful sentiment and the nations of the world were permanent and strong entities unlikely to expire or to welcome world control. In addition there was the problem of the probably justified fear that

[68] *Ibid.*, 189. [69] *Ibid.*, 143. [70] *Ibid.*, 144.

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world government would be "overbearing." The powerful nations of the world would undoubtedly provide the basis for any world government, and they would, at least for a time, run it in their own interests. A total relinquishment of sovereignty and independence was not a realistic request. The groundwork for such a development must be carefully laid—in the creation of world interests, in the slow erosion of individual national separation, and in the enlargement of the sphere of political loyalty.

In Lippmann's view, the erosion of national sovereignty and separatism would come from the popularizing of diplomacy. "By increasing the number of people concerned in diplomacy, publicity, criticism, and discussion must follow. From them education. The realities of diplomacy which are to-day hidden under a cloud of ambiguous phrases and primitive emotion will be revealed. The false unity of nationalism will be superseded by complex facts about which men will differ and argue. And because people differ, their sense of sovereignty must diminish; their isolation behind frontiers must disappear. Agreements and disagreements will cross frontiers. Men will discover that they are more in sympathy with a group in some foreign country than with some of their own fellow-citizens. Politics will no longer cease at the water's edge, and nations will no longer be able to face each other as irritable monarchs. . . . The real effect of democracy on foreign affairs will be to make them no longer foreign. For democracy brings out the real alignment of classes and interests."[71]

The creation of real interests in world government would have the effect of creating world patriotism. The lack of world-wide interest in supranational governments was due to the fact that until recently the nation-state was the only real source of protection. "The reason we are not loyal to mankind in general or to The Hague or to internationalism is that these conceptions are cold and abstract beside the warmth of the country and place where we were born."[72]

Loyalty could extend beyond national borders. Canadians and Australians had a place in their hearts for the English Monarch. The nature of the modern world, its interrelatedness and interdependence, had produced a situation in which a movement toward world patriotism was not at all unlikely. "In other words, loyalty overflowed the nation-state because in the world today the nation-state was no longer a sufficient protection."[73] Isolation terrified people in the modern world. "They want to be members of a stronger group."[74] Lippmann recognized that patriotism was not a fixed quantity. It could be ex-

[71] *Ibid.*, 194-95. [72] *Ibid.*, 172. [73] *Ibid.*, 173-74. [74] *Ibid.*, 174.

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tended to larger units. Not only could it be extended, but it was crying for extension.

The use of political machinery in the engineering of a world organization demanded this common loyalty. It would be impossible to create an effective organization of mankind prior to the emergence of a sense of world community, of world loyalty. Just as this was so, it was also true that such loyalty would not spring from a vacuum. Plans for world government must prove themselves. They must provide the real protections and the necessary points of identification. This was the best defense of Lippmann's suggested regional, trial governments. They would, if successful, operate to remove the doubts which people had about the fairness and justice of international government. They would go a long way in the creation of favorable public attitudes toward the eventual attainment of a political organization encompassing the whole of humanity. In the organization of the regional commissions he suggested, Lippmann foresaw the "entering wedge of the World State. . . . They offer the best opening, because the least amount of national vanity is involved. . . . If international government can be established in these distant regions, there will begin that whittling away of sovereign pretensions and national separatism which is necessary to any cooperation of mankind."[75]

V

The differences in outlook among Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann are basic enough to justify treating them as distinctive expressions of separate styles. The substance marking the distinctiveness of each writer is varied. On the one hand, there are, in part, basic differences of philosophical orientation. Mahan's thought partially reflects the influence of Herbert Spencer, while Bryan might be generally classified as a philosophical idealist. Lippmann's pragmatic disposition falls clearly into the James-Dewey tradition in American philosophy. On the other hand, the differences among the three styles of international thought bear a resemblance to divisions more widely found in the American political tradition. Something very much like the contrasts among Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann can be seen, for instance, in the thought of John Adams, Thomas Paine, and Benjamin Franklin (or James Madison).

More specifically and immediately, however, the three styles of international thought differ in terms of the manner in which they

[75] *Ibid.*, 186.

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address themselves to three major issues: (1) the nature and the causes of international war; (2) the relation among war, politics, and morality; and (3) the possibility and the techniques of preventing war in international relations.

War, for Mahan, was the result of natural forces compelling nations locked in a struggle for survival. For Bryan, war was criminally evil, the result of the ambitions and the conspiratorial wills of corrupt leaders. For Lippmann, war was the outcome of factors discoverable in the patterns of social and political relationships characterizing both the domestic and the international political arenas. War resulted from conditions which, however real, were neither inevitable nor subject merely to moral criticism.

Mahan considered war an extension of politics, a form and an instrument of diplomacy. Political society rested on power and force, and war was simply a natural and necessary expression of the basic stuff of world politics. Bryan saw the relation between war and politics altogether in moral terms. Politics, excluding corrupt politics, must be democratic and designed for achievement of the good moral life. War was the denial of morality; it stemmed from evil and accomplished only evil. For Lippmann, war and politics were separable in an important way. War, at bottom, resulted from the breakdown and suspension of political processes. Men were driven to war by the failure of their politics to encompass the real problems that led to war.

War, in any sense, could never be prevented, Mahan argued, given the conditions of international politics, the nature of the national units which made it up, and the character of man. The best that could be hoped for was to avoid unnecessary wars through realistic national preparedness. Bryan held out the most alluring promises with respect to the eventual elimination of war. It could simply be prohibited, and that prohibition guaranteed through the moral and intellectual uplifting of mankind. Lippmann's proposals for the prevention of war centered around identifying the factors which gave rise to international violence and then, through political, educational, and economic modernization, eliminating those things which provoked and allowed men to fight.

Although American internationalism faltered briefly in the decade after World War I, the thought of the preceding twenty years or so had laid the foundations for future American perspectives in world politics. A period of isolationism followed the defeat in the Senate of the Versailles Treaty and the repudiation of Wilsonian internationalism that that vote entailed. Eventually, however, the commitment to

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world affairs that had made possible American participation in the First World War was to prove too strong, and the short period of isolationism in the twentieth century came to an end. When Americans looked again upon world politics, they retained the angles of vision that had been formed in the period of their emergence onto the stage of world politics. The three styles of international thought continued to provide the boundaries, the vocabulary, the modes of analysis, and the goals of the American international mind.

The three styles compete with one another for acceptance. Each would give its particular direction to the philosophy and the conduct of American foreign relations. They would set goals, devise methods, and judge results. They would each govern the international political education of the United States. An important question to ask then is: which style is best suited to provide the underpinnings of American foreign policy? To this question the best answer is: it all depends. That is, whether one or another of the styles is appropriate depends on the circumstances and conditions prevalent in world affairs and shaping American responses. The question is then modified. The issue becomes when and in what circumstances one or the other or some combination of the styles is most likely to fit American needs.

The tough, muscle-flexing style of Mahan's Deterministic internationalism finds its *raison d'être* in an era of "adventurous extension." When the alternative to rugged national assertiveness in foreign affairs is humiliation, serious economic disadvantage, or the stifling of a more or less spontaneous nationalism, prescriptions like those offered by Mahan provide both an avenue of action and a set of comfortable justifications for a policy of international daring.

The fundamentalist and altruistic demands characteristic of Bryan's Utopian internationalism become most appropriate in periods of "honorable consolidation." The pursuit of the values of democracy, ordinary morality, and brotherly love in international affairs is possible when, after having successfully pursued a "realistic" national interest, a nation has achieved for itself a secure position with respect to other nations. What Americans eventually do with gains made in international affairs can, to a limited extent, be directed by the loftier concepts of their political tradition.

And, finally, the careful, analytical, problem-solving teachings of Lippmann's Pragmatic internationalism are best applicable in periods of "dangerous disorder." When world political tensions are high, when nations stand poised and ready for mutual destruction, then the

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calm, surgical explorations of Pragmatic internationalism provide an intelligent guide for foreign affairs.

I am tempted to suggest that the growing interest of American social scientists in the many aspects of international relations, especially the growing sophistication of theoretical developments, may have been prompted by the pragmatic, scientific tradition in American political thought. Modern theories, devoid in the main of either empty moralizing or facile, tough-minded nationalism, approach international affairs problematically. Their aim is explanation in a scientific vein. They do not condemn or defend emotional positions on the major political issues of the international arena. The scientific study of international relations in the United States seems to be heir to the Pragmatic style. Neither the Deterministic nor the Utopian approach could have been parent to these modern developments. The complexity, imperativeness, and frustrating character of contemporary world politics demand a sophistication, a detachment, and a patience beyond the limited horizons of an Alfred Thayer Mahan or a William Jennings Bryan.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE STATE SYSTEM

By WILLIAM D. COPLIN*

MOST writers on international relations and international law still examine the relationship between international law and politics in terms of the assumption that law either should or does function only as a coercive restraint on political action. Textbook writers on general international politics like Morgenthau,[1] and Lerche and Said,[2] as well as those scholars who have specialized in international law like J. L. Brierly[3] and Charles De Visscher,[4] make the common assumption that international law should be examined as a system of coercive norms controlling the actions of states. Even two of the newer works, *The Political Foundations of International Law* by Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach[5] and *Law and Minimum World Public Order* by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano,[6] in spite of an occasional reference to the non-coercive as-

* I want to thank Dr. Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins University and Richard Miller of Wayne State University Law School for their constructive criticism of the first draft of this article.

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1961), 275-311. The entire evaluation of the "main problems" of international law is focused on the question of what rules are violated and what rules are not.

[2] Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 167-87. That the authors have employed the assumption that international law functions as a system of restraint is evident from the title of their chapter which examines international law, "Limitations on State Actions."

[3] J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (New York 1963), 1. Brierly defines international law as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations. . . ."

[4] Charles De Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (Princeton 1957), 99-100.

[5] Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York 1961), 5. In a discussion of how the student should observe international law and politics, the authors write: "To understand the substance and limits of such constraining rules (international law), it is necessary to examine the interests which support them in the international system, the means by which they are made effective, and the functions they perform. Only in this way is it possible to predict the areas in which rules operate, the limits of rules as effective constraints, and the factors which underlie normative change." Although the authors are asking an important question—"Why has international law been binding in some cases?"—they still assume that international law functions primarily as a direct restraint on state action. For an excellent review of this book, see Robert W. Tucker, "Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII (March 1963), 69-75.

[6] Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public*

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pects of international law, are developed primarily from the model of international law as a system of restraint. Deriving their conception of the relationship between international law and political action from their ideas on the way law functions in domestic communities, most modern writers look at international law as an instrument of direct control. The assumption that international law is or should be a coercive restraint on state action structures almost every analysis, no matter what the school of thought or the degree of optimism or pessimism about the effectiveness of the international legal system.[7] With an intellectual framework that measures international law primarily in terms of constraint on political action, there is little wonder that skepticism about international law continues to increase while creative work on the level of theory seems to be diminishing.[8]

Therefore, it is desirable to approach the relationship between international law and politics at a different functional level, not because international law does not function at the level of coercive restraint,

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Order (New Haven 1961), 10. The authors suggest that if any progress in conceptualizing the role of international law is to be made, it is necessary to distinguish between the "factual process of international coercion and the process of authoritative decision by which the public order of the world community endeavors to regulate such process of coercion." This suggestion is based on the assumption that international law promotes order primarily through the establishment of restraints on state actions.

[7] There are a few writers who have tried to approach international law from a different vantage point. For a survey of some of the other approaches to international law and politics, see Michael Barkun, "International Norms: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *Background,* VIII (August 1964), 121-29. The survey shows that few "new" approaches to international law have developed beyond the preliminary stages, save perhaps for the writings of F. S. C. Northrop. Northrop's works (e.g., *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics* [New York 1960], 326-30) are particularly significant in their attempt to relate psychological, philosophical, and cultural approaches to the study of law in general, although he has not usually been concerned with the overall relationship of international law to international political action. Not mentioned in Barkun's survey but important in the discussion of international law and politics is Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton 1961), 205-38. However, Hoffmann's essay is closer in approach to the work by Kaplan and Katzenbach than to the approach developed in this article. Finally, it is also necessary to point to an article by Edward McWhinney, "Soviet and Western International Law and the Cold War in a Nuclear Era of Bipolarity: Inter-Bloc Law in a Nuclear Age," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law,* I (1963), 40-81. Professor McWhinney discusses the relationship between American and Russian structures of action, on the one hand, and their interpretations of international law, on the other. While McWhinney's approach is basically similar to the one proposed in this article in its attempt to relate international law to politics on a conceptual level, his article is focused on a different set of problems, the role of national attitudes in the contemporary era on ideas of international law. Nevertheless, it is a significant contribution to the task of analyzing more clearly the relationship between international law and politics.

[8] See Richard A. Falk, "The Adequacy of Contemporary International Law: Gaps in Legal Thinking," *Virginia Law Review,* L (March 1964), 231-65, for a valuable but highly critical analysis of contemporary international legal theory.

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but because it also functions at another level. In order to illustrate a second functional level in the relationship between international law and politics, it is necessary to examine the operation of domestic law. In a domestic society, the legal system as a series of interrelated normative statements does more than direct or control the actions of its members through explicit rules backed by a promise of coercion. Systems of law also act on a more generic and pervasive level by serving as authoritative (i.e., accepted as such by the community) modes of communicating or reflecting the ideals and purposes, the acceptable roles and actions, as well as the very processes of the societies. The legal system functions on the level of the individual's perceptions and attitudes by presenting to him an image of the social system—an image which has both factual and normative aspects and which contributes to social order by building a consensus on procedural as well as on substantive matters. In this sense, law in the domestic situation is a primary tool in the "socialization"[9] of the individual.

International law functions in a similar manner: namely, as an institutional device for communicating to the policy-makers of various states a consensus on the nature of the international system. The purpose of this article is to approach the relationship between international law and politics not as a system of direct restraints on state action, but rather as a system of quasi-authoritative communications to the policy-makers concerning the reasons for state actions and the requisites for international order. It is a "quasi-authoritative" device because the norms of international law represent only an imperfect consensus of the community of states, a consensus which rarely commands complete acceptance but which usually expresses generally held ideas. Given the decentralized nature of law-creation and law-application in the international community, there is no official voice of the states as a collectivity. However, international law taken as a body of generally related norms is the closest thing to such a voice. Therefore, in spite of the degree of uncertainty about the authority of international law, it may still be meaningful to examine international law as a means for expressing the commonly held assumptions about the state system.

The approach advocated in this article has its intellectual antecedents in the sociological school, since it seeks to study international law in relation to international politics. Furthermore, it is similar to that of the sociological school in its assumption that there is or should be a significant degree of symmetry between international law and politics

[9] See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 26-31, for an explanation of the concept of socialization.

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on the level of intellectual constructs—that is, in the way in which international law has expressed and even shaped ideas about relations between states. It is hoped that this approach will contribute to a greater awareness of the interdependence of international law and conceptions of international politics.

Before analyzing the way in which international law has in the past and continues today to reflect common attitudes about the nature of the state system, let us discuss briefly the three basic assumptions which have generally structured those attitudes.[10] First, it has been assumed that the state is an absolute institutional value and that its security is the one immutable imperative for state action. If there has been one thing of which policy-makers could always be certain, it is that their actions must be designed to preserve their state. Second, it has been assumed that international politics is a struggle for power, and that all states seek to increase their power. Although the forms of power have altered during the evolution of the state system, it has been generally thought that states are motivated by a drive for power, no matter what the stakes. The third basic assumption permeating ideas about the international system has to do with maintaining a minimal system of order among the states. This assumption, symbolized generally by the maxim "Preserve the balance of power," affirms the necessity of forming coalitions to counter any threat to hegemony and of moderating actions in order to avoid an excess of violence that could disrupt the system.

It is necessary at this point to note that an unavoidable tension has existed between the aim of maintaining the state and maximizing power, on the one hand, and of preserving the international system, on the other. The logical extension of either aim would threaten the other, since complete freedom of action by the state would not allow for the limitation imposed by requirements to maintain the system, and a strict regularization of state action inherent in the idea of the system would curtail the state's drive for power. However, the tension

[10] The following discussion of the assumptions of the state system is brief, since students of international politics generally agree that the three assumptions listed have structured most of the actions of states. This agreement is most complete concerning the nature of the "classical" state system. The author is also of the opinion that these assumptions continue to operate today in a somewhat mutated form. (See his unpublished manuscript "The Image of Power Politics: A Cognitive Approach to the Study of International Politics," chaps. 2, 4, 8.) Note also the agreement on the nature of classical ideas about international politics in the following: Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," *Journal of Politics*, XV (August 1953), 370-97; Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 22-36; and Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1955).

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has remained constant, with neither norm precluding the other except when a given state was in immediate danger of destruction. At those times, the interests of the system have been subordinated to the drive for state survival, but with no apparent long-range effect on the acceptance by policy-makers of either set of interests, despite their possible incompatibility. The prescriptions that states should be moderate, flexible, and vigilant[11] have been a manifestation of the operation of the system. Together, the three basic assumptions about the state system have constituted the conceptual basis from which the policy-makers have planned the actions of their state.

I. Classical International Law and the Image of the State System

Almost every legal aspect of international relations from 1648 to 1914 reinforced and expressed the assumptions of the state system. State practices in regard to treaties, boundaries, neutrality, the occupation of new lands, freedom of the seas, and diplomacy, as well as classical legal doctrines, provide ample illustration of the extent to which the basic assumptions of the state were mirrored in international law.

The essential role of treaties in international law reflected the three assumptions of the state system. First, treaty practices helped to define the nature of statehood. Emanating from the free and unfettered will of states, treaties were the expression of their sovereign prerogatives. Statehood itself was defined in part as the ability to make treaties, and that ability presupposed the equality and independence usually associated with the idea of the state. Moreover, certain definitive treaties, like those written at the Peace of Augsburg (1515) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648), actually made explicit the attributes of statehood. The former treaty affirmed the idea that the Prince had complete control over the internal affairs of the state, while the latter emphasized that states were legally free and equal in their international relationships.[12] Even the actual wording of treaties expressed the classical assumption about the sanctity of the state. Whether in the formal references to the "high contracting parties" or in the more vital statements about the agreement of sovereigns not to interfere with

[11] See Gulick, 34; and for a discussion of the principles of moderation, flexibility, and vigilance, *ibid.*, 11-16.

[12] For the effects of the two treaties, see Charles Petrie, *Diplomatic History, 1713-1939* (London 1949), 111; David Jayne Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (New York 1924), 603-6; and Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations* (New York 1961), 116.

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the actions of other sovereigns, treaties were clear expressions of the classical idea of the state.[13]

Treaty law also contributed to the evolution of the classical assumption regarding the maintenance of the international system. Both explicitly and implicitly, treaties affirmed the necessity of an international system. Whether or not they contained such phrases as "balance of power," "just equilibrium," "universal and perpetual peace,"[14] "common and public safety and tranquillity,"[15] "public tranquillity on a lasting foundation,"[16] or "safety and interest of Europe,"[17] the most important treaties during the classical period affirmed the desirability of maintaining the international system.[18] Also, many treaties reaffirmed earlier treaty agreements, contributing to the idea that the international system was a continuing, operative unity.[19] Therefore, treaties usually reminded the policy-maker that the maintenance of the international system was a legitimate and necessary objective of state policy.

Finally, treaties affirmed the necessity and, in part, the legality of the drive for power. The constant juggling of territory, alliances, and other aspects of capability was a frequent and rightful subject of treaty law. Treaties implicitly confirmed that power was the dynamic force in relations between states by defining the legal criteria of power and, more important, by providing an institutional means, subscribed to by most of the members of the system, which legalized certain political transactions, such as territorial acquisition and dynastic exchange.

A second state practice which contributed to the classical assumptions about the state system was the legal concept of boundaries. Inherent in the very idea of the boundary were all three assumptions of the classical system. First, the boundary marked off that most discernible of all criteria of a state's existence—territory.[20] A state was sovereign within its territory, and the boundary was essential to the demarcation and protection of that sovereignty. Freedom and

[13] E.g., *The Treaty of Ryswick, 1697* in Andrew Browning, ed., *English History Documents*, VIII (New York 1963), 881-83.

[14] *Treaty of Ryswick*, Article I, in *ibid.*

[15] *Barrier Treaty of 1715*, Article I, in *ibid.*, Vol. X.

[16] *Treaty of Vienna, 1713*, in *ibid.*, Vol. VIII.

[17] *Treaty of Quadruple Alliance, 1815*, in *ibid.*, Vol. XI.

[18] Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," *American Journal of International Law*, XLII (January 1948), 20-40.

[19] For a treaty which expressed the necessity of keeping prior obligations, see *Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748*, in Browning, ed., Vol. X.

[20] See John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York 1962), 53, for a discussion of the role of territory in the classical state system and the international legal system.

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equality necessitated the delineation of a certain area of complete control; the boundary as conceptualized in international law was the institutional means through which that necessity was fulfilled. Second, the boundary was essential for the preservation of the international system.[21] After every war the winning powers set up a new or revised set of boundaries which aided them in maintaining order by redistributing territory. More important, the boundary also provided a criterion by which to assess the intentions of other states. Change of certain essential boundaries signified a mortal threat to the whole system, and signaled the need for a collective response.[22] Finally, the legal concept of boundaries provided a means through which the expansion and contraction of power in the form of territory could be measured. Since the boundary was a legal means of measuring territorial changes, international law in effect reinforced the idea that the struggle for power was an essential and accepted part of international politics. All three assumptions of the state system, therefore, were mirrored in the classical legal concept of boundaries.

Another international legal concept which reflected the assumptions about the state system was the idea of neutrality. The primary importance of neutrality law lay in its relation to the classical emphasis on the preservation of the international system. The practice of neutrality was an essential element in the mitigation of international conflict because it provided a legitimate means of lessening the degree of violence in any given war (by reducing the number of belligerents) and also made those involved in a war aware of the possibility of hostile actions from outside should the conflict weaken the participants too greatly. In short, the legal concept of neutrality implied that the actions of states must remain moderate and flexible in order to preserve the state system.[23]

There were other aspects of international legal practice which substantiated the assumptions of the state system. For instance, since the sixteenth century the law pertaining to the occupation of new lands and to freedom of the high seas constituted a vital aspect of international law, and provided "legitimate" areas in which the struggle for power could take place.

From the outset, most of the non-European areas of the world were

[21] See Hoffmann, 212, 215, for a discussion of the way in which territorial settlements in treaties aided stability within the system. He calls this function part of the law of political framework.

[22] E.g., the English and French attitude toward Belgium.

[23] For a discussion of the role of neutrality in the balance of power system, see McDougal and Feliciano, 391-413.

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considered by the great powers to be acceptable arenas for the struggle for power. International legal practice made it easy for states to gain control of land overseas by distinguishing between the laws of occupation and the laws of subjugation. This distinction made it easier for powers to extend control over non-European territorial expanses because it enabled states to "occupy" territory legally without actually controlling it.[24] Through the laws of occupation, international law confirmed the assumption that colonial expansion was part of the struggle for power.

The law of the high seas also contributed to the idea of the struggle for power. The expansion of trade, military power, and territorial domain was, throughout almost the entire history of the state system, greatly dependent upon the free use of the high seas. The laws of the sea were designed so that maximum use could be made of this relatively cheap mode of transportation. Like the laws of occupation of non-European territory, sea law helped to keep the distribution of power among European states in continuous flux.[25]

Therefore, both the laws of the seas and the laws governing the occupation of new lands were instrumental in "legalizing" areas for conflict. Given the assumption that states always maximize their power, a free sea and the easy acquisition of non-European lands provided the fluidity needed for the states to struggle for power. Moreover, both sets of laws removed the area of conflict from the home territory, thus enabling states to increase the scope of their struggle without proportionately increasing its intensity.[26]

A final category of international law which reinforced the assumptions about the state system was the law of diplomacy. The legal rationalization behind the rights and duties of diplomats (i.e., since diplomats represent sovereign states, they owe no allegiance to the receiving state) emphasized the inviolability of the state which was an essential aspect of the classical assumptions.[27] At the same time, the very fact that

[24] L. Oppenheim, in H. Lauterpacht, ed., *International Law* (New York 1948), I, 507.

[25] The attempt to control a "closed sea" was sometimes a bid by a powerful state to freeze the *status quo*—e.g., Portugal's control of the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Nussbaum, 111).

[26] Analysts have argued over whether colonialism reduced or exacerbated international antagonism. Without settling the argument, it seems safe to say that the struggle for colonies was a more spectacular and relatively less dangerous system of conflict than was competition for European land.

[27] For the relationship of the assumption of statehood and the functioning of diplomatic immunities, see a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of diplomatic immunities in Ernest L. Kelsey, "Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities," *American Journal of International Law*, LXXXVIII (January 1962), 92-94.

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even semi-hostile states could exchange and maintain ambassadors emphasized that all states were part of a common international system.[28] Finally, the classical functions of a diplomat—to make sure that conditions are not changing to the disadvantage of his state and, if they are, to suggest and even implement policies to rectify the situation—exemplified the rule of constant vigilance necessary in a group of states struggling for power. Therefore, in their own way, the laws of diplomacy expressed all three of the assumptions of the state systems.

The assumptions of the state system were reinforced not only by the legal practices of states but also by the major international legal theories of the classical period. Three general schools of thought developed: the naturalists, the eclectics or Grotians, and the positivists.[29] In each school, there was a major emphasis on both the state and the state system as essential institutional values. Whether it was Pufendorf's insistence on the "natural equality of state,"[30] the Grotians' concept of the sovereign power of state,[31] or Bynkershoek and the nineteenth-century positivists' point that treaties were the prime, if not the only, source of international law,[32] the state was considered by most classical theorists to be the essential institution protected by the legal system. At the same time, almost every classical writer on international law either assumed or argued for the existence of an international system of some kind.[33] Along with Grotians, the naturalists maintained that a system of states existed, since man was a social animal. Vattel, probably the most famous international lawyer in the classical period, asserted that a balance of power and a state system existed.[34] Even the positivists of the nineteenth century assumed that there was an international system of some kind. This is apparent from their emphasis on the balance of power,[35] as well as from their assumption

[28] Morgenthau, 547.

[29] For a discussion of the precise meaning of these classifications, see Nussbaum.

[30] *Ibid.*, 149.

[31] Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace*, ed. with notes by A. C. Campbell (Washington 1901), 62.

[32] Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, *De dominio maris dissertatio*, trans. by Ralph Van Deman Mogoffin (New York 1923), 35.

[33] De Visscher, 88. For similar interpretations of classical and pre-twentieth-century theorists, see Walter Schiffer, *The Legal Community of Mankind* (New York 1951), chap. 1; or Percy E. Corbett, *Law and Society in the Relations of States* (New York 1951).

[34] Emeric de Vattel, *The Laws of Nations* (Philadelphia 1867), 412-14.

[35] G. F. Von Martens, *The Law of Nations: Being the Science of National Law, Covenants, Power & Founded upon the Treaties and Custom of Modern Nations in Europe*, trans. by William Cobbett (4th ed., London 1829), 123-24.

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that relations between nations could be defined in terms of legal rights and duties.[36]

Therefore, there was a consensus among the classical theorists of international law that international politics had two structural elements: the state, with its rights of freedom and self-preservation; and the system, with its partial effectiveness in maintaining a minimal international order. That the theorists never solved the conflict between the idea of the unfettered sovereign state, on the one hand, and a regulating system of law, on the other, is indicative of a conflict within the assumptions of the state system,[37] but a conflict which neither prevented international lawyers from writing about an international legal order nor kept policy-makers from pursuing each state's objectives without destroying the state system.

Although the norms of classical international law sometimes went unheeded, the body of theory and of state practice which constituted "international law as an institution" nonetheless expressed in a quasi-authoritative manner the three assumptions about international politics. It legalized the existence of states and helped to define the actions necessary for the preservation of each state and of the system as a whole. It reinforced the ideas that vigilance, moderation, and flexibility are necessary for the protection of a system of competing states. And finally, international law established a legalized system of political payoffs by providing a means to register gains and losses without creating a static system. In fact, this last aspect was essential to the classical state system. With international law defining certain relationships (territorial expansion, empire-building, etc.) as legitimate areas for political competition, other areas seemed, at least generally in the classical period, to be removed from the center of the political struggle. By legitimizing the struggle as a form of political competition rather than as universal conflict, international law sanctioned a form of international system that was more than just an anarchic drive for survival.

[36] Almost all of the nineteenth-century positivists assumed that relations between nations were systematized enough to allow for a system of rights and duties. E.g., William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law* (Oxford 1904), 43-59; Henry Wheaton, *Elements of International Law* (Oxford 1936), 75. Wheaton does not discuss duties as such, but when he talks about legal rights he distinguishes between "absolute" and "conditional" rights. According to Wheaton, the "conditional" rights are those resulting from membership in the international legal system. This formulation implies the existence of corresponding duties.

[37] See Von Martens, 123-34, for the intellectual and legal problems growing out of the assumption that states may legally maximize power but that they also have a responsibility "to oppose by alliances and even by force of arms" a series of aggrandizements which threaten the community.

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II. Contemporary International Law and the Assumptions of the State System

As a quasi-authoritative system of communicating the assumptions of the state system to policy-makers, contemporary international law no longer presents a clear idea of the nature of international politics. This is in part a result of the tension, within the structure of contemporary international law itself, between the traditional legal concepts and the current practices of states. International law today is in a state of arrested ambiguity—in a condition of unstable equilibrium between the old and the new. As a result, it no longer contributes as it once did to a consensus on the nature of the state system. In fact, it adds to the growing uncertainty and disagreement as to how the international political system itself is evolving. The following discussion will attempt to assess the current developments in international law in terms of the challenges those developments make to the three assumptions of the state system. It is realized that the three assumptions themselves have already undergone change, but our purpose is to show where contemporary international legal practice and theory stand in relation to that change.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE STATE AND THE SYSTEM

The current legal concept of the state is a perfect example of the arrested ambiguity of contemporary international law and of the threat that this condition represents to the assumptions of the state system. On the one hand, most of the traditional forms used to express the idea of statehood are still employed. Treaty-makers and statesmen still write about "respect for territorial integrity," the "right of domestic jurisdiction," and the "sovereign will of the high contracting parties." Moreover, most of the current substantive rights and duties, such as self-defense, legal equality, and territorial jurisdiction, that are based on the assumption that states as units of territory are the irreducible institutional values of the system continue to be central to international legal practice.[38] On the other hand, certain contemporary developments contrast sharply with the traditional territory-oriented conceptions of international law.[39] With the growth of international entities possessing

[38] E.g., Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law* (New York 1952), chap. 11.

[39] For a survey of current challenges to traditional international law, see Wolfgang Friedmann, "The Changing Dimensions of International Law," *Columbia Law Review*, LXII (November 1962), 1147-65. Also, see Richard A. Falk, *The Role of the Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order* (Syracuse 1964), 14-19, for a discussion of the fact that while there is a growing "functional obsolescence" of the state system, the

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supranational powers (e.g., ECSC), the legal idea of self-contained units based on territorial control lacks the clear basis in fact that it once enjoyed. Many of the traditional prerogatives of the sovereign state, such as control over fiscal policy,[40] have been transferred in some respects to transnational units. While the development of supranational powers is most pronounced in Europe, there is reason to believe, especially concerning international cooperation on technical matters, that organizations patterned on the European experience might occur elsewhere.

Another significant manifestation of ambiguity in the territorial basis of international law is found in the post-World War II practice of questioning the validity of the laws of other states. The "act of state doctrine" no longer serves as the guideline it once did in directing the national courts of one state to respect the acts promulgated in another.[41] Once based on the assumption of the "inviolability of the sovereign," the "act of state doctrine" today is the source of widespread controversy. The conflicting views of the doctrine are symptomatic of the now ambiguous role of territoriality in questions of jurisdictional and legal power. Although these developments in current legal practice are only now emerging, they nonetheless can be interpreted as a movement away from the strictly and clearly defined legal concept of the state that appeared in classical international law.

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assumptions of the state system continue to operate for psychological and political reasons.

[40] E.g., Articles 3 and 4 of the *Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community* (April 18, 1951).

[41] For an excellent discussion of the legal and political problems related to the question of the "act of state doctrine" in particular, and of territorial supremacy as a concept in general, see Kenneth S. Carlston, *Law and Organization in World Society* (Urbana, Ill., 1962), 191-93, 266-69. Also, for a discussion of the problem in a larger framework, see Falk, *Role of the Domestic Courts*. Since World War II, states, especially on the European continent, have found increasingly broader bases to invalidate the effect of foreign laws. Traditionally, states have refused to give validity to the laws of other lands for a small number of narrowly constructed reasons (e.g., refusal to enforce penal or revenue laws). Today many states have declared foreign laws invalid for a variety of reasons, the most important being the formulation that the national court cannot give validity to a foreign law that is illegal in terms of international law (see "*The Rose Mary Case*," *International Law Report* [1953], 316ff.), and the most frequent being a broad interpretation of "sense of public order" (see Martin Domke, "Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts," *American Journal of International Law*, LIV [April 1960], 305-23). The most recent case in American practice, the *Sabbatino* decision (Supplement, *International Legal Materials*, III, No. 2 [March 1964], 391), appears to reaffirm the traditional emphasis on the territorial supremacy of the national legal order in these matters, but is actually ambiguous. On the one hand, the Opinion of the Court applied the "act of state doctrine" in declaring the Cuban law valid, but on the other hand, the Court stated that "international law does not require application of the doctrine."

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Other developments in contemporary international law represent, theoretically at least, a challenge to the assumption that the state and its freedom of action are an absolute necessity for the state system. Most noticeable has been the attempt to develop an international organization which would preserve a minimal degree of order. Prior to the League of Nations, there had been attempts to institutionalize certain aspects of international relations, but such attempts either did not apply to the political behavior of states (e.g., the Universal Postal Union) or did not challenge the basic assumptions of the state system (as the very loosely defined Concert of Europe failed to do). As it was formulated in the Covenant and defined by the intellectuals, the League represented a threat to the assumptions of the state system because it sought to settle once and for all the tension between the policy-maker's commitment to preserve his state and his desire to maintain the state system by subordinating his state to it through a formal institution.

Proponents of the League saw it as a means to formalize a system of maintaining international order by committing states in advance to a coalition against any state that resorted to war without fulfilling the requirements of the Covenant. If it had been operative, such a commitment would have represented a total revolution in the legal concept of the state as an independent entity, since it would have abolished the most essential of all sovereign prerogatives, the freedom to employ coercion. However, the ideal purpose of the League, on the one hand, and the aims of politicians and the actual constitutional and operational aspects of the League, on the other, proved to be quite different. Owing to certain legal formulations within the Covenant (Articles 10, 15, 21) and the subsequent application of the principles (e.g., in Manchuria and Ethiopia), the hoped-for subordination of the state to the system was not realized.[42]

Like the League, the United Nations was to replace the state as the paramount institutional value by establishing a constitutional concert of powers. However, it has succeeded only in underscoring the existing tension between the drive to maintain the state and the goal of maintaining the system. In the Charter itself, the tension between the state and the system remains unresolved.[43] Nor does the actual

[42] For a useful discussion of the relationship between the idea of collective security and the assumption of the balance of power system, see Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York 1962), 255-60; and Herz, chap. 5. It is necessary to make a distinction between the theory of collective security, which certainly would challenge the basic assumptions of the state system, and its operation, which would not.

[43] Compare Articles 25-51, or paragraphs 2-7 in Article 2, for the contrast between system-oriented and state-oriented norms.

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operation of the United Nations provide a very optimistic basis for the hope that tension will be lessened in the future.

In terms of international law, regional organizations constitute a mixed challenge to the traditional relationship between the state and the system. Although certain organizations represent an attempt to transcend the traditional bounds of their constituent members on functional grounds, this does not necessarily mean that those members have rejected the state as a political form. In reality, if regional organizations represent any transformation at all in the structural relationship between the state and the system, they constitute an attempt to create a bigger and better state, an attempt which is not contrary to the traditional assumptions of the state system. In spite of the fact that some organizations are given supranational power and present a challenge in that sense, most of the organizations are as protective of the sovereign rights of the state as is the United Nations Charter (e.g., the OAS Charter) or are not regional organizations at all, but military alliances.[44]

A more serious challenge, but one somewhat related to the challenge by regional organizations, is the changing relation of the individual to the international legal order. In the classical system, international law clearly relegated the individual to the position of an object of the law. Not the individual, but the state had the rights and duties of the international legal order.[45] This legal formulation was in keeping with the classical emphasis on the sanctity of the state. Today, however, the development of the concepts of human rights, international and regional organizations, and the personal responsibility of policy-makers to a higher law not only limit the scope of legally permissible international action but, more important, limit the traditional autonomy of the leaders of the state over internal matters.[46] The idea that the individual rather than the state is the unit of responsibility in the formulation of policy has a long

[44] This is not to say that regional organizations do not represent a challenge to the concept of the state on psychological or social grounds. Obviously, the type of allegiance to a United Europe would be different in kind and degree from the traditional allegiance to a European state. However, in terms of the challenge to the legal concept of the state, regional organizations still adhere to the idea that the constituent members are sovereign in their relationship with states outside the organization.

[45] See Corbett, 53-56, for a discussion of the place of the individual in classical international law.

[46] Most modern writers have noted that the individual no longer stands in relation to international law solely as the object (e.g., Corbett, 133-35, or Friedmann, 1160-62), though they are agreed that, to use Friedmann's words, "the rights of the individual in international law are as yet fragmentary and uncertain."

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intellectual tradition;[47] however, it is only recently that the norms associated with that idea have become a part of international law.

Although the role of the individual in international law is small and the chances for its rapid development in the near future slight, it represents a more vital challenge to traditional international law and to the assumptions of the state system than either international or regional organizations. Since the principle of collective responsibility (of the state) rather than individual responsibility has traditionally served as the infrastructure for the rights and duties of states,[48] the development of a place for the individual in the international legal system that would make him personally responsible would completely revolutionize international law. At the same time, by making the individual a higher point of policy reference than the state, the development of the role of the individual represents a challenge to the assumption once reflected in classical international law that the preservation and maximization of state power is an absolute guideline for policy-makers. The evolving place of the individual in the contemporary international legal system, then, is contrary to the traditional tendency of international law to reaffirm the absolute value of the state.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEPT OF POWER

One of the most significant developments in international law today relates to the assumption that states do and should compete for power. In the classical period, international law, through the legal concepts of neutrality, rules of warfare, occupation of new lands, rules of the high seas, and laws of diplomacy, reinforced the idea that a struggle for power among states was normal and necessary. Today, many of these specific legal norms still apply, but the overall permissible range of the struggle for military power[49] has been limited by the concept of the just war.

The idea of the just war is not new to international law. Most of the classical writers discussed it, but they refused to define the concept in strict legal terms and usually relegated it to the moral or

[47] According to Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism* (Boston 1959), 363-70, the liberal conception of the state has always assumed that the individual was the absolute value, though this idea has not always been operative.

[48] For an excellent discussion of the role of collective responsibility in international law, see Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (New York 1959), 9-13, 114-48.

[49] Although the military struggle today is considered to be only one aspect of the struggle for power, it is the one most closely related to the problem of order in both the classical and the contemporary system, and therefore the most crucial in the relationship between law and politics.

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ethical realm.[50] The nineteenth-century positivists completely abandoned the doctrine with the formulation that "wars between nations must be considered as just on both sides with respect to treatment of enemies, military arrangements, and peace."[51] However, with the increased capability of states to destroy each other, a movement has grown to regulate force by legal means.

This movement developed through the Hague Conventions and the League of Nations and, in some respects, culminated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Today, the just war is a more or less accepted concept in international law. Most authors write, and most policy-makers state, that aggression is illegal and must be met with the sanction of the international community. The portent of this formulation of the assumption regarding power is great since, theoretically at least, it deprives the states of the range of action which they once freely enjoyed in maximizing their power and in protecting themselves. If the only legal justification for war is self-defense, or authorization of action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,[52] then a war to preserve the balance of power or to expand in a limited fashion is outlawed. While the traditional formulation of international law provided a broad field upon which the game of power politics could be played, the new formulations concerning the legal use of force significantly limit and, one could argue, make illegal the military aspects of the game of power politics.[53] The freedom to use military power, once an essential characteristic of sovereignty and an integral part of international law, is no longer an accepted international legal norm.

The concept of the just war directly challenges the assumptions of the state system, because it implies that the military struggle for

[50] See D. W. Bowett, *Self-Defense in International Law* (Manchester 1958), 156-57; and Nussbaum, 137, 153-55, 171.

[51] See Nussbaum, 182-83. Also see Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford 1963), 15-18.

[52] Actually, the range of action provided by the contemporary formulation, especially regarding the authorization in accordance with the United Nations Charter, could be broad and could conceivably take in "balancing" action if the deadlock in the Security Council were broken. The reason for this is the very ambiguous mandate for Security Council action spelled out in the Charter. It is possible under this mandate to call the limited "balancing" action, typical of the eighteenth century, an action taken to counter a "threat to the peace." Nonetheless, given the current stalemate within the Security Council, and the nature of the General Assembly actions to date, it is safe to conclude that contemporary international law has greatly limited the wide-ranging legal capacity that states once had in deciding on the use of force.

[53] See Brownlie, 251-80, for a discussion of the contemporary legal restrictions on the use of force. Also see Kaplan and Katzenbach, 205, for a discussion of the just-war doctrine and its compatibility with the balance of power system.

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power is no longer a normal process of international politics. No longer does international law legitimize the gains of war, and no longer do policy-makers look upon war as a rightful tool of national power.[54] This is not to say that states do not use force in their current struggles or that the doctrine of the just war would deter them in a particular case. However, the doctrine does operate on the conceptual level by expressing to the policy-makers the idea that the use of force is no longer an everyday tool of international power politics. In terms of the traditional assumption about the state's natural inclination to maximize power, the contemporary legal commitment to the just-war doctrine represents a profound and historic shift.

III. International Law and the Reality of Contemporary International Politics

Contemporary international legal practice, then, is developing along lines which represent a threat not only to traditional concepts of international law but also to the assumptions of the state system. The sporadic developments in international and regional organizations, the evolving place of the individual in the international legal system, and the doctrine of the just war are manifestations of the transformation occurring today both in the structure of international law and in attitudes about the state system. Actually, of course, the traditional conceptions of international law and the classical assumptions about international politics are not extinct.[55] Rather, there is in both international law and politics a perplexing mixture of past ideas and current developments. The only thing one can be sure of is that behind the traditional legal and political symbols which exist today in a somewhat mutated form, a subtle transformation of some kind is taking place.

It is not possible to evaluate the line of future development of the assumptions about the state system or the international legal expression of those assumptions from the work of contemporary theorists of international law. The most apparent new expressions are those that propose increased formalizations of world legal and political

[54] Certainly, technological developments have been primarily responsible for the rejection of war as a typical tool of international power. In this case, as in most, international legal doctrine mirrors the existing attitudes and helps to reinforce them.

[55] As in the past, international lawyers are still concerned with definitions and applications of concepts of territorial integrity, self-defense, and domestic jurisdiction, and policy-makers are still motivated by the traditional ideas of state security and power. However, the traditional political and legal symbols have been "stretched" to apply to current conditions. For a development of this position see Coplin, chaps. 4 and 8.

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processes.[56] On the other hand, much international legal theory today seems to be dedicated to an affirmation of the traditional assumptions of international politics. Political analysts like Hans Morgenthau,[57] E. H. Carr,[58] and George F. Kennan,[59] and legal theorists like Julius Stone,[60] P. E. Corbett,[61] and Charles De Visscher,[62] are predisposed to "bring international law back to reality."

This trend toward being "realistic" occupies the mainstream of current international legal theory,[63] and to identify its exact nature is therefore crucial. Many writers who express this viewpoint seem to fear being labeled as overly "idealistic." They utter frequent warnings that international law cannot restore international politics to order, but, on the contrary, can exist and flourish only after there is a political agreement among states to maintain order. In short, it is assumed

[56] E.g., Arthur Larson, *When Nations Disagree* (Baton Rouge, La., 1961); or Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960). These theorists and others who fall under this classification are "radical" in the sense that what they suggest is antithetical to the assumptions of the state system as traditionally developed. These writers are not necessarily utopian in their radicalism. This is especially true since adherence today to the traditional assumptions might itself be considered a form of (reactionary) radicalism. However, the radical scholars, in the sense used here, are very scarce, especially among American students of international law. Today there is a very thin line separating the few radical scholars from the more numerous radical polemicists of world government.

[57] Morgenthau writes (277): "To recognize that international law exists is, however, not tantamount to assessing that . . . it is effective in regulating and restraining the struggle for power on the international scene."

[58] E. H. Carr, in *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (London 1958), 170, writes: "We are exhorted to establish 'the rule of law' . . . and the assumption is made that, by so doing, we shall transfer our differences from the turbulent political atmosphere of self-interest to the purer, serener air of impartial justice." His subsequent analysis is designed to disprove this assumption.

[59] George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton 1954), 16.

[60] Julius Stone, *Legal Control of International Conflict* (New York 1954), introduction.

[61] Corbett, 68-79, 291-92.

[62] De Visscher writes (xiv): "International law cannot gather strength by isolating itself from the political realities with which international relations are everywhere impregnated. It can only do so by taking full account of the place that these realities occupy and measuring the obstacle which they present."

[63] The programs of the last two annual meetings of the American Society of International Law exemplify the way in which the concern for reality (as power) has come to dominate international legal theory. In the 1963 program, the relationship between international law and the use of force was not discussed by international legal theorists but by two well-known writers on the role of conflict in international politics. The 1964 program manifested the same tendency. It centered on the question of compliance with transnational law, a topic treated in a sociopolitical framework by most panelists. This point is not to be taken as a criticism of the two programs, both of which were excellent and very relevant, but as proof of the assertion that the mainstream of contemporary theory of international law is significantly oriented to the role of power.

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that international law cannot shape international political reality, but can merely adjust to it. Although there are complaints of too much pessimism in current legal theory,[64] most writers, given the initial predisposition to avoid "idealism," do not heed them.

The desire of contemporary theorists to be "realistic" has been crucial to the relationship between contemporary international law and the assumptions of the state system. In their effort to achieve realism, current theorists have not examined their traditional assumptions about international politics. When they talk about adjusting international law to the realities of power, they usually have in mind the traditional reality of international politics. Today, a large share of the theoretical writing on international law that is designed to adapt law to political reality is in effect applying it to an image of international politics which itself is rapidly becoming outmoded. Much contemporary international legal theory, then, has not contributed to the development of a new consensus on the nature of international politics but instead has reinforced many of the traditional ideas.

In order to understand more fully the relation of international law to world politics, it is necessary to do more than examine law merely as a direct constraint on political action. The changes in the conceptual basis of international law that are manifested in current practice and, to a lesser extent, in current legal theory are symptomatic of a series of social and institutional revolutions that are transforming all of international politics. To conclude that international law must adjust to political reality, therefore, is to miss the point, since international law is part of political reality and serves as an institutional means of developing and reflecting a general consensus on the nature of international reality. In the contemporary period, where the international legal system is relatively decentralized, and international politics is subject to rapid and profound development, it is necessary to avoid a conceptual framework of international law which breeds

[64] Many writers, even realists like Morgenthau (*op.cit.*, 275) and others like McDougal and Feliciano (*op.cit.*, 2-4), decry the modern tendency toward "cynical disenchantment with law," but it is obvious from their subsequent remarks that they are reacting more against the "utopianism" of the past than the cynicism of the present. There have been a few who have attacked the "realist" position on international law (e.g., A. H. Feller, "In Defense of International Law and Morality," *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 282 [July 1951], 77-84). However, these attacks have been infrequent and generally ineffective in starting a concerted action to develop more constructive theory. For another evaluation of the "realist" trend, see Covey T. Oliver, "Thoughts on Two Recent Events Affecting the Function of Law in the International Community," in George A. Lipsky, ed., *Law and Politics in the World Community* (Berkeley 1953).

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undue pessimism because it demands too much. If international law does not contribute directly and effectively to world order by forcing states to be peaceful, it does prepare the conceptual ground on which that order could be built by shaping attitudes about the nature and promise of international political reality.

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PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS IN WEIMAR AND BONN

By CHARLES E. FRYE

I

IN THE last forty years, Germany has had three radically different political systems. In each case, the party system, better than any other single index, reflects the style of politics of that period. The highly splintered, multiparty system of Weimar mirrors perfectly the extreme ideological dissension and radicalism of postwar German politics. The one-party system of the Third Reich epitomizes the attempt to destroy the individual's traditional social ties and then to absorb him totally in a coordinated movement. Finally, the two-party system of Bonn reflects the growing social and political consensus concerning the more pragmatic and concrete political goals of post-Hitlerian Germany. Although these three political systems are intimately related, the main question for us is why the democratic party systems of Weimar and Bonn are so different. The party systems are unintelligible, however, without an understanding of the patterns of pressure-group politics as well.

One measure of the differences between the two democracies is simply the number of active political parties. At any given election to the Reichstag, thirty-odd political parties were likely to be competing in Weimar; less than a third that number competed at the last elections in Bonn.[1] But by themselves these figures might be misleading, for although more than thirty parties in Weimar had candidate lists, rarely more than a dozen of them won seats to the Reichstag. Never more than six parties (sometimes as few as three) united to form coalition governments. Social Democrats (SPD), German Democrats (DDP), and Centrists (Z), for example, united to form the Weimar Coalition of the Constitutional Assembly and the early republican years.

Today in Bonn one also finds a coalition government—formed of the Christian Democratic Union, its Bavarian affiliate, the Christian Socialist Union (CDU/CSU),[2] and the Free Democrats (FDP). De-

[1] For a general descriptive account of German parties since their beginnings, see Ludwig Bergstraesser, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland* (10th ed., Munich 1960).

[2] I consider the CDU and CSU as one party and for brevity's sake usually refer to it hereafter as the CDU.

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spite their relative similarity in this respect, however, in actual functioning the governments of Weimar and Bonn are worlds apart.

The CDU singlehandedly won a majority of seats in the lower house of parliament in 1953, something no other German party in free elections had ever done, and followed that by victory in 1957[3] with an unprecedented absolute majority of the popular vote. Moreover, whether the CDU has commanded a majority of the seats in the Bundestag or not, the Social Democrats have dominated the opposition; and the opposition, it should be remembered, is nearly as important as the government in determining the style of politics in a parliamentary system. In Weimar, there were never fewer than five parties in opposition—two of them always at the extremes, which is not the case in Bonn. How can one account for these differences? Why did the number of parties in Weimar tend to multiply whereas in Bonn it has constantly decreased?

Or, taken from another point of view: German farmers pressed their demands upon the government through three pressure groups in Weimar.[4] But there was also the German Farmers' Party (DBP); and the German National People's Party (DNVP), heir to the conservative tradition in Weimar, was in large measure a party of farmers—aristocratic Junkers. Today most German farmers have united in the *Deutsche Bauernverband* and, with good reason, this group is held to be among the most powerful in Bonn.[5] Yet, despite persistent demands for the creation of a farmers' party, they until now have remained organizationally active within the bounds of the *Bauernverband*. Of other economic associations that were or became active parties in Weimar but have become mere pressure groups in Bonn, there are at least two instances—the *Wirtschaftspartei* and the *Handwerkerpartei*. In Bonn itself the remnants of the Refugee Party, Bavarian Party, Economic Reconstruction League, and South Schleswig Voters' League, among others, are forceful reminders of the continuous threat to such narrowly oriented parties. Eleven parties won seats to the Bundestag in the election of 1949; only six remained in 1953, and by 1961 the number was three—in each case, the victims being splinter

[3] U. W. Kitzinger's *German Electoral Politics* (Oxford 1960) is a study of that election.

[4] *Reichslandbund, Bauernverein, and Bauernschaft.* The best descriptive account of these and other pressure groups early in Weimar is Edgar Tatarin-Tarnheyden, *Die Berufsstaende* (Berlin 1922).

[5] "Around the political power potential which the *Deutsche Bauernverband* represents, there has gathered an economic concentration of power which in breadth, rationality, and certainty of achieving its goals has no equal in West Germany" (Kurt Pritzkoleit, *Maenner Maechte Monopole* [2nd ed., Duesseldorf 1960], 61).

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parties.[6] But why have associations that were active as parties in Weimar contented themselves, or had to content themselves, with the status of pressure groups in Bonn?

It is the main hypothesis of this article that these two kinds of association are interrelated. A political party system affects the activities of pressure groups (their goals and the means of attaining them) at the same time that pressure-group patterns condition the functioning of political parties. The closeness of the ties between parties and pressure groups, as well as the kinds of ties that exist, is directly related to the number of parties in a system.[7] Party and pressure-group activities also interact in other respects. At what point pressure groups will tend to bring pressure, how dogmatic and persistent they are likely to be, and whether or not parties will be able to compromise their programs are the kinds of questions that cannot be settled without an understanding of party and pressure-group patterns.[8]

The consequences of the kinds of relationships that exist between parties and pressure groups in modern democracies run deep. Political party and pressure-group activity is, in fact, a primary determinant of the stability and effectiveness of a political system. Political effectiveness presupposes, among other things, a degree of stability that highly fragmented multiparty systems such as Weimar or the Third and Fourth Republics in France have never achieved. And for the study of these relationships, Weimar and Bonn make a particularly good case because there are more constants and relatively fewer variables than in many cross-national studies. Yet the differences could hardly be sharper. Ultimately, the question is why Weimar was so unstable and ineffective as a political system and why Bonn has been so stable and relatively effective.

II

Perhaps the most striking fact about parties in Weimar was the narrowness of their appeals; the whole tendency was for them to become representatives of particular interests.[9] The closeness of their affiliations can be seen most clearly among the small *Splinterparteien* in Weimar—Party of House and Land Owners; People's Coalition of

[6] Kitzinger, 170-97, discusses the efforts of the minor parties in the 1957 election.

[7] Compare Gabriel A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," *American Political Science Review*, LII (March 1958), 275-76.

[8] For a statement of determinants of pressure-group politics, see Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics* (Stanford 1960), 15-39.

[9] See, for example, Karl D. Bracher, *Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik* (3rd ed., Villingen 1960), esp. 65-69.

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the Victims of Inflation; Non-political List of War Victims, Work Invalids, and Welfare Recipients.[10] But it is hardly less striking among the larger parties—Social Democrats and labor, German Populists and the upper middle class, National Populists and Junkerdom. In fact, the only party to escape the bonds of really narrow identification was the Center party, and it was almost exclusively Catholic.

Despite the large number of parties in Weimar and the specificity of their appeals, party programs did overlap—particularly at the center of the political continuum.[11] The economic position of the German Democratic Party, for example, was very similar to that of the Stresemann-led German People's Party (DVP); and the Center party was famous (or infamous, depending upon the contemporary's point of view) as the party that could find a community of belief with several other parties. In Prussia, which comprised approximately two-thirds of both the people and territory of Germany, the Center party maintained a very stable coalition with the Social Democrats throughout the Republic.[12] It also participated in every coalition in the Reichstag, although after 1920 those coalitions always included at least one rightist party and excluded the SPD an even dozen times. As the Republic became older, this area of overlap moved constantly to the right.

That parties in multiparty systems tend to make narrower appeals tells us something very important about their relations with interest groups—namely, that parties and interest groups in a multiparty system are more closely integrated than parties and interest groups in a two-party system. They become more interdependent because the relative importance of each particular interest to the life of the party increases as the party appeal becomes more narrow. By tying a given interest group more closely to itself, a party is seeking to compensate, as it were, for its inability to integrate a large variety of interests. It becomes increasingly dependent upon particular interest groups for funds and electoral support, while the interest groups are increasingly dependent upon it for furthering their interests. When this inter-

[10] The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 9, 1928, gives a list of the parties competing in the 1928 election.

[11] James K. Pollock, Jr., "The German Party System," *American Political Science Review*, XXIII (November 1929), 878-79.

[12] Several people have commented upon this startling incongruity. Allan Bullock, for example, has written that "In Prussia . . . the State Government enjoyed a stability which made it the bulwark of democracy in Germany . . ." (*Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* [New York 1961], 121). See also Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany* (New York 1945), 20-23. But no one has adequately accounted for the disparity between Prussia's stability in Weimar and, despite its comprising such a large part of Germany, its instability in the Reich.

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dependence is complete, one has interest groups fully politicalized—as a *Wirtschaftspartei*, a *Bauernpartei*, a *Handwerkerpartei*.

Several forces were operating to counteract the narrowness of these identifications. First of all, no party could hope to join a coalition, let alone win an election, if it did not succeed in bringing large numbers of people into its fold.[13] This meant an appreciable advantage for the Social Democrats. On the strength of worker class-consciousness, they could direct their appeal to one particular class and still win a sizable representation. To attract a comparable following, any bourgeois party would have had to extend its appeal across a broad front of social and economic interests. For as the large number of parties competing among the bourgeoisie suggests, middle-class identification was much more ambiguous. Moreover, when the identification between the party and its social groupings became too tenuous, every party faced the threat that another party might be formed or that the voters might switch to a party more specifically directed to their social and economic interests. A case in point is the National Populists, who split at least three times in the course of their brief history—each time sending out another party shoot.

Second, and more important, that many pressure groups could not afford to put all their eggs in one party basket helped to loosen the ties between parties and particular groups. Pressure groups could exert a significant influence in a coalition government only by operating across several party lines. The national organizations of industry, trade, and agriculture, for instance, cultivated relations with all the bourgeois parties and contributed heavily to their campaign funds.[14] Furthermore, the strongest professional groups were represented in the Reichstag without regard to party lines.[15] Important as these affiliations were to the individual parties and pressure groups, they also had an enormous impact upon the political system as a whole.

Cross-fertilization was the latent function of this pressure-group activity. Without a web of contact and affiliation that allowed interchange of information and ideas, it is inconceivable that there would have been a political system at all—multiplicity of self-contained entities within a state, to be sure,[16] but little or nothing to bind them

[13] The SPD won the largest plurality of any democratic party in the Republic with 37.9% of the vote in 1919. It dropped to 21.6% in the next election and never again reached 30%.

[14] Bracher, 199-200.

[15] Ernst Saemisch, "Wer vertritt das Volk?" *Die Tat*, XXI (March 1930), 932.

[16] For an apt description by a contemporary of the tendency toward party isolation, see Carl Schmitt, *Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923-1939* (Hamburg 1940), 189.

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together and relate them to one another. Pressure-group activity across party lines helped to keep those lines from hardening more rapidly than they did, and it prevented the parties from completely isolating themselves behind their ideological walls.[17] As a consequence of the immobilization of the Reichstag under Bruening after 1930, this extensive pattern of interchange and communication collapsed; the Republic itself would soon follow.

III

With the declaration of the Republic, it became absolutely essential for all German parties to develop organizations capable of enlisting the support of the voting masses.[18] Only the SPD among pre-republican German parties had set up its own bureaucracy; and the strength of its organization (like the weakness of the bourgeois organizations) reflected the role it had always wanted the people to play. But it was not alone in having a large following. After 1890, the *Volksverein fuer das katholische Deutschland* had served to deliver masses of votes to the Center party, although neither it nor many of its members were directly affiliated with the party.[19] The Center party itself had only a small membership, consisting chiefly of party notables.

In contrast to the SPD, the prewar bourgeois parties, liberal and conservative, were decentralized parties of notables (*Honoratiorenparteien*).[20] It was to them that the advent of the Republic presented the greatest organizational challenge. The Center party rationalized its organization and gradually took over the functions of the *Volksverein* itself. But, characteristically, the most truly liberal party of the Republic, the German Democratic Party, failed to meet the challenge and soon began its rapid decline. While its neighbor to the right, the German People's Party, was somewhat more successful, the greatest change came from the quarter where one might least have expected it—from the Prussian conservatives and the DNVP. Overnight the National Populists had created an organization that would

[17] Werner Liebe states, for instance, that "Economic cross-ties, as with the *Reichslandbund*, the *Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie* and the *Deutschnationalen Handlungsgehilfenverband* . . . bound the National Populists more and more strongly to the German People's Party and to the Center party. It furthered the process of inner accommodation of the moderate circles on the right with the bourgeois Republic" (*Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 1918-1924* [Duesseldorf 1956], 105).

[18] Max Weber, "Parlamentarisierung und Demokratisierung," *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Tuebingen 1958).

[19] Thomas Nipperdey, *Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918* (Duesseldorf 1961), 281.

[20] *Ibid.*, 42.

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increase their stature considerably by 1920 and in representation make them second only to the Social Democrats in 1924.[21]

Part of the impetus for this change came from the Christian Socialists, one of the five parties that had united in the DNVP in 1918. They had also enjoyed the fruits of an extraparty mass organization (*Bund der Landwirte*) before the war.[22] Formed in 1893, this association, which concentrated its strength in western and southern Germany, was estimated to have a peak membership of between 200,000 and 300,000; and although it too was formally independent of party, in fact it worked intimately with the Christian Socialists and was indispensable to them. These mass organizations had helped prepare the parties for the important changes they faced in Weimar. In several short years, the German democratic parties were to develop "a highly integrated, smoothly working party machinery which has an equal in England but no superior anywhere in the world."[23]

The very excellence of the bureaucratic organizations, however, tended to make the parties in Weimar undemocratic, unwieldy, and unresponsive to popular opinion. They were often criticized as parties of aged functionaries divorced from the people.[24] And despite other dramatic changes, the parties in Bonn seem to have changed little structurally. Perhaps today the change in electoral law from the "pure" list system has decreased the power of the party *Apparate*,[25] but the German parties still continue to be bureaucratically strong—particularly the SPD. The Bonn parties are also similar to those in Weimar in that their membership is made up of a relatively small percentage of the voters and it consists predominantly of older people. Duverger gives the following percentages of party voters who are members of some European socialist parties: Germany 9.1 per cent (1949); Sweden 35.5 per cent (1948); Norway 25.6 per cent (1949); France 8.4 per cent (1946); Austria 37.9 per cent (1949).[26] As far as

[21] Liebe, 30ff.

[22] Nipperdey, 249.

[23] Pollock, 865.

[24] Compare Herbert Sultan, "Zur Soziologie des modernen Parteiensystems," *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LV (1926), 109; Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (2 vols., New York 1928), II, 457; Ottmar Buehler, *Die Reichsverfassung vom 11. August, 1919* (2nd ed., Berlin 1921), 158.

[25] See Kitzinger, who gives considerable weight to the local constituency in the all-important selection of candidates (p. 64).

[26] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York 1954), 95. Perhaps in partial explanation of this disparity, Erich Reigrotzki has suggested that "The parties in Germany according to this [the frequency of membership in groups] have the character not of mass organizations, but much more so of local groups [or] clubs of notables . . ." (*Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik* [Tuebingen 1956], 191).

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one can tell from the few studies we have, there would not seem to be any important organizational differences either between the highly bureaucratized interest groups in Weimar and those in Bonn.[27]

IV

The intimacy of the ties between many pressure groups and parties in Weimar meant that each party could transmit the demands of its component groups directly into the legislative process. There was no need to try to harmonize or compromise them first with other conflicting demands within or outside the party, because the possibility of such conflict had already been minimized. Existing differences among various interests in society had been hidden, as it were, by segregating them behind party walls. Labor and management, Catholic and Protestant, farmer and entrepreneur did not have to iron out their differences within a party, for each party tended to represent non-conflicting interests—which is not at all to say that there was no internal party conflict; it is to say that it had been minimized.

As potential conflict was reduced *within* parties, it became all the more real *among* parties in the Reichstag, at least as long as that body continued to legislate. (With its complete paralysis after 1930, the only recourse for conflicting interests was to the party battle leagues, the *Kampfbuende*.) In the Reichstag, the hitherto unchecked competing demands entered a common hopper. Between the articulation of interests and their introduction into the legislative process, no intermediary stage had existed where differences of opinion had had to be curbed and interests compromised. Perhaps more important, life in the social and political institutions of Weimar (in the authoritarian family, schools, churches, political parties, military organizations) had not prepared the politicians for the reconciliation and compromise they faced in the Reichstag. But if settlement was to be reached within the polity, it had to occur in the legislature or, beyond it, in the administrative hierarchy. The paucity of legislation indicates how much compromise of this kind ever really took place.[28]

It is said that pressure groups concentrate their activities upon positions of power in a political system.[29] In fact, centers of pressure-group

[27] Rupert Breitling has pointed out in this connection that in general he believes the German groups, though less numerous, "have a higher degree of organization, a more monopolistic position, and are more privileged" than their counterparts in the United States (*Die Verbaende in der Bundesrepublik* [Meisenheim am Glan 1955], 2).

[28] Fritz Poetzsch-Heffter, "Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung," *Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, XIII (1925), 216.

[29] Almond, 278.

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activity are considered to be reliable indices of the loci of power in a political system.[30] Yet in Weimar, where the Reichstag was practically immobilized, pressure groups directed much of their activity to that body. The Reichstag, of course, had served as a center for pressure-group activities early in the Republic primarily because the identification between parties and pressure groups was so close. Also the Reichstag did pass some legislation prior to 1930. Extensive so-called "Aid to the East"—that is, to the Junkers—came as late as 1930.[31] Moreover, because the bureaucracy was ostensibly responsible to the Reichstag, pressure upon the administration would more likely be effective coming through a party than directly from a pressure group. Identification with a party also gave the pressure-group officials access to governmental agencies and circles, and the Reichstag gave them a national platform from which to broadcast their goals. Today, in Bonn, it is not that pressure groups do not wish to have the official status of parties[32] or at least to have the advantages which go with it. Many of them do, but conditions do not permit it. In Weimar they did: "In 1928 the Wulfmeyer family formed a party which was called 'Law and Renter's Protection Party.' As the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* remarked: 'Here is real anarchy—every family its own party.' "[33]

The very narrowness of interests being represented in the Reichstag conditioned that body's deliberations in several important respects. It increased the number of issues before the Reichstag by staggering proportions and overburdened that body to the point of collapse. And because the members of parliament could never transcend their differences, it also prohibited meaningful debate. Discussion in the Reichstag tended to be about matters of little consequence or *Weltanschauungen*.[34] And if discussion of middle-range issues was rare, even rarer was a piece of middle-range legislation, for the parties in Weimar could not reconcile their differences. Obviously, if a party has but one interest to represent, it is going to be much more dogmatic and

[30] Eckstein, 16.

[31] Bruno Buchta, *Die Junker und die Weimarer Republik: Charakter und Bedeutung der Osthilfe in den Jahren 1928-1933* (Berlin 1959).

[32] The Basic Law of Bonn broke with the German constitutional tradition in officially recognizing parties (Art. 21) as having a role in the formation of the will of the people. For a criticism of this change, see Werner Weber, *Spannungen und Kraefte im westdeutschen Verfassungssystem* (Stuttgart 1951), 20-23. Also Gerhard Leibholz, *Der Strukturwandel der modernen Demokratie* (Karlsruhe 1952).

[33] Pollock, 882.

[34] Gerhard A. Ritter, *Deutscher und britischer Parlamentarismus* (Tuebingen 1962), 45.

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uncompromising in that interest's behalf than if it represents a variety of interests. That one interest is its *raison d'être*. A party with a number of interests can afford to win a little here, lose a little there, and still maintain its integrity.

The consequences of differences in the breadth of party appeals are manifest in the differences between the extreme splinter parties and the parties which had some hand in governing Weimar. Because Weimar was a highly pluralistic and stratified society—and a republic—to have an effective parliamentary party, each of the five or six major parties had to make relatively broader appeals and attempt to aggregate at least several interests. In the Empire, it had sufficed for the German Conservative Party to restrict itself to the Junkers of East Elbia;[35] one of the first actions of the conservative party (DNVP) in the Republic was to extend its appeal geographically. That in turn necessitated a broadening of its social appeal. Any party that had expectations of participating in a government had to attract as many voters from as wide an area as possible, but the minor parties did not even make any pretensions of inclusiveness. That is the point—they were not interested in governing. They were merely carrying their particular interests into the governing processes. They were pressure groups turned parties.

The most broadly based party in Bonn, the Christian Democratic Union, is a coalition of a wide variety of social, economic, and geographic elements: farmers, workers, professional people, entrepreneurs, refugees, Bavarians, Rhinelanders.[36] But what is most striking about its make-up, what would have been inconceivable in Weimar, is its union of Catholics and Protestants—in almost equal proportions.[37] Possibly as anomalous would have been the recent Social Democratic overtures to German farmers. No party in Bonn, however, can hope to succeed to power without embracing all, or nearly all, major social groupings. The mellowed tone of debate in the Bundestag reflects that change.

V

Widespread in Weimar was the charge that the Reichstag was not legislating in the interests of the community. It was not without substance. The Reichstag could not ordinarily reach any agreement on

[35] Hans Booms, *Die Deutschkonservative Partei* (Duesseldorf 1954), 7-8.

[36] Although the data are now over twelve years old, useful in this connection is Friedrich A. von der Heydte and Karl Sacherl, *Soziologie der deutschen Parteien* (Munich 1955), esp. 288-93.

[37] Thomas Ellwein, *Klerikalismus in der deutschen Politik* (Munich 1955), 99.

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important policy issues when mere discussion of them was sufficient to cause a coalition split. But for that very reason, it was all the more urgent that every interest group not only be heard but satisfied—and satisfied in its boldest demands. Had there been more general legislation on the many pressing issues in Weimar, the need for each group to pursue its own policies on each issue would not have been as great, nor would the differences among groups have been as clear and distinct.

Between the area covered by party ideologies, on the one hand, and the everyday business matters of the legislature, on the other, there was an immense array of middle-range problems which the Republic had faced ever since its inception: schools, taxation, unemployment and other economic matters, social welfare, and farming—the list was interminable. But the parties had shown themselves to be impotent in dealing with most concrete problems. As a result, the Reichstag increasingly lost power and stature to the executive.[38] It was not that the Reichstag refused the programs submitted to it; most frequently it never had to make a choice. Only three of the seventeen different governments to be formed prior to Bruening in 1930 had to dissolve according to constitutional provision—two because of votes of censure and one because of a vote of lack of confidence.[39] The remainder collapsed from inability to reach agreement in the Cabinet —before the matter ever came up for a final vote in the Reichstag.

Near immobilization of the Reichstag early shifted the balance of power to the President and the bureaucracy in Weimar. Of 1,150 pieces of legislation enacted between 1920 and 1924, two-fifths came in the form of emergency statutes from the President.[40] Among them were some whose enactment was crucial: approximately forty economic emergency laws, for example. This helped not only to decrease the size of the legislature's workload, but also to relieve it of some pressure-group activity. It simultaneously overburdened a bureaucracy which had been schooled rigorously in objectivity.[41] And unfortunately the National Economic Council, which could have served as a channel for much of this activity, was born lame.

The Prussian civil service had always prided itself on being apolitical,

[38] Poetzsch-Heffter, 131.

[39] Poetzsch-Heffter, "Uebersicht ueber die in den Jahren 1924-1928 gestellten Vertrauens- und Misstrauensantraege," *Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, XVII (1929), 106ff.

[40] Poetzsch-Heffter, "Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung," 216.

[41] Theodor Eschenburg discusses and denounces the increasing pressures upon the bureaucracy in Weimar and particularly in Bonn (*Herrschaft der Verbaende* [Stuttgart 1955], esp. 13-16).

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and yet the bureaucracy in Weimar was being drawn inexorably into the very heart of the political process.[42] Aside from hampering effective administration, this pressure increased the tensions and strains of the civil service as a class and alienated it further from the Republic. Nevertheless, after 1930, when the Reichstag had been shunted out of the governmental process, there was nowhere else pressure groups could turn.

VI

From the point of view of a two-party system, Almond suggests, parties and pressure groups in highly fragmented multiparty systems are not markedly different in function.[43] Considered in their own right, however, the parties and pressure groups of Weimar were quite different: parties tended to be seats of ideology; pressure groups, associations for the representation of concrete interests. If there had been no such role differentiation, it would have been unnecessary to have both a party and several pressure groups operating in the same area at once, as the German Farmers' Party and the *Bauernverein*, *Landbund*, and *Bauernschaft* did or as the *Handwerkerpartei* and the various artisan pressure groups did.

Parties in Weimar served as the official keepers of ideological seals,[44] and pressure groups existed for the articulation of specific determinate demands. The bond between them came, of course, in that party ideology was a rationalization of the particular interests. Labor unions (SPD) and Marxism, for example; Junkers (DNVP) and Prussian conservatism; *Grossbuergertum* (DVP) and capitalism; Catholics (Z) and Catholicism. German parties had traditionally been charged with the exposition of a philosophy.[45] It perhaps strikes us as strange that their contemporaries exhorted them to become more rather than less philosophical.[46] Nearly every party commentator decried the increasing ties of parties with particular interests and their decreasing emphasis on philosophy.

[42] Ritter talks of "Die der Buerokratisierung der Politik parallel laufende Politisierung der Buerokratie . . ." (p. 51).

[43] Almond, 275-76.

[44] Werner Conze, "Die deutschen Parteien in der Staatsverfassung vor 1933," in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds., *Das Ende der Parteien 1933* (Duesseldorf 1960), 9.

[45] Sigmund Neumann, *Die deutschen Parteien* (Berlin 1932), 10-11; Gerhard Ritter, "Das politische Parteiwesen in Deutschland," in his *Lebendige Vergangenheit* (Munich 1958), 63.

[46] Emil Lederer, "Das oekonomische Element und die politische Idee im modernen Parteiwesen," *Zeitschrift fuer Politik*, v (1912); Fritz van Calker, *Wesen und Sinn der politischen Parteien* (Tuebingen 1928), 18.

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As one might expect, there are significant differences between interest-group activities in Weimar and Bonn. Not only were more groups probably active in Weimar, where German society was more highly stratified and heterogeneous, but also relatively more interest groups became politicalized as pressure groups. It was much more important, as we have seen, that each group pursue its own interests politically because the general policy machinery had been incapacitated. This urgency also affected the tone of pressure-group activity: it made the groups more dogmatic and adamant in their demands. Although pressure groups had focused their activities on the Reichstag at the outset simply because they were so closely identified with the parties, they steadily shifted the center of their activities to the executive and the administration. In Bonn activity tends to be directed at the party hierarchies[47] and the cabinet or shadow cabinet, rather than at Bundestag deputies and the administrative bureaus.[48]

The primary distinction, however, in party and pressure-group activity lies between the *parties* in Weimar and Bonn. Weimar parties could not seek out a common denominator among a broad range of interests as their successors in Bonn do. But they did formulate policies for the narrow range of interests they represented. The DNVP, for example, had a tariff policy and an agricultural policy—policies geared, in large part, to Junker interests and derived from a conservative philosophy. The Social Democrats also had a policy regarding tariffs and agriculture, but it was based on the interests of labor and deduced from Marxism. The Center party also had a policy on tariffs and agriculture—a Catholic one.[49] In other words, it was not the absence of policy or program ideas, but their ideological tone, their irreconcilability, their mutual exclusiveness that differentiated them from the programs of the parties in Bonn. Thus, in differentiating parties and pressure groups in two-party and multiparty systems, it seems more appropriate to distinguish between systems by the way in which policy is formulated, rather than by the presence or absence of programs.

Parties in modern states also serve as the channel for the recruitment of political leaders, and the differences between Weimar and Bonn in this regard are similarly striking. Basically, the same kind of

[47] Breitling, 91; Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford 1959), 90; Otto Stammer, "Interessenverbaende und Parteien," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, IX (1957), 595.

[48] See especially Eschenburg.

[49] Wilhelm Mommsen and Guenther Franz, *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme, 1918-1930* (Leipzig 1931).

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distinction has to be drawn—namely, between leadership of a narrow sector of society and leadership of a nation. Immediately apparent and most significant is that although the two-party system of Bonn might not be producing leaders of a different quality,[50] it has enabled the leaders whom it has chosen to lead. Unlike the Weimar party system, it has given them an opportunity to develop their leadership potential. Bauer, Wirth, Mueller, Cuno, Luther, even Stresemann—no Weimar chancellor approached the nearly universal respect and adulation offered an Adenauer. And although the quality of the Weimar chancellors (except for Stresemann) was not exceptional, the party system in Weimar tended to exaggerate their very mediocrity. The party system in Bonn bolsters and reinforces the man. Leadership in Weimar was leadership in spite of the party system, while in Bonn it is leadership because of and through the party system.

VII

That parties can form coalitions of broad general interests in society has a very important impact upon the way they function. What was it that kept them from combining interests in Weimar? Surely this is the question, rather than why did they not *want* to embrace a diversity of social interests. It was to their own advantage to have as much and as wide an appeal as possible if they wished to influence governmental policies. (We assume that at least some of them did seek to exercise power.) Why was it labor *or* management, labor *or* farmer, Catholic *or* Protestant, Bavarian *or* Prussian, and not a union of these elements? To exercise power in Bonn, parties have had to offer themselves as coalitions which cut across differing strata of the social structure, and they have succeeded in doing so. Why not the parties in Weimar?

One possible answer, it seems to me, lies in the political orientations of the voters. People in Weimar viewed their interests as being mutually exclusive and irreconcilable. They would not have voted for a party leader or a party that had tried to form as broad a social coalition as possible. In fact, they did not. The DNVP sincerely tried to broadcast an image of itself as a party of the people;[51] many parties did. Witness, for example, how many times one encounters the word *Volk* in the names of Weimar parties. The DNVP, however, made

[50] For a comparison of elites, including political elites, in Weimar with those in Bonn, see Lewis J. Edinger, "Post-totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960).

[51] Liebe, 13.

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only nominal gains in the long run; and made them, in large part, because it was the successor to the earlier party of Junkers. In the popular image it remained a party of East Elbian landowners and large industry. Much the same could be said for the other major parties in Weimar—the Social Democrats and the German Populists, the Centrists and the German Democrats.

Voters in Weimar perceived their interests as worker or bourgeois, businessman or farmer, Catholic or Protestant, as being mutually exclusive. They tended to look upon the political process, in turn, as a game of winner take all. How could one party (like the CDU today) possibly pretend to represent such diverse and disparate interests? On the contrary, because it was not limited by cross-membership or competing and conflicting interests, each party could and was expected to make bold specific demands. As a voter in such a system, however, to choose the party most specifically geared to one's particular status and outlook was to run the danger of wasting one's vote. And in fact hundreds of thousands of votes were lost at every election by the failures of parties to attain the necessary 60,000 vote minimum;[52] still, the number of parties never decreased. "Better nothing at all than a compromise solution" is what these voters were in effect saying.

What holds for individuals holds *a fortiori* for associations in Weimar. In the first place, interest groups everywhere are organized around specific interests. Within them there is, relative to the compromise that has to occur among interests in society, little need for compromise. But second, there were in Weimar practically no attitude groups of a kind similar to our broadly based civic associations where people with potentially different interests could meet. As much as possible, conflicting interests had been organizationally segregated at all levels; neither the individual as an individual nor as a member of a group had to learn to reconcile major differences. Any political compromise that occurred had to occur in the Reichstag, but no one, least of all the *party* deputies themselves, had been prepared by society for the task they faced.

This process of segregation within society culminated in the democratic parties' attempts to encompass all areas of an individual's life. By 1933 affiliation with a particular party tended to absorb the whole man in all his capacities.[53] It was within his party citadel that he and

[52] In 1924, for example, the number of votes so lost was 710,000 and in 1928 it was 1,320,000 (James K. Pollock, Jr., "The German Elections of 1928," *American Political Science Review*, XXII [August 1928], 700).

[53] This process was only a part, but nevertheless a significant part, of the tendency throughout the Republic for more and more spheres of life and more and more

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his family carried on many of their activities, and it was from behind a party framework that he looked out upon the world. From the party organizations for young people,[54] to the variety of party activities designed for the wife and mother, to his own participation in the party's non-political organizations, he was first, last, and always committed to a particular political party.[55]

The formation of party battle leagues (*Kampfbuende*) was the last stage in this process.[56] In organizing the *Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold* in 1924, the parties of the Weimar Coalition were seeking to resist the increasing popularity of associations of the Free Corps type such as the (*schwarz-weiss-rot*) *Stahlhelm*. But in the *Reichsbanner*, as in the *Kampfstaffeln* of the DNVP, the *Rote Frontkaempferbund* of the Communists, and the *Sturmabteilung* of the Nazis, the goal was one and the same: political quarantine, complete integration of the individual under the party banner, and his isolation as much as possible from other "contaminating" influences. By the end of the Republic, the parties—strictly speaking—were no longer parties; they had become movements. Society itself had been divided into a multiplicity of self-contained, non-communicating armed hierarchies. The attempt to reach rational settlements in the Reichstag had failed; differences would now be settled in the streets.

In Bonn this sense of urgency, of life and death, surrounding party and pressure-group activities is fortunately missing. And it is missing, above all, because the government has been able to legislate. The integration of millions of refugees (more than one of every four West Germans today is a refugee) is perhaps the Republic's most outstanding domestic achievement, all the more so when one tries to imagine what such a burden would have done to Weimar. The success

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people to be politicalized—art, theater, drama, the very old, and the very young. No activity and no person was immune from politicalization. See among others Roger H. Wells, *German Cities* (Princeton 1932), 93: "That city government is far more politicalized now than before the Revolution is generally admitted. . . ." Also Felix Bertaux, *A Panorama of German Literature* (New York 1935), 216, 277.

[54] "In almost every school class there are, five years after the revolution, even political parties among the children!" (Wilhelm Flitner, "Der Krieg und die Jugend," in Otto Baumgarten, *et al., Geistige und sittliche Wirkungen des Krieges in Deutschland* [Stuttgart 1927], 304).

[55] The DNVP, for example, had a *Bismarckbund* for youths of 18 and above; in each of its local organizations it had special committees to deal with men and women in different walks of life; and for the men, it had its own *Kampfbund* after 1930. Until then, the party had relied upon the closely akin *Stahlhelm*. Also very important were the party newspapers and motion pictures that were at the disposal of the DNVP through the Hugenberg combine. Hugenberg became the party leader in 1928.

[56] See Ernst H. Posse, *Die politischen Kampfbuende Deutschlands* (2nd ed., Berlin 1931); Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).

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in that area, however, is only part of an extensive program of social welfare all of which rests upon the remarkable economic recovery. There is conflict and competition among pressure groups in Bonn—a great deal of it. But in contrast to Weimar, "win a little here, lose a little there" seems to be a more characteristic attitude. A greater margin of error has been permissible.

VIII

If the differences between a two-party and a highly fragmented multiparty system are so great, the final and most important question we can ask about party and pressure-group politics is why a system tends toward one pattern or the other.[57] One possible condition for a multiparty system has already been suggested—namely, exclusive and irreconcilable voter orientations. Another way of saying much the same thing is that such a system is marked by an absence of political consensus. It was, however, not merely an absence of agreement on fundamentals that characterized Weimar Germany; it was much more intense disharmony and disagreement.[58] Certainly no political institution—most definitely not parliament—had the universal support of the German people. To the forces on the right, the Reichstag epitomized a system of *Kuhhandel* politics—i.e., of politics in which the interests of the state are bartered back and forth like cattle.[59] On the other hand, the President, particularly Hindenburg, and the bureaucracy were distrusted as being partial to Junkerdom.

The first German Republic followed immediately upon the most rapid period of industrialization that any nation had ever experienced, and the processes of industrialization continued throughout the Republic. Intense rationalization of business and industry, for example, characterized the period between 1924 and 1929.[60] As a consequence of industrialization, all Germany's social patterns were in rapid flux; and, to make matters worse, there were the turmoil and losses of war and catastrophic inflation. Confusion and disagreement regarding social and po-

[57] Although it is not of major significance, one cannot discount completely the impact of the electoral laws upon the party system. Obviously, electoral laws have made it more difficult for minor parties to compete in Bonn. But as we saw above, the 60,000 vote minimum did not discourage minor parties in Weimar. For a description of the electoral laws in Bonn, see Kitzinger, ch. 2. For a discussion of the impact of electoral laws in general upon a party system, see Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics* (Glencoe, Ill., 1963), Part IV.

[58] Neumann speaks of the lack of a "*Wir-Bewusstsein*" and "insufficient social homogeneity" in explanation of the party crisis (p. 106).

[59] Carl Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Hamburg 1933), 23-27.

[60] Robert A. Brady, *The Rationalization Movement in German Industry* (Berkeley 1933).

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litical norms were bound to be widespread.[61] Moreover, Germany had shifted overnight from the most absolutist Western regimes to the most radically democratic. The Weimar Constitution was hailed in its day as the most nearly perfect of democratic constitutions. It featured democratic devices from many states of the Western world, including the United States, Switzerland, Belgium, and Great Britain. Formally it was the most direct and popular democracy one could imagine in a state the size of Germany. Its very radicality, however, against a background of centuries of absolutism meant that large numbers of people would be alienated from it.

If a fragmented party system is characterized by extreme disunity, one might assume that Germany has experienced a decrease in political disunity since the fall of the first Republic. The evidence is necessarily indirect, but it comes from several sources. Most important is the overall decrease in social differences.[62] The middle class has shown a marked increase in size since Weimar, and class lines are no longer as clearly distinguishable. Otto Kirchheimer, for instance, has suggested that "Workers in general have ceased to consider themselves a specific class with a specific mission."[63] Class differences continue to exist; to surmount them, however, is no longer as difficult as it was in Weimar. West Germany, that is to say, has displayed a high rate of social mobility.[64]

Not only have differences among classes diminished and relaxed, but also the differences within the family units of these classes. "The social events of the war and postwar periods," writes the German sociologist, Helmut Schelsky, "have called forth extraordinarily important changes in the situation and structure of the German family."[65] In general, the changes he refers to have been toward a partnership with equality of rights within the family.[66] Moreover, the framework of

[61] See Hermann Hass, *Sitte und Kultur im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Hamburg 1932), 141; Georg Steinhausen, *Deutsche Geistes und Kulturgeschichte* (Halle 1931), esp. 11.

[62] "A rise in the social scale at one end and a fall at the other have produced one relatively equal and uniform social class [in West Germany]" (Helmut Schelsky, "Elements of Social Stability," *German Social Science Digest* [Hamburg 1955], 115). See also Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies," *Daedalus*, XLIII (Winter 1964).

[63] "West German Trade Unions," *World Politics*, VIII (July 1956), 507.

[64] Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (1958), 10-11. He concludes that "The weight of the evidence rests on the side of the conclusion that the consequences of social stratification and social mobility are now operating to decrease traditional class-consciousness and to increase social consensus concerning internal matters."

[65] Helmut Schelsky, *Die skeptische Generation* (Duesseldorf 1957), 127.

[66] *Ibid.*, 148.

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government in Bonn is not—as was Weimar's—radically democratic; by that token, it is more consonant both with German political traditions and family authority patterns.

If there is indeed less political discord in Bonn, the style of politics might also be expected to reflect that change. Voters and politicians alike are probably less ideological and dogmatic, more pragmatic and concrete in their demands. "Germans tend to be satisfied with the performance of their government," Almond and Verba found, "but to lack a more general attachment to the system on the symbolic level. Theirs is a highly pragmatic—probably overpragmatic—orientation to the political system. . . ."[67] In the same vein, Schelsky called the postwar generation *Die skeptische Generation* because German youth are so skeptical of ideologies and so heavily oriented toward results. Extremist parties, right and left, have fared very poorly in Bonn at the hands of both the voters and the courts. The Social Democrats have rid themselves of their Marxist ideology[68] and their open hostility to the Church. There has been a marked decline in pitched political battles, political murders, and political activity in the streets; party battle leagues are unknown. Numerically, Protestants and Catholics are more evenly matched. The restrained wage demands of the German worker in the immediate postwar world and the absence of political strikes are further indices of the magnitude of the change since Weimar.[69] Bonn, in fact, has been a paragon of orderly and moderate political activity. And if general political system affect is low, as Almond and Verba note, agreement on the goals of the system is overwhelming.

One could hardly expect a high degree of system identification in Bonn, considering, first, its brief history; second, its indefinite nature until the framework for a united Germany is settled; and, third, its origins during a period of occupation and uncertainty about the future of Germany. But in the short run, general system affect would not seem to be as important for party and pressure-group as the decrease in disunity. Despite the absence of political affect, political parties in Bonn have been able to form coalitions of diverse social groups simply because the differences among groups are no longer so deep and divisive. Moreover, that the demands from the system are so concrete suggests that the parties can combine and reconcile them with other competing interests—something the parties of Weimar were unable to do with ideologies.

[67] *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 429.

[68] See the *Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* (Bonn 1959), esp. 13-14. This is the so-called Godesburger Program.

[69] Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of the German Revival* (New Haven 1955), 11-12.

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Much has been written about the "miracle" of German recovery from World War II. For a relatively brief period in Weimar—for the five years between 1924 and 1929, to be exact—the German nation also enjoyed the fruits of an economic "miracle." In those five short years Germany managed to recover from a condition which experts believed would cripple the country for half a century. Yet the differences between the two periods of recovery are as night and day. For the purposes at hand, the most important difference lies in the changed political orientations. Whether or not one happened to be a Marxist in Weimar, Marxism defined the framework for analysis. The political or economic process was looked upon as a struggle between workers and management in regard to mutually exclusive and necessarily hostile class interests, and it was a struggle to the end.[70] Relatively speaking, in Bonn it has not been a question of the improvement of conditions for the workers or of more profits for the entrepreneurs, but of mutual gain and satisfaction through increased productivity. Collective bargaining and codetermination have all but replaced armed struggles, political strikes, and lockouts.[71]

Why has there been such a widespread decline in social, political, and economic differences, in ideological differences in the broadest sense? What brought about these dramatic changes? Most important, I believe, was the reign of the Third Reich itself. National Socialism came into power as a social revolution,[72] and it instituted policies that brought far-reaching changes in the German social structure. It sought to destroy all traditional social differences and to reorient a totally coordinated society around the *common* "ties of blood." The rise with Nazism of a new class of leaders predominantly from the lower middle class,[73] the release under totalitarianism of the individual from all traditional ties, and his subsequent incorporation into the new mass movement all led to a lessening of social extremes. Burckhardt talks of a citizenry's being equalized under dictatorship; how much more equal men can be made under totalitarianism! But in addition one cannot discount the impact of the war: loss of the territory east of the Elbe which was the seat of Junkerdom; exodus from the east and extensive internal migration; devastation, turmoil, and poverty in postwar Germany—all these also operated to lessen the divisions and differences within the society.

[70] See Bracher, chap. 8.

[71] Theodor Geiger speaks of this as the "institutionalization of class antagonism" (*Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmeltztiegel* [Cologne 1949], 184).

[72] Hermann Rauschning, *The Revolution of Nihilism* (New York 1939), esp. 87-88.

[73] Daniel Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford 1951).

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One relatively large segment of the West German population still feels alienated by increasing industrialization and the course of post-war politics: the German farmer. He is particularly uneasy about the pressure from Common Market developments. Alone among major economic groups in Bonn today, the farmer continues to retain some vestiges of the political radicalism of Weimar. His marches on Bonn recall the activities of the so-called "Green Front"[74] after 1928—except that today he marches with a tractor. There also exists a striking disparity between the farmers' high percentage of voter turnout, on the one hand, and their general lack of political awareness, on the other hand, as compared with all other economic and social groups.[75] According to Reigrotzki, "The independent farmers stand behind every other group in their intellectual participation in politics not only with respect to the depth of their political awareness, but also with respect to their preparedness to make a political decision."[76] The independent farmers, he suggests, appear to be part of the group with the "highest opinion rigidity."[77] All observers agree that the farmers are among the most powerful groups in Bonn today, if not *the* most powerful.[78] The future of the Bonn Republic will depend upon its ability to enter this problem area boldly and with imagination.

[74] Erwin Topf, *Die Gruene Front* (Berlin 1933).
[75] Reigrotzki, 103.
[76] *Ibid.*, 242.
[77] *Ibid.*, 105.
[78] In addition to Pritzkoleit cited above, see Eschenburg, 65-66.

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FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS

By PAUL Y. HAMMOND*

SERIOUS literature about foreign policy, when it is not primarily historical, can be classed in three ways. It is either pragmatic, attempting to solve specific problems through a mastery of specific data; or it is what I will call unitary, arguing for comprehensive solutions on the basis of some general vision of the truth; or it is pluralistic, asserting the value of many approaches and denying the certainty of any one.

Of the three, the pragmatic argument is the most satisfactory only because it makes the most modest claim: that it applies to the immediate case only. Despite its specificity, however, it involves criteria which are either dogmatic (i.e., they claim standing as truth) or pluralistic (i.e., they claim validity as a method of pursuing truth when confidence is low that it will ever be captured). The unitary approach has survived remarkably well side by side with scientific skepticism, perhaps owing to the attractions of *raison d'état*, or the appeal of expertise, or simply the grace and charm of writings like those of George Kennan, or the authoritative ring of other postwar realists like Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. The pluralistic approach is supported by a growing body of serious writing on democratic political processes, but it does not begin to cope with the demands of necessity when confronted by *raison d'état*, or by the postwar realities.

In particular cases, the issue between the unitary and the pluralistic approach may be focused on whether one should seriously rely upon the development and skillful application of a satisfactory set of tools for analyzing and making policy, or on whether the analysis of policy-making should be confined predominantly to describing the political process of policy-making. This article is an attempt to deal quite explicitly with the relation between the two approaches in a discussion primarily confined to United States foreign policy.

I. The Dialectic of Administrative Politics

In its fullest conception, the problem of political control in the field of external affairs assumed the general dimensions it now presents in

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the late nineteenth century—after the Franco-Prussian War, by one reckoning, or after the extension of the suffrage and the rise of the yellow press, by another. At any rate, the problem is composed of elements that can be associated with both reckonings. On the one hand, the enormous possibilities for combining resources in time and space in the prosecution of wars and, equally, the potential consequences of not being able to do so put governments contingently in the hands of their military. On the other hand, the development of mass electorates and the mobilization of a mass public opinion in the politically developed states of Western Europe tended to loosen the material and political constraints on the size of national effort in war.

The issue of control thus had to be defined in two ways, neither of them altogether new, but each involving stakes of an appalling order of magnitude. First, the question was how to keep the military establishment non-partisan, yet still sensitive to and flexible about matters involving domestic values. A look at the changes which had to be made in the force posture of the United States between, say, 1900 and 1920 will indicate how relatively new this problem was in American politics. Second, given the mobilization requirements made evident by the Franco-Prussian War and the centralization of authority usually considered essential in military operations (and reinforced by technical and administrative innovations which made greater centralization feasible), how was it possible to maintain political control over war? Two additional factors are commonly associated with this second control problem—the nature of war itself, and the radical separation of war and policy in certain Western political traditions. These factors were, I would hold, dependent, not dominant, variables, but they were persistent and troublesome ones nonetheless. They, in turn, posed additional questions: How to control war when it seemed to be so uncontrollable? How to control the actions of those assigned to prosecute war when it seemed essential to the success of their efforts that they be free from controls or restraints? It should be noted that, together, these questions pose the dilemma of strategic efficiency and domestic political control in which authoritarian rationality is pitted against egalitarian pluralism—in theory, what in the American context is sometimes referred to as Hamiltonianism vs. Jacksonianism.

The state as actor in foreign relations may be thought of as a political system composed of three sectors: the public governmental, the privileged governmental, and the non-governmental, or private, sectors. The public government consists primarily of the national legislature, together with the chief executive and his leading political associates or

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subordinates in the executive branch. The privileged governmental sector is roughly the bureaucracy, or the executive branch beneath the highest political levels. It is called privileged because its ultimate assertion of hierarchical loyalty is in the claim of executive privilege. The boundary between the public and privileged sectors is plain enough where it falls between the legislature and the bureaucracy, because of a convenient constitutional arrangement in the United States and, in some degree, in other modern constitutional governments. But where the boundary segregates executive branch officials from each other, it is, like the distinction between policy and administration, more an analytical convenience than a denotable fact. The private sector consists of a network of political interests that provide a political environment within which the government, public and privileged, functions. Together, the three sectors constitute, in one carefully explicated term, the national governmental process.[1]

The network of relationships that binds the private sector to the governmental sectors is the instrument of domestic political control. It may be considered to perform three major functions: cognitive, responsive, and aggregative. The cognitive function is to produce, transmit, and evaluate the information which serves as the basis of policy-making. The responsive function is to meet the objectives of policy with appropriate actions and programs. The aggregative function is to gain support for courses of action decided upon as government policies.

In this article our attention will be limited as much as possible to the cognitive and responsive functions. We shall, for instance, not be concerned specifically with the transactions among the sectors within a political system that produce not only consensus about a particular set of objectives but support for the measures undertaken by the government in pursuit of those objectives. To be sure, the distinction between response and aggregation is no more than a point of emphasis. Response deals with what to do, and aggregation with how to gain consent and support for what to do. The first is primarily concerned with developing the best answer; the second, with obtaining the best effort in support for it. In politics, however, the two are ultimately integrated.

In democratic political systems—and certainly in the United States—responsiveness to political pressures is a legitimate mode of behavior in many, though not in all, cases. But it is also legitimate for govern-

[1] See, e.g., David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York 1951).

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ment to respond to its own internally derived standards—to standards of consistency and efficiency, and to the requirements for and the advantages of organized effort. Political responsiveness and operational efficiency, then, form a kind of dialectic, a coexistence in which each imposes control upon the other. As was said earlier, our concern will be with the cognitive and responsive requirements for the making and executing of foreign and military policy and with the controls imposed upon meeting these requirements in the setting of administrative politics.

II. Empirical Methods in the Study of Administration

Some of the problems of analyzing administrative politics lie in the methods used. It may therefore be helpful to begin with a discussion of these methods, even if it is brief and somewhat arbitrary.

Pluralism has been nothing if not fashionable in American political studies. Among other things, it has helped to justify the enlarged bureaucracies and the expanded executive powers—the neo-Hamiltonianism—which were a consequence of the economic and social crises of the interwar period, explaining them in terms of the same economic and social categories that actuated the social reform of that period. More broadly, it provided the basis for the development of what has been called empirical democratic theory. Political pluralism has served not only to tame by explanation the executive and administrative power requirements of a democratic age but also to explicate other political functions associated with the modern democratic state.[2]

In the field of defense policy and politics, Huntington published a powerful elaboration of the pluralist argument in *The Common Defense* in 1961.[3] In an earlier work, *The Soldier and the State*, he had attacked administrative pluralism as it applied to civilian control of the military, insisting that only if a clear line of division was maintained between military and civilian functions could control be "objective" and effective, and the military profession be kept professionally intact.[4] His theory ran against the grain of the pragmatic interpretations of politics reflected in the tenet of post-World War II public administration scholarship that policy and administration could not be sepa-

[2] For example, in *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1950), Gabriel Almond provided an enrichment of the systematic concept of public opinion, with particular reference to the potentiality of public opinion for rational behavior despite the notable inadequacies in individual opinions revealed by opinion surveys (i.e., gross inconsistency and a frighteningly meager and inaccurate information base).

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York 1961).

[4] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 189-92, 260-63.

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rated, for Huntington's military-nonmilitary distinction rested on their separation. In *The Common Defense*, on the other hand, he surveyed from several perspectives the development of American military policy since World War II, each time explaining these developments in terms of a bargaining process within the executive branch of the federal government which he characterized as "legislative." According to Huntington, this process cut across, though it did not eliminate, distinctions like those upon which he had depended earlier in his concept of "objective" civilian control of the military.

Huntington's qualified optimism that the system works poses an issue which is fundamental to any appraisal of national security policy. It is the contention that rationality in administrative politics rests upon the same premise that rationality in the outcome of the legislative process does; that an open system of bargaining and debate will produce the most rational policy possible, even though the legislative process can be seen as wholly "political." The question, then, is whether administrative politics is, as Huntington asserts, comparable to legislative politics.

Rationality can be defined broadly according to two standards. One is internal consistency; the other, correspondence. Bureaucracies try to be consistent, but get out of touch with reality. Popular assemblies are by design sensitive to certain elements of the real political world, public perception and opinion, but pay the price of internal consistency. Sometimes they are also more sensitive than the bureaucracies they sponsor to other elements of political reality, such as the political ramifications of nuclear proliferation or the impact of aid programs on foreign business activities. This is so, however, not because they have more competent intelligence facilities. On the contrary, bureaucracies are likely to be superior in their perception of reality to the extent that perception depends upon an organized intelligence operation which gathers and processes information systematically, whereas the advantage enjoyed by the popular assembly in collecting and processing information derives from the very lack of routinization and consistency.

We may therefore as a schematic convenience identify legislative bodies with correspondence and executive bodies with internal consistency. A circumstance where this general statement would hold, for example, could be stated as follows: The impact of Congressional interest on established (i.e., on-going) public policies will usually be to challenge the administrative rationale of the program in the interest of facing more squarely a particular set of facts with which the pro-

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gram must cope. If we are to take these schematic relationships seriously, however, they need much greater refinement.

Pluralism, or group political analysis—in the present context they can be taken as the same thing—has many strengths but suffers from three important inadequacies when it is used to analyze the problems of control and efficiency in the modern democratic state. (1) It explains the bureaucracy's cognition of political data found within the domestic political system far better than it does any sensitivity of the bureaucracy to data located outside it. (2) It is often dependent upon perspectives of extreme detachment which limit its utility to participants in the political process. And (3) it is a culture-bound, "shallow" analysis of what are in fact "deep" political phenomena.

A particular problem for modern democracies, though one whose dimensions are difficult to estimate in the conduct of foreign relations, is the predominant response they give to their electoral constituencies. To the extent that the electorate is preoccupied with domestic, "bread-and-butter" issues, foreign policy can suffer from a lack of political support or popular understanding. In the classical liberal model of this phenomenon, the result would be passivity in foreign affairs as the state reflects the electorate's interest in the pursuit of material well-being through domestic means. Actually, this classical model can be inaccurate. Foreign adventures have, as an observable fact, been supported by publics which came to see them as solutions to problems of domestic well-being. The classical liberal model of the democratic state, therefore, is not particularly reassuring at present levels of technology.

There is nothing inherent in the methods of group political analysis which ties them to this liberal model or prevents them from making provision for adaptations (either potential or observable) which allow the popularly based state to address itself directly to matters of foreign relations. It is not necessary first to translate foreign policy issues into domestic interests, any more than it is to define and explain domestic interests entirely in terms of the material interests of classical liberalism, for modern group political studies have considerably broadened the conception of motivation inherited from nineteenth-century liberalism with which they began.

A more serious symptom of the inadequacy of methods as they actually are applied is the prominent use of the analogue of the legal consummation of a commercial negotiation—the contract—in political analysis.

Bargaining is only one of several plausible versions of group political

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dynamics which can be used for analytical purposes, but it is seemingly precise and analytically convenient. It is a model of a single event or of a small cluster of events—a transaction, as it is sometimes termed. Its limitations can be demonstrated, first, by placing it in a larger analytical context (though still one of group political processes) where other explanations of what happened can be shown to account for as much or more data; and, second, by exposing the prerequisites for effective bargaining. In the larger analytical context, aggregative models which describe the building of a majority in terms of an intricate process of mutual self-adjustment do not afford bargaining an explicit role, or possibly any role at all. Explicitness, of course, may not be important. It may be possible to do a great deal of what amounts to bargaining implicitly without any actual negotiations and without an expressed "deal." This leads us to the second limitation.

The more that bargaining is understood in political analysis to depart from the explicitness of a formal negotiation ending with an enforceable contract—the more, that is, that the political phenomena to be interpreted are taken as amounting to informal and implicit bargaining—the more the political analysis involved is dependent upon the existence of a basic political or social order. Bargaining requires a capability to signal and communicate, to discern one's interests and derive means for achieving them, to interact, to predict the behavior of the other party, and possibly to sanction that behavior. Where these capabilities are formal and explicit, patently they are a part of the social and political order. Where they are implicit, they are equally dependent on that order. Implicit bargaining can be expected to reflect especially the problems of communication between the parties involved in the social and political context in which the bargaining takes place. It will reflect also the confidence of each party in its capacity to define and pursue its own interests, to predict the behavior of the other party, and to hedge against predictive error. The terms of the tacit bargain, as well as the means by which they are reached, should reflect expectations about enforcement which in turn rest on interpretations of the social and political order. However, since the selection and interpretation of the available data will depend upon their conformity to an abstract (if also implicit) mode, it should be expected that similarities among cases, not their variations, will be stressed. Put this way, it should be clear that bargaining analysis can be only the beginning of a political analysis, although it may be a very good beginning indeed.

One effect of concentration on discrete or individual political trans-

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actions in bargaining analysis is the emphasis which it gives in turn to lateral political relationships. The conception of the political marketplace—like its prototype, the liberal economic marketplace—gives much prominence to decentralized, individualistic (actually, group, in the sense that that word is now used in political studies) activities and the over-all rationale for them.

In order to comprehend the underlying dimensions of the social phenomena involved, it is necessary to probe beneath the formal prescriptions which must persist in the official versions of public and private organizations. But these formal organizations cannot simply be dismissed in political analysis. At the minimum, their existence will affect the structure of social phenomena. Beyond that, in a nontraditional society—one in which the bureaucracy is viewed as an instrument of governing which should be modified whenever necessary —the continued existence in the public bureaucracy of any particular formal arrangement must be taken as largely intentional, and as the consequence of some fairly vigorous and influential convictions about its desirability.

The formal organization sustains a network of relationships and a schedule of varied functions and controls which by no means eliminate individualistic bargaining, but, equally, are not limited to these lateral activities. The political analyst, whether he considers himself a pluralist or not, is bound to recognize the activities so often characterized nowadays as bargaining; equally, he should not ignore the political context in which the bargain is struck, particularly the bureaucratic order, which has functions that bargaining patently does not cover, or at least cover well.

Legitimate government is not just a condition; it is a more or less stable capability composed of men and resources. Unless we are to deny the legitimacy of government, we are probably obliged to recognize the hierarchy and the division of function which are used both formally and informally to organize the resources and activities of government. They are therefore factors of special significance among the phenomena with which we are concerned. They are and they ought to be important in the government. They can be nothing less for the political analyst.

By looking for the evidence that behavior in a public or a private bureaucracy consists of implicit or informal contract-making, one can normally fulfill his expectations readily, but quite possibly to the neglect of phenomena which have organic rather than individualistic analogues. To neglect these is to miss the crucial characteristics of ad-

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ministrative politics, the mixture of authoritarian *and* equalitarian elements, the hierarchy of authority *and* the lateral relationships. It is this hierarchical relationship which empirical political studies have been the least prone to take seriously.

III. Administrative Politics: The Setting as Determinant

Similar political methods will have dissimilar uses and consequences as they are applied in different sets of circumstances. An obvious categorization which will help to explicate the bureaucracy as a political arena in developed constitutional orders is one intended to distinguish the differences in context imposed by the legal order within which bureaucracy works. Legal orders could be listed as extraconstitutional, constitutional, statutory, and administrative. Classes of politics could then be described by variations in the mixture of these four classes of the legal order. Partisan politics, for example, would have a high proportion of extraconstitutionality, a growing but still small element of statutory constraints, some structuring to accord with the constitutional entities whose control is the objective of party activity, and very little constraint by governmental administrative act. Legislative politics, for another example, would be predominantly though not exclusively constitutional. The mixture here would reflect, on the one hand, the large role played by lateral relationships among fellow executive officials with independent constituencies and, on the other, the legislative-executive rivalry. The setting of judicial politics might be described as another variant mixture of these components. Leaving aside the question of whether executive and administrative politics should be regarded as separate classes, let us examine the setting of administrative politics.

What is striking about this setting in comparison with that of legislative and party politics is the prominent role that intention or conscious choice has played in its development. The bureaucracy operates within certain fixed limits which are traditional-conventional and legal-constitutional, but the predominant components of its setting are statutory and administrative—rules provided by act of Congress or by the executive chain of command. It is difficult to characterize the consequences of this mixture. The setting can be, and has been, changed more rapidly and readily than that of partisan politics; yet partisan politics is more flexible than administrative politics, for it operates in a less structured setting. Being more the consequence of recent deliberate actions than is legislative politics, moreover, administrative politics might be re-

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garded as more rational. (This is, of course, an anti-historical standard of rationality. One might argue quite the opposite—that the longer the basic structures which control politics have remained unchanged, the more rational they are, because they have withstood the test of time.) Yet legislative politics coincides more nearly than does administrative politics with at least one model of anti-historical rationality—the marketplace for the free exchange of ideas. What we can say at the very most, then, is that the administrative setting can be and probably is controlled by deliberate act more than are legislative or partisan politics.

Theoretically, it should be possible to rank political acts along a continuum from an extreme one-to-one lateral relationship to an extreme superior-subordinate hierarchical relationship. We could approach the task of analyzing the lateral-hierarchical variation as a distributional-description problem, summarizing our findings with schedules or profiles of executive-branch and legislative-branch phenomena. But it might be very difficult as a practical matter to rank phenomena according to their lateral-hierarchical value. The difficulty would be that each phenomenon occurs within a more general context in which the immediate relationship might have the characteristics, say, of a strongly lateral relationship, while the behavior of each actor would in fact have been strongly influenced by hierarchical pressures not in the foreground of the phenomenon. This multiple effect, for example, has often been the problem in analyzing cabinet-level activities in the United States government. Even when one keeps in mind the primacy of the President in relation to each and every person involved in cabinet and National Security Council deliberations, it is possible to overestimate the lateral quality of cabinet-level discussions. In the American system, the Presidential cabinet is a forum that provides the chief executive with advice which presumably he cannot get as conveniently in any other way. But a President cannot count on his cabinet members' either thinking of or telling him everything he wants to be told in a cabinet meeting. In particular, cabinet members may be more willing to talk to the President in private. What is unsaid, though known, may be much more important to the President than what is said. If he is aware of this problem, he will take steps to evoke the responses he wants, but he can never be certain that he has brought out all of them.

Conceiving of the cabinet as a set of lateral relationships actually depends upon viewing the President as an observer of its deliberations

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rather than as one who directs its course. When one recognizes that the President has an interest intrinsic to his office, as it were—in who attends a meeting, what the agenda is, what positions are explored or staffed out beforehand, and where the best data and the best expert judgments concerning an agenda item can be obtained—the apparent lateral character of the deliberation begins to yield to its hierarchical elements. In fact, to the extent that the cabinet is a President's cabinet —i.e., to the extent that it deals with issues and interests in *his* terms— it would perhaps be more appropriate to consider it a predominantly hierarchical phenomenon. The lateral character of its proceedings would then denote the extent to which it falls short of performing its President-serving function as it operates instead as a forum in which equals meet to bargain, deal, and exchange.

Administrative politics takes place in an environment in which it is impossible to neglect either hierarchical or lateral relations—the foreclosing of competition within a bureaucracy, which is the tangible manifestation of authority, or the promotion of the competitive pursuit of competitive objectives. In addition to the openness of a public bureaucracy—particularly one in the American setting, including the competition in means and over ends, the flexibility, the redundancy, the sensitivity to fragmentary public wishes, the skepticism about collective judgments and objectives—there exists something quite the opposite, a commitment to consistency, and hence to inflexibility, to a centralized determination of policy and organizational objectives. In formal organizational terms, this tendency is expressed by the usual prescription of clear channels of authority and responsibility from top to bottom, with energetic leadership at the top. Less conventionally, what it amounts to is a commitment to the values of consistency and coordination in policy and, in an important measure, to the capacity of the system to make the best decisions at or near the top.

Ultimately, the administrative dialectic can be resolved into a difference about cognition. The ultimate authoritarian position is that the truth (i.e., the correct perception and analysis of relevant conditions) can be known, and that the place it is most likely to be known is at the top, the only place where the cognitive resources of the whole organization can be fully exploited. The ultimate liberal position is that perhaps there is no truth beyond what the individuals in the system perceive, or claim to perceive, and that if any truth is to be uncovered it will be done through individualistic methods in pursuit of individual interests, which implies free and equal discussion. Since the results of even these methods will be highly imperfect, it is a good thing for the

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organization not to commit itself wholly to any single answer or set of answers.

IV. Administrative Politics and National Security

The administrative politics of national security has its own particular, if not unique, setting. Policy and programs must be responsive to both domestic and foreign political considerations. These two sets of considerations impose somewhat different requirements upon the cognitive and responsive capacities of a government bureaucracy—the privileged government sector. Of the cognitive requirements, the domestic set are the least peculiar. They are met, as they are in other areas of governmental activity, by the networks of political communication and transaction which are indigenous to the domestic political system and which link both the public and privileged government sectors with the non-governmental or private sector of the system.

The communication links are mass and private media—the press, radio and television, motion pictures, private correspondence, public meetings, private mail and telephone communication, and the variety of personal, face-to-face contacts made by private interests and their representatives with government officials in a whole range of different circumstances, from the formality of a judicial proceeding or administrative hearing to the informality of a private session with a legislator or an agency official.

At one end of these communication links are the sensors and transmitters of the government. As receptors, they may be armed with the power of subpoena, or with the statutory right to know—the right to ask and to require an answer. They may search discriminately for information by means of investigators and researchers, or they may be passive, at least as initial receptors, recording or conveying whatever they encounter in the conduct of their business. What they sense may be data about the substantive problems with which the government is faced—facts about economic conditions, scientific developments, social conditions. Or they may sense views and opinions about issues. Much of the time they will sense a combination of the two—what we might call political information in the form of representations more or less partisan in character which at once provide data, express interests, and convey opinions. In particular, these sensors provide information about the domestic consequences of national security programs and the range and character of support for programs and policies. Thus we may characterize, if only schematically, how the cognitive require-

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ments of domestic political considerations for national security or any other kind of public policies and programs are satisfied.

The cognitive requirements of the foreign set of considerations depend in part upon the same networks, though in different proportions. In comparison with the domestic pattern, the mass media probably play a proportionately more important role in providing information about foreign conditions pertinent to American interests. Private interest representation probably plays a smaller role, though by no means a negligible one. The government, on the other hand, takes a proportionately more active and prominent part in the collection and processing of data. The data about the foreign sector are collected and processed chiefly through what is called the intelligence community.

Presumably the government could utilize many of the same methods and at least devote as many—or even more—resources to the collection of data about domestic conditions, although such activities when directed at domestic affairs are always more likely to have discernible partisan uses than do their foreign counterparts. Moreover, some methods of data-gathering that are thought to be justified in the foreign realm would be considered out of bounds in the domestic realm. In part, the difference here is a reflection of the particular constraint under which the government operates in the domestic realm in the interest of maintaining a liberal democratic system internally. In part, it reflects a difference in the availability to a national, privileged governmental sector of information from domestic and external sources. In part, also, it is a reflection of the different responsive requirements of the government in dealing with the two realms. To be responsive in either, however, the government must be at least minimally efficient, for certain basic requirements of managerial effectiveness exist in the privileged government sector in general.

It is not difficulty to draw contrasts in responsive requirements. In the domestic realm, the government is not expected to encounter or respond to situations in which its total physical security capabilities will be challenged, nor does it have to deal with unified aggregates of power units or actors on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis. Both of these situations are precluded by the character of the domestic order, including the monopoly of organized violent means permitted the government. In the external realm, however, the government must be prepared to cope with both situations. In both an obvious advantage is unity, the capability of speaking with one voice and acting in a consistent and coordinated manner as a sovereign state. This responsive re-

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quirement is met through a range of structural and dynamic patterns in the United States government, ranging from the President's constitutional powers in foreign relations to the public tendency to support the President in a crisis.

This contrast in cognitive and responsive requirements between those originating domestically and those which derive from external conditions suggests why the most commonly used analytical methods of illuminating empirical democratic theory can be inappropriate for analyzing government, even democratic government, in the performance of its national security function. For example, as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out in a criticism of group political analyses, models of political integration simply ignore the fact that the processes involved in political integration can be fostered or suppressed by national governments as an important matter of state policy, and that therefore a major determinant of political integration is the political decision of the states involved.[5]

V. The Analytical Challenge

It may well be enough in the pursuit of democratic theory merely to illuminate the political processes of which democratic orders are composed. That is not enough, however, for the development of policy analysis and the methods appropriate to it. A major advance in policy analysis where complicated operational capabilities are involved, such as in defense and foreign aid functions, is in the development and application of operations and systems analysis techniques, if only because they provide ways of asking and answering the questions which government officials want to deal with. These methods are, in effect, a powerful tool for specifying in particular contexts standards of internal consistency. Their uses are limited to the capacities of those who practice them to explicate and quantify policy objectives and operational functions.

One need not approve of every application or outcome of systems and operations analysis in the Defense Department in order to consider the extensive changes brought about there by the incumbent administration an important improvement in the Department's operation. Indeed, one need not even approve entirely of the methodology of systems analysis in order to give some approval to its use. It is, of

[5] Stanley Hoffmann, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System," in F. O. Wilcox and H. F. Haviland, Jr., eds., *The Atlantic Community: Progress and Prospects* (New York 1964), 11.

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course, first and foremost an attempt to quantify operational tasks and functions, and some factors and functions resist quantification, to say the least. But to impose the task of quantification is to force the production and distribution of data organized, correctly or incorrectly, with reference to some purpose. Data of any reliability, organized in this manner, are not to be taken for granted.

The liberal ideal of the marketplace for the free exchange of ideas as the model of social rationality refers to a setting in which it is expected that reason will be articulated and hence will prevail. But articulation is not without costs. If these costs are not offset by expectations of substantial gains to be made from articulation, it is difficult to justify. Under these circumstances, organizations usually satisfy their needs for the appearance of rationality with clearance procedures or some other form of administrative due process without specifying standards for appraising the substance or content of policy. At worst, such procedures produce discussions in which no one reveals his reasons why. At best, these procedures attack the issues on their merits, but may have to do so without adequate or agreed-upon supporting data.

When it is working well, operations analysis forces a consideration of issues on specified merits within a specified policy frame of reference and with questions of fact systematically linked to questions of policy. But, like any intellectual or professional discipline or any rational system, it sacrifices comprehensiveness and correspondence for precision and internal consistency. One can, therefore, without contradicting oneself, be enthusiastic about the utilization of operational analysis techniques in the Defense Department for their linking of data, analysis, and choices; be critical of certain applications of them; and be anxious to see the particular constraints of the analytical methods involved pushed back or transcended. Shifts in emphasis along these lines are already discernible in the Defense Department, as was indicated in a budget hearing last year when Congressman Laird of Wisconsin asked Secretary McNamara, "When you get into this area of decision-making, you are relying more and more on cost effectiveness studies?" McNamara replied: "No; I think not. We are relying more and more upon sophisticated analysis of potential political-military conflicts and an appraisal of the advantage to the United States of alternative force sizes in relation to those contingencies, and the various applications of those forces in those contingencies. The cost effectiveness study as it would be narrowly defined . . . comes into

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importance only in choosing between alternative means of satisfying an established force requirement."[6]

Cost effectiveness analysis can be as useful and as limiting in policy analysis as the bargaining mechanism can be in the analysis of group political behavior. It would appear that both are capable of considerable further adaptation, but both need to be better understood in their political context than they now are. The interest of political science in political systems as well as in political transactions encourages the expectation that the narrowness of bargaining analysis will be reduced and possibly overcome. The challenge for policy analysis in the national security sphere, quite apart from the structural questions which it raises, is not only to refine the new, pragmatic "theologies" of operations and systems analysis as disciplines in cognitive consistency, but also to develop broader systematic representations of the context in which they are applied, and to find ways of dealing with political as well as material resources which will strengthen the cognitive correspondence capacities of internally consistent policy-making.

[6] House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965*, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, Part 4, 304-5.

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Review Articles

THE McNAMARA PHENOMENON

By BERNARD BRODIE*

William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, New York, Harper & Row, 1964, 339 pp. $5.95.

THE Kennedy Administration had not been long in office when one began to hear from Pentagon friends that the man whom the President had chosen as his Secretary of Defense was not just extraordinary; he was *un phénomène.*

First there were stories of his tremendous zeal for getting on top of his new job. Senior members of his staff hurrying to the Pentagon on Sunday mornings would feel the hood of the Secretary's car, to determine by its temperature how long he had been at work. Usually they found the metal distressingly chilled. Stories about his restless energy and his fantastically long hours of work were, however, shortly giving away to other stories stressing his enormous personal competence. He knew, they told us, how to keep firmly in hand the running of a large operation, he apparently possessed an extraordinary capacity for learning and absorbing relevant facts and structuring them appropriately in his mind, and he clearly had a gift for decisiveness. Soon one began also to see evidences of a quite phenomenal degree of personal and political courage.

But perhaps the most novel and remarkable of Mr. McNamara's attributes was that he seemed to have ideas of his own about strategy, ideas which owed little to military orthodoxy and which he seemed quite ready to pursue against monumental opposition both at home and abroad. Previous Secretaries of Defense had rarely interposed judgments on military matters except to set limits on expenditures or, when it was imperative, to resolve in one way or another issues on which the Joint Chiefs were irreconcilably at odds. Mr. McNamara seemed to care little whether the Joint Chiefs were in agreement or not. He wanted rather to know the specific reasons for their individual views, and if those reasons struck him as logically or factually un-

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sound he rejected them. This was a sharp and cold wind indeed to have blowing through the Pentagon.

It is Mr. McNamara's special brand of strategy that Professor Kaufmann's book is all about. This of course is what its title proclaims it to be, but one is nevertheless somewhat shaken to find the subject matter so relentlessly true to the title. Except for a brief paragraph near the beginning, in which we learn among other things that Mr. McNamara has been a supporter of the NAACP and of the American Civil Liberties Union, we hear nothing more about the kind of man he is, which is rather a pity. We can see, to be sure, that Kaufmann enormously admires the Secretary's talents. Once or twice a faint trace of criticism is allowed or perhaps rather forced to appear, but one feels it is mostly for the sake of the record.

With respect to Mr. McNamara's strategic ideas, it is clear that Kaufmann's approval, or rather identification, is complete. There are no doubt special reasons for this identification, because otherwise the fact of its existence might occasion some surprise. Those who remember Kaufmann's earlier work appreciate his capacity for reserved and often critical judgment of other people's views. A piece of his that won wide public attention was a carefully developed and sharp rebuttal of the "massive retaliation" views of the late Secretary John Foster Dulles.[1] And in the pages of this journal he published some years ago a strongly critical review-article of Professor Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which up to that time had received almost exclusively enthusiastic praise from other reviewers.[2]

In the formal sense, it is easy enough to distinguish between Professor Kaufmann's own major contribution in the book and that of Mr. McNamara. The entire first chapter, called "Prelude to Revolution," is a brilliant historical summary by Kaufmann which sets the stage for his account of the McNamara reforms in both philosophy and method. The remainder of the book consists mostly of his skillful weaving together of excerpts from speeches and papers by Mr. McNamara—or occasionally from speeches by one of the latter's senior assistants, functioning as his chief's alter ego. On the other hand, as we shall see later, the sharpness of this distinction is somewhat misleading.

Most readers will, I think, find most interesting the book's second and third chapters, entitled respectively "The Search for Options" and

[1] See the first of his three chapters, entitled "The Requirements of Deterrence," in the symposium edited by him entitled *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton 1956).

[2] "The Crisis in Military Affairs," *World Politics*, x (July 1958), 579-603.

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"Dialogue with NATO." It is in these chapters that the most distinctive and also the most controversial aspects of Mr. McNamara's strategy are illuminated. Some might consider Mr. McNamara's attachment to cost-effectiveness analysis, described in the fifth chapter, as equally controversial; but in my opinion the controversy on that score has been of much more parochial character.

Actually, cost-effectiveness *considerations* must come very close to being as old as war itself. What is novel about the modern type of analysis is the marvelous development and refinement of the method and also the conscious and open dedication to the effort. Perhaps Mr. McNamara is chargeable with sharing with some of his subordinates an overvaluation of its reliability and a relative insensitivity to some of its limitations, but if so it would be a criticism of something marginal, not basic. Although sophisticated people recognize the possible existence of biases tending to distort the technique itself, most public criticism of it has been of a different and lower order. Most professional military people today, at least in the appropriate decision-making ranks, recognize its utility, though they are sometimes pained by the conclusions it produces, and very few people outside their ranks object to it at all.

What is distinctive about the McNamara approach is partly a code and partly a fund of specific ideas. Kaufmann describes the former in the following terse terms: "He likes to see objectives concretely defined. He abhors the thought that there is only one way of doing something; he is intensely interested in alternatives. And he is a restless seeker of ways to measure the effectiveness of the alternatives. Several of McNamara's operating principles are in the highest tradition of military planning. He dislikes having programs out of balance; he sees no point in calling up soldiers when there is no ammunition for them to shoot. He is an economizer of resources, always on the alert for ways of determining how much is enough to perform a given mission. He is an advocate of taking out insurance against the failure of a program or an action. And above all, he recognizes that the world is an uncertain place and believes in plans that take the uncertainty specifically into account. One way to deal with uncertainty is to buy options, and that is what he seeks" (p. 49).

That word "options" one now recognizes as a favorite term of Mr. McNamara's. He is perhaps too loath to consider the possibility of diminishing or negative returns in the broadening of options—for example, through gratuitously scaling down or making unnecessarily

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ambiguous the penalties that might otherwise seem to be threatening potential aggressors. Besides, providing options usually costs money, sometimes a good deal of money—a consideration to which the Secretary is reputedly not insensitive.

On the other hand, when one recalls the kind of deliberate constricting of options that characterized some of the military planning under the previous administration, where there seemed to be in some places a deliberate desire to limit to nuclear means alone our ability to respond even to the most minor military threats (e.g., Quemoy, in 1958), one has to recognize that some of Mr. McNamara's passion for enlarging options is simply a wholesome reaction to an earlier and noxious insistence on the reverse. However, reactions can go too far, and anyway there is more to it than that.

What we usually understand as the McNamara strategy concerns mainly that special kind of enlargement of options that stresses the importance of alternatives to the use of nuclear weapons in military actions. It is of course important to remember that on taking office Mr. McNamara, together with President Kennedy, was also determined to build up American strategic capabilities—there was some honest confusion at the time about a "missile gap"—and statistics scattered through Mr. McNamara's speeches, and repeated in this book, emphasize the magnitude of the nuclear build-up since the beginning of 1961. Much of the substantial (about 25 per cent) increase in the military budget under the new regime was a result of the nuclear-strategic build-up.

One must remember too that the changes in strategic capability were qualitative as well as quantitative, in two important respects. First, Mr. McNamara insisted on raising the degree of emphasis placed on securing the survival of our retaliatory forces against surprise attack. This meant primarily putting missiles in heavily protected underground silos, as well as giving extra impetus to the Polaris submarine program. Second, as a part of what he has called the strategy of "flexible response," he pushed through a far-reaching reform of targeting concepts, in the direction of what is widely known as the counterforce or "no-cities" strategy—first described publicly in his Ann Arbor speech. These changes were undoubtedly too long delayed and can now hardly be called controversial, though they have some controversial facets, like the de-emphasis on manned bombers that results partly from the heavy stress on "hardening" or concealment as a form of protection.

On the other hand, the most essential, the most critical, and cer-

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tainly the most seriously controversial aspect of the Kennedy-McNamara strategy is its extraordinary emphasis on building up conventional forces. This emphasis entirely suffuses the "dialogue with NATO" as well as decisions on the home front.

Before we go into the subject itself, it is appropriate to inquire about the sources of Mr. McNamara's strategic ideas. After all, until becoming Secretary of Defense he had been a member of the administration of the Ford Motor Company, and had just taken office as its president. There is no indication that he was a deep student of strategy at the time, though he had been an effective staff officer in Air Force "statistics control" during World War II. Even one as brilliant as Mr. McNamara does not develop overnight on his own a capacity for finding his way through some extremely baffling issues concerning deterrence and war, especially with the kind of confidence that enables one to reject with aplomb relevant advice from the officially appointed military advisers.

It would no doubt have been contrary to the primarily political purposes of Kaufmann's book for him to have attempted to trace the origins of the ideas that Mr. McNamara has made his own, but his refraining from doing so certainly limits its scholarly value. He can be excused partly on grounds of modesty. His own contribution has not been small, not least as one who has helped prepare speeches and papers for the Secretary. One wonders how many of the words that Kaufmann quotes from McNamara are originally out of Kaufmann. But there have been other contributors too.

The sources of political and strategic ideas are often unnecessarily obscured. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor once took issue with a statement of mine that the basic views with which the RAF approached World War II were derived from Douhet. Sir John denied this indebtedness vehemently, insisting that in his early years in what was then the Royal Flying Corps he had never heard of any of his superiors' reading or quoting Douhet; in fact he had never heard of Douhet. The RAF was accustomed to attributing the origin of its particular philosophy to its chief founding father of World War I fame, Lord Trenchard.

My reply had to be that if Lord Trenchard and his colleagues did not get their ideas from Douhet, then Douhet must have got his from them. That is, the ideas were far too much alike *in detail* to argue anything but a common source. Important ideas which become precepts for a whole service are no more likely in strategic philosophy than in any other kind of philosophy to have multiple spontaneous

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origins. Actually, Sir John's not having heard of any colleagues' reading Douhet impressed me not at all. Apart from the fact that it is almost inconceivable that Douhet's small body of writing had not been read by at least some few important persons in the RAF at a critical stage in its development, people who make borrowed ideas their own are not, except in the rarefied world of scholarship and then only marginally, given to burdening themselves with scrupulous references to the sources of their best thoughts. Actually, for politicians and soldiers there are special handicaps in doing so—unless the originating thinker is sufficiently hallowed and preferably dead.

We know that President Kennedy himself was, upon taking office, very much dedicated to the idea of enlarging our conventional capabilities and placing heavier reliance on them. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he had been an unusually avid reader of books and other materials on military strategy, and he had absorbed the obviously congenial ideas on limited and non-nuclear war that by 1959 and 1960 were already very much in the air in American strategic discourse. We know that he had been deeply impressed by the ideas of General Maxwell D. Taylor, especially as expounded in the latter's book, *The Uncertain Trumpet.*

We also know from Professor Richard E. Neustadt that the first and most compelling of what Neustadt regards as President Kennedy's three main purposes in office was to "get the nuclear genie back in the bottle."[3] He had a deep antipathy to the thought of nuclear "proliferation," which was certainly connected in his mind with the obligation to reduce our own dependence on nuclear weapons for resisting aggression. However, as a busy politician who had to have an all-round approach to the nation's problems, we may be sure that President Kennedy's basic strategic ideas were derived from others and not developed in any detail. We can say only that by the time he became President he was ready to be receptive to any anti-nuclear military philosophy that came his way.

We also know that former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who may have had some influence on the thinking of the Kennedy Administration, was also for quite different reasons in favor of a conventional build-up. Mr. Acheson was Secretary during most of the Korean War, when we had a modest stockpile of nuclear weapons but did not use any. His favorite phrase at the time urged the advantage of "negotiating from strength," a slogan which stressed the need for

[3] See his "Kennedy in the Presidency: A Premature Appraisal," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIV (September 1964), especially p. 325.

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more peacetime power but which somehow seemed to throw the major emphasis on the necessity for postponing the great acts he had in mind until the new power was acquired.

Lately Mr. Acheson has been advocating in his writings and speeches a build-up of conventional strength in Europe for the chief purpose of forcing the Russians out of East Germany and thereby achieving the reunification of Germany—failure to accomplish which he holds to be the main threat to European peace in the future. Just how an increase in Allied conventional forces will accomplish so great an end, especially without provoking any serious conflict (or even an offsetting Soviet build-up), he does not explain; the details can be left to the technicians, though of course statesmen must be courageous and make the most of opportunities.[4] Mr. Acheson seems always to be yearning for a kind of power different in character and magnitude from what is currently available to us, fantastically great though the latter may be, and with it he will do wondrous things. One thinks of King Lear, proclaiming magnificently:

> . . . I will do such things—
> What they are yet I know not—but they shall be
> The terrors of the earth.

However, Mr. Acheson's views are relevant mostly to show that there is nothing strikingly unusual about the pro-conventional flavor in the strategic concepts that Mr. McNamara has made famous. But those concepts have a special richness that indicate another source (which Mr. Acheson has also tapped). I think the question is interesting and important, and I go into the matter less unwillingly because there is after all nothing nefarious about anyone's influencing the thinking of his own national administration. Most of us frequently try, and as likely as not envy those who succeed. The only thing remarkable about this instance is the magnitude of the success.

Henry Kissinger and the distinguished French writer Raymond Aron, as well as many others, have generally attributed the McNamara philosophy in its most characteristic attributes to the influence of The RAND Corporation. Professor Kissinger could have stated it more exactly. He knows that it was a relatively small group of persons

[4] See, for example, the speech that Mr. Acheson delivered on September 30, 1963, at the Fifth Annual Conference, in Cambridge, England, of the Institute for Strategic Studies. Bearing the title "The Evolution of NATO," it is published in No. 5 of the *Adelphi Papers* issued by the Institute. It is almost needless to say that Mr. Acheson's views have received an overwhelmingly unsympathetic and indeed often hostile reception among his European audiences, who prefer to think of NATO as a defensive alliance.

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formerly associated with RAND but with an exceptionally strong in-group cohesion among themselves and thus a sometimes marked degree of personal and intellectual separation from most other members of that organization that developed a philosophy extremely close in detail to that which Mr. McNamara has since made his own.

The leader of this group has been the eminent Albert Wohlstetter, who though invited chose not to become a member of the new Administration but consulted with its leaders and also remained in very close contact with others in his old group, especially Henry S. Rowen and Alain C. Enthoven, who did become important members of McNamara's staff. Wohlstetter's contribution has now been publicly acknowledged in the glowing citation with which Mr. McNamara awarded him the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in February of this year. Kaufmann was also a dedicated follower and participant, and though he too refrained from becoming a full-time member of the Administration (preferring to take a professorship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) he has done a great deal of work as a consultant for Mr. McNamara. These are all brilliant men, fervently dedicated to their common point of view, and with personal characteristics that make them as a group remarkably persuasive. Mr. Charles J. Hitch, also formerly at RAND and currently the Comptroller of the Defense Department, has been close to the group as friend and colleague, but his interests are mostly of a different sort.

It is interesting to notice that all these persons (and some other close associates) were originally trained as economists, except for Kaufmann himself, whose graduate training at Yale and subsequent connection with Princeton were primarily as a political scientist in international relations. Rowen and Enthoven, who are in fact relatively youthful, have often been listed among the "whiz kids" of whom we have heard so much, and are very likely the major source of the strategic ideas associated with that fraternity. Enthoven is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, a kind of work in which he is undoubtedly expert. It is somewhat intriguing to consider the probability that Mr. McNamara's passion for this kind of analysis had much to do with his attaching to himself a group of persons who just happened to entertain a special philosophy which actually has nothing at all to do with systems analysis.

But what, if anything, is wrong with what we now call the McNamara strategy, with its powerful emphasis on the conventional build-up? It has on the whole received in this country astonishingly

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little criticism in print. All civilized people share in greater or less degree the desire to put the "nuclear genie back in the bottle" (though, like the classical genie, it has also done some useful service—such as critically reducing the probability of war between the United States and the Soviet Union). Therefore any tendency to de-emphasize the reliance on nuclear weapons looks on the surface good, especially in view of our previous tendency to overemphasize it.

We must also remember that the number of persons in this country who are responsible for advancing the leading ideas in the strategic thinking of our time, though at least of an order of magnitude greater than a dozen years ago, is still very small. It is even smaller, very much smaller, abroad. Thus, an idea or group of ideas can often win what looks like an overwhelming acceptance simply because the number of literate and articulate people who need to do the accepting is small and relatively easily accommodated. They all know each other personally and usually have had some shared experience. The military have been on the whole—in varying ways and degrees, depending largely on the branch of service involved—opposed, resistant, or ambivalent to the McNamara ideas, but for a variety of reasons, including required obedience, have not been especially articulate about their views. The real opposition has come from our NATO partners abroad, but this has been motivated far more by political and economic than by intellectual considerations.

This is hardly the place to attempt an adequate critique of even one major aspect of the McNamara philosophy. I have in fact attempted elsewhere such a critique of what I regard as the overemphasis on conventional capabilities.[5] Let us in passing notice just a few things about it that are at least questionable.

First we should observe that the philosophy of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons has apparently required a considerable building up of our conventional capabilities, and a strong pressure on our Allies to do likewise. Our build-up has meant a sizable net increase in our own already high military budget, as well as a continuation of the draft, and this at a time which includes the period that we have called *détente*. More to the point, and most curiously, the Soviet run-down in ground forces in Europe has in effect been cited as justification for our building ours up, because their run-down made it appear feasible to match them. The idea, repeated in this book, is that the re-evaluation of Soviet ground strength in 1962, after the failure of McNamara's

[5] See my "What Price Conventional Capabilities in Europe?" *The Reporter*, May 23, 1963.

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Ann Arbor (and Athens) speeches to change our Allies' views, "sent McNamara back into the campaign for additional non-nuclear capabilities" (p. 120). In the Ann Arbor speech Mr. McNamara had already said that the Soviet superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe was at the time "by no means overwhelming" (p. 119). Surely, however, the size of the Soviet forces in 1962 represented what was left after a considerable run-down that Khrushchev began in the late 1950's, but that the Soviets finally halted in late 1961, when they observed our own contrary efforts. If they refrained from reversing course and resorting to a new build-up, it is surely in large part because our pressure on our allies simply failed.

Now, it might still be logical to build up forces in the period of *détente*, even when the opponent is running his down, if it can be established that we had allowed our relevant forces to deteriorate well below any reasonable minimums. But how much *is* needed? Referring perhaps to Kissinger, or possibly even to me, Kaufmann says somewhat loftily at one place: "It was difficult to take seriously the critic who claimed that the United States was asking for too large a conventional build-up in NATO, and damaging the alliance in the process, when he would not say what, in his opinion, would constitute the proper level of forces" (p. 204).

One can turn that remark around and ask the builder-uppers what does constitute in their mind "the proper level of forces," a subject on which they have been quite ambiguous. For the NATO central front there is the somewhat time-worn figure of "30 divisions," but the involved story of its derivation surely invalidates that figure as a basis for accenting the words "proper level." Besides, to repeat, the Soviet level would surely expand under stimulus, especially in a category in which, to put it most optimistically, they suffer the least comparative disadvantage. And how about the size of the United States forces?

At one point Kaufmann does state approvingly that the increase from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions, plus 21 tactical air wings and 3 Marine divisions, "now gave him [McNamara] something like a 10-division strategic reserve. With it he could handle a Korean-sized engagement and still have several divisions left over for another emergency" (p. 79). A Korean-sized "*engagement*"! The American people considered it a war, and a nasty, unduly prolonged, and unsatisfactorily concluded one at that. They are not eager to enter another such—as their present attitudes toward Vietnam confirm.

It is at least moot whether it would not be the sheerest folly to fight

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another Korean-sized "engagement" without using tactical nuclear weapons, or rather opportunely threatening their use in order to deter the conflict altogether. Could the Chinese possibly fail to fear a war with us in which we might use nuclear weapons tactically? Could it conceivably be true that our attachment to conventional weapons would have no effect in degrading the deterrence value of our nuclear stockpile—as the school we are discussing so often alleges—if we let Communist China fight another war with us of Korean magnitude without encountering tactical nuclear weapons? The view that Kaufmann shares with his colleagues and attributes to McNamara may be correct, but its correctness is very far from being self-evident.

In that connection one really ought to call attention to the total obsoleteness of a variety of standard arguments with which the philosophy is usually advanced, such as that we must not be "forced to choose between doing nothing or deliberately initiating nuclear war" (p. 68). Or, as the author quotes Mr. Paul Nitze as putting it: ". . . it would be neither wise nor credible for us to build our doctrine and our forces on the premise that every pinprick must be met by nuclear war" (p. 131). Nobody now entertains any such premise. Nor have our conventional capabilities for a long time, if ever, been anything like that low. One notices also the familiar associated assertion that increase of conventional weapons "would give a sense of freedom and initiative that primary reliance on nuclear power does not provide, increased bargaining power with the Soviet Union . . . [etc.]" (p. 132). One ought sometimes to ask, how? What bargaining power do we genuinely lack now or have lacked recently that additional conventional forces have brought us or would bring us?

Implicit or explicit in these arguments, and apparently necessary to them, is an image of the Soviet opponent and an appraisal of our experience that must be labeled as patently incorrect. For example, as Kaufmann states it, ". . . the record was replete with instances where, *despite the direst threats* [italics mine] of massive or limited nuclear retaliation, forbidden actions of one kind or another had taken place" (p. 72). Well, what were they?[6] And how did it happen that

[6] We certainly made no "direst threats" of massive or other nuclear retaliation in the case of the so-called "Berlin Blockade" of 1948-1949, the gravest crisis we have had in Europe since World War II. Moreover, we now have abundant evidence (which I have outlined in a paper not yet published) to support the conclusion that in that affair the United States was completely bluffed concerning ground access—that is, that Stalin was clearly determined to avoid getting into hostilities with the United States over the issue and in fact never made any threat of the use of force to deny us such access. Thus, the ground "probe" that various highly placed persons were advocating at the time would almost certainly have met with no active resist-

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our threats were not carried out when the acts they were supposed to forbid were perpetrated? Kaufmann goes on: "But there remained a large set of aggressions which had not been deterred in the past and were unlikely to be in the future—unless someone set the record straight by using nuclear weapons in response to one of these acts" (p. 106). And still again: "A strategy based solely on deterrence, and nuclear deterrence at that, seemed almost a frivolous way to treat the Soviet threat. It had already failed to deter a number of provocative acts and was likely to remain of limited utility in the future" (pp. 118f.). Or "It seemed virtually impossible to convince the Allies that nuclear capabilities long since had been found wanting as an all-purpose deterrent" (p. 128).

What these terrible but avoidable failures had been are not specified, except for some vague references to "the crises of Berlin and Cuba." The most specific reference is: "Despite these efforts, the monstrous Wall dividing East Berlin from West Berlin went up on August 13, 1961" (p. 258).

One ought certainly to ask, what would we have been prepared to do about that wall had we had ten more conventional divisions in Europe, or twenty? Contrarily, if we wanted to do something bold, why did it require a single additional soldier? How much did the strictly local forces affect the Russians' willingness or unwillingness to risk open hostilities with us? Or, for that matter, our willingness or unwillingness to get into such hostilities with them?

Actually, the greatest single challenge to the *status quo*, the greatest "failure of deterrence," was precisely the Cuban crisis of October 1962, when our conventional forces had already been very considerably built up by the Kennedy Administration. After the event various persons attributed Khrushchev's spectacular retreat primarily to our large conventional superiority in the Caribbean. Oddly, in a passage not quoted in this book, Mr. McNamara expressed himself before a Congressional Committee as thinking otherwise. In his opinion it was the entire strength of the United States, including and above all its nuclear power, which caused the Soviet Union to retreat so precipitously.[7]

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ance. Stalin of course wanted us to interpret his actions as a denial of access, so long as we made no trouble over it.

[7] Among Secretary McNamara's words were: ". . . in any event Khrushchev knew without any question whatsoever that he faced the full military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons. . . . we faced that night the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons." (*Department of Defense Appropria-*

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To return to the question of how much is enough, Mr. McNamara can be quoted as apparently urging two very different positions within a few weeks in 1963. On January 30, 1963, his book-length "Statement" for the House Armed Services Committee suggested, implicitly but clearly, that Allied conventional forces in Europe ought to be large enough to contain just about any size of Russian attack, so long as it is non-nuclear.[8] (One must wonder at the image of a fantastically venturesome Soviet Union massively attacking by conventional weapons alone our nuclear-armed forces in Europe!) But on February 22, 1963, the Secretary's responses to questions before the Senate Committee on Armed Services expressed a quite different opinion. In the latter place one finds him specifically rejecting the thought of using conventional forces in Europe to deter anything other than "certain low-scale forms of Soviet political and military aggression which they might be tempted to carry out were they not opposed by forces of the type that are being strengthened" (pp. 376-78 of the published Hearings).

These discrepancies, and they are many, incidentally suggest a major defect of the Kaufmann book. It is almost completely derived from carefully prepared speeches or "statements" by Mr. McNamara, where his staff plays so large a role, including formal presentations in hearings before Congressional Committees. Rarely used, however, are his usually spontaneous and often exceptionally candid answers to questions in those hearings. At least it is a defect if we want to know what Mr. McNamara really thinks.

Space does not permit us to go into the question of Mr. McNamara's NATO policies, in which respect his considerable efforts seem on balance to have had quite negative results. With no professional background in international politics, he would have had to rely heavily on advice. What kind did he receive? Kissinger has remarked on his astonishment that an Administration made up largely of intellectuals should show so little empathy for ancient and proud allied states that are less strong and less rich than we but whose leaders are not necessarily less intelligent or less well-informed on world political affairs.

Surely we have too often appeared to be prejudging for our Allies where their own self-interest lay. Their views on that subject are entitled to respect even when we disagree. We are, for example, en-

tions for 1964, Part I, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, 30-31.)

[8] See especially pp. 18 and 54 of the mimeographed version released to the press.

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titled to regard the French nuclear effort as contrary to our national interests, but hardly to project a sense of outrage at their doing simply what we have done. Nor should we presume that French arguments presenting their view of their interests are devoid of merit. After all, some of those arguments have been expressed impressively by people like Aron, who is more sympathetic than not to the relevant American ideas and who is certainly not lacking in intelligence.[9] Kaufmann feels that to have shown any sympathy or even tolerance for the French views would have been "to subscribe in effect to the view that the United States would soon become an unreliable ally . . ." (p. 111). In another place, in discussing the MLF idea, which many Americans as well as most Europeans regard as unnecessary and potentially mischievous, Kaufmann remarks: "The United States, perhaps naïvely, had tried to be constructive" (p. 127).

The Western Europeans have for some years felt little or not at all threatened by military aggression from the Soviet Union, and they wonder whence comes all our scorn for nuclear deterrence. It seems to them to have worked very well indeed. They have therefore seen no reason for increasing their terms of conscription (or introducing it where they did not have it) and adding to military budgets which they considered already large enough. That our government had other views does not prove that our Allies were utterly foolish or frivolous.

I do not wish by these words to imply any approval for the particular brand of conspicuous and often malicious non-cooperation that President de Gaulle has enjoyed practicing. Even so, on the MLF issue as on various others, we were pursuing with determination a collision course with him that was wholly unnecessary and that made the utmost nonsense when justified as a means of furthering the *unity* of NATO. Mr. McNamara was probably not responsible for it, but it finally took a person of political insight like President Johnson to put a stop to it.

Work on the Kaufmann book was substantially completed when Secretary McNamara had been in office for less than three years. Actually, the concluding section, called "Epilogue," is given over entirely to a speech that he delivered to the Economic Club of New York on November 18, 1963, just four days before the assassination of President Kennedy. Mr. McNamara has since completed another year and a half in office, and undoubtedly has many more such years

[9] See especially *The Great Debate* (New York 1965); trans. from *Le grand débat.*

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before him. The story is yet to be finished, let alone adequately told. We can therefore look forward to new, more complete, and also more detached interpretations of what will undoubtedly be one of the most significant careers of any Presidential cabinet member in American history.

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MUST STRATEGY AND CONSCIENCE BE DISJOINED?

By ARTHUR LEE BURNS

Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience*, New York, Harper and Row, 1964, 323 pp. $6.95.

A CRITIQUE of "Theories of Rational Decision" and an exposé of "Hazards and Pitfalls of Strategic Thinking" comprise the first two and more significant Parts of *Strategy and Conscience*. A third Part pleads for understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, and for "ideological disarmament"; it presents "another mode of thinking in which conscience is central."

One of the deficiencies of this last Part shows up in its title, "The Two Worlds": at first and apparently, "East and West," but actually, America and Russia. With the strategic thinkers whom he criticizes, and indeed with most Americans, conservative and liberal, Rapoport shares the habit of treating world affairs as a two-person situation. This he compounds all too readily with a second deficiency—the psychologist's and sociologist's conviction that international conflict results chiefly from incompatibility between sets of national dispositions, ideologies, and commitments. His world-picture is the Cold Warrior's, though his conscience is a pacifist-internationalist's. Or, to put the objection the other way, he makes too little of government's dependence upon military force; of a mass society's dependence on government; of an ideological development's dependence upon the structure of the national society which has adopted it; and the dependence of all these, with varying directness, upon the changing constellations of the inter-Power system.

Since Rapoport's lively characterizations of the United States and Soviet world-pictures, systems of value, ideologies, visions, and so forth, are mostly beside the point of peace between the major Powers, so are any criticisms of this Part—though certainly it is not beyond criticism: there is a subsection on "Our Calvinist Origins" that reproduces Weber's speculations of sixty years ago without a suggestion that any historian since then has looked at Calvinistic views about labor, virtue, and divine election. Rapoport counts upon a crypto-Hegelian synthesis in which apparently conflicting mores—the Russian and the American—nevertheless "complement each other." If

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they do, that still will not help. There is not the slightest evidence that the Russians are likely to transfer to us "what *we* lack," or vice versa. Ideologies *are* sometimes filled out with a complement of new and liberating conceptions, but rarely by "ideological disarmament." Indeed, Rapoport is not quite such a disarmer as he hopes to seem: "However, both sides could, if they were willing and persistent, get rid of their own psychopaths. If enemies are needed to fulfill a psychological need, they are readily available. A simple realignment of forces would enable the liberals of both sides to concentrate on their common enemy—the extreme right-Stalinist axis" (p. 280). There are some countries in which serious opposition to Stalinists and to "rightists" at once is practicable; but neither the United States nor (for very different reasons) the Soviet Union is amongst them. The political conflicts over ways of life *within* each of those two Superpowers look from the outside like two-person games. But, except in Cold War terms, there can be no foreign allies in those battles of internal politics.

One kind of "simple realignment" is impracticable: the pacifist-internationalists of the United States cannot concert with their likes (if any) in the Soviet Union. Another kind has already occurred: the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. But that came about only after the Democratic administration (not the Republican) had increased the United States military budget, Mr. McNamara had announced a "damage-limiting" counterforce doctrine, and the anti-Stalinist Khrushchev had put missiles in Cuba. In some respects, Rapoport overrates the powers of government: "It seems that by issuing just a few decrees, the leadership of the Soviet Communist party could transform Soviet society. They could release the pent-up creative energies to mix with the heady air of freedom and so stimulate an era of magnificent accomplishment unequalled in history" (p. 279). In a different respect, he will not admit that governments alone—the bodies that arm themselves—can manage disarmament, and that even they can do so only by agreements carrying both their own subjects and other armed governments with them.

In conclusion upon this, the last and professedly more constructive Part of *Strategy and Conscience*: it seems to afford further evidence that in the nuclear-missile age, pacifism cannot be a *political* position. No pacifist policy appears devisable for a society of several millions or more. Pacifism remains a possible—an honorable—stance for individuals, and one that for them can have political consequences: a conscientious pacifist presumably renounces much of the politics of

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any contemporary society, from Cambodia to Ghana to Iceland. If a thinker of Rapoport's stature is unable to set forth a pacifist-internationalist policy that anyone could do anything about, then it is so much the less likely that others could.

Nevertheless, this essay in the "mode of thinking in which conscience is central" has great educative value in loosening up imaginations too long fettered to a "strategic mode" which at first promised much but seems now unable to resolve its own dilemmas. Strategic thinking begins with a question both instrumental and partial: what *means* will increase *my* country's security, or its military power? When two or more countries severally promote power or security in relation to each other, they jointly form a "system." Thought about the system as a whole requires, but goes beyond, partial strategic thought. Rapoport is quite right to push us beyond the limits of a self-defeating concentration upon our own country's or alliance's partial interests and to make us ask questions about the system as a whole; but he is mistaken in supposing that if all parties take into consideration the interests of the system as a whole as well as their several partial interests, then there will cease to be a system. In a recent article, contrasting strategic with "systemic" thinking (Adam Smith's, Pareto's, Marx's, Freud's, Lewis F. Richardson's), he argues that the latter is concerned only with "determinants in human affairs which operate independently of anyone's rationally designed actions or consciously perceived goals."[1] The determinants of a Richardson arms race are not "independent of" rationally designed actions: they are the unintended consequences of rationally designed but particularistic actions. If, contrariwise, the national leaders enlarge their perspective and contemplate the consequences of some or of all other nations' acting from particularistic designs only, or, as well, from designs in similarly enlarged perspective, then those individual leaders will have some disposition to act differently, as a result of which the behavior of the system they represent will change. But it would still be a system. Only if a world-wide and barbarizing nuclear war occurs, or if all nations merge in a single world state (and we must ask whether, on closer analysis, that is not strictly impossible), do they dismantle the system of external inter-Power relations and constitute another, "internal," political and social system. No system subsists without the rationally designed actions of at least two parties; and conversely.

Furthermore, it must stand initially as an open question, to be de-

[1] "Systemic and Strategic Conflict: What Happens When People Do Not Think—and When They Do," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XL (Summer 1964), 342.

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termined by systemic analysis, whether a particular group of persons or societies systemically related is more likely to survive when severally *pursuing* egotistic or, instead, altruistic ends. The question, of course, cannot be asked without *considering* altruistic goals (as Rapoport would say, without considering conscience) and other parties' egotistic ends; but it must remain a possible conclusion that affairs will go best for all if each can be counted upon to pursue his own interest. Such a conclusion, though derived from a quite informal analysis, underlay the classic doctrine of the balance of power. Underlying the doctrine of deterrent balance is a mixed conclusion: the system is supposed to be stable (and thus nuclear war is avoided—the overriding interest of "our" as well as of "their" side) only when each of the parties in the nuclear system has an "invulnerable second-strike force," so that it would seem to pay the United States to see to it that any other Power that begins to maintain a nuclear force (Russia, France, Communist China) is provided with an invulnerable one! On the other hand, so-called stable deterrence certainly depends on the conviction that each party would be egotistic enough—indeed, vengeful enough—to *launch* its second strike if attacked.

An implicit but important aspect of Rapoport's ethical convictions also derives from a systemic analysis which presupposes thinking in the strategic mode: "The basic question in the strategist's mind is this: 'In a conflict how can I gain advantage over him?' The critic cannot disregard the question, 'If I gain an advantage over him, what sort of a person will I become?' . . . With regard to deterrence, the critic might ask not 'What if deterrence fails?' (everyone worries about *that*) but, on the contrary, 'What if deterrence works?'" (p. 189). Deterrence 'works' if nuclear and major conventional war is permanently avoided by the more-or-less direct threat to kill scores of millions of other Powers' civilians. This seems to be the present situation. The longer it persists, the longer we shall need critics like Rapoport to insist how disgusting a condition for peace it is. But the full repellence of the condition is most clearly revealed by making explicit, as does Herman Kahn (something of a villain in this book), the strategic consideration determining it.

Rapoport's criticism, however, is directed not only against the alleged objectionable morals of strategic thought, but against its validity. The remainder of this article will concern the latter criticism.

Let us first notice that most of Rapoport's criticism is directed to a special, narrow, and largely American variety of strategic thought—

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that in which game theory, particularly the theory of the zero-sum two-person game, is apt to be applied to, or used to illustrate, strategic issues. (He refers much more briefly to simulation, war-gaming, and scenario-writing.) In other nations there are other styles and varieties of strategic thought: the Russian, the French, even the British. It is perfectly possible to develop a strategic doctrine without using any game-theoretic concepts; one need never assign a numerical probability to any military-political event (though one might, presumably, to the performance of hardware), let alone assign "utilities" to "outcomes." Indeed, a telling methodological criticism of any single variety of strategic thinking, which Rapoport overlooks, would be that it took no cognizance of the effects of the other varieties: except where "we" know we have a dominant strategy, it is not rational to choose the strategy containing a saddlepoint unless we are convinced that "they" believe themselves to be playing the same game as we do. Unless it can be shown (as some decision-theorists think could be shown in principle) that a game-theoretic approach, by virtue of its greater generality, somehow contains any other consistent approach as a special case, it will not follow that a critique of game theory implies a critique of all strategic thinking. The proponent of a "common-sense" approach could very well close *Strategy and Conscience* with the comment: "Well, he's shown that war is not a zero-sum two-person game. *We* never for a moment thought it was. He has shown that it rarely makes sense to assign definitive probabilities to unique events; that it is rather an academic exercise to assign utilities on an interval scale; that most scenario-writing is tendentious and most simulations bogus. Of course! Only the Americans would have thought otherwise. Now—to be serious—just how can we Ruritanians get ourselves in a position to tear a limb off the Russians?" In other words, if your country is a hostage to the Russians or Chinese for American good behavior, and unless you are convinced that the inordinate power of Russia and America is counterbalanced by a quite unusual prudence and care for the interests of the least of their allies and dependents, you may consider yourself a little safer possessing a nuclear strike-force of your own, and the world no more unsafe as a consequence. Neither Rapoport nor the most game-theoretical strategist could prove you wrong.

Rapoport has a section on "the neo-traditionalists" (broadly, those who deal in *Realpolitik*) in which Henry Kissinger and Morton Kaplan are mentioned, and which he may consider to subsume all "common-sense" varieties of thinking in the strategic mode. What he

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misses is the neo-traditionalists' sense of tragic and inescapable dilemma. Especially in Western Europe, peoples and governments cannot extricate themselves from the predicament of nuclear power-politics. Dutchmen and Belgians, for example, have seen the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union build up regardless of anything that Holland or Belgium might do. The stockpiles, the bombers and missiles, are deployed and in production; thinking in a non-strategic mode will not get rid of them. That is now true for American citizens also—or, at least, the American neo-traditionalists will suppose so, all the more because other nations, responding to the predicament in which the Super-power stand-off places them, are acquiring nuclear forces. Thinking "in the strategic mode" (which, to repeat, need not mean thinking in the terms of game theory or of anything like it) could hardly be avoided even by, for example, a Western European country that adopted a policy of "conscience." Suppose that France had decided to abjure all force except a token conventional frontier guard; even so, its government would have to decide for or against a counternuclear shelter program, since its population could still be imperiled by a Russian-American nuclear war set off, perhaps, by events in Cuba. What steps could it take, in such a case, to promote the survival of Frenchmen and French society? That is a strategic question, though asked under the promptings of conscience, for it involves an assessment of how others might employ their armed forces, and of how to respond to various uses.

In short, the present reviewer cannot accept a distinction of modes—only of levels—between strategic and conscientious thinking, just as, being a socialist, he would challenge a dichotomy between economic and conscientious thinking. On the other hand, Rapoport seems quite right to expose the pretense to logical completeness of thinking at the strategic level: the supposition that there is or could be a calculus of strategic thought, built up "objectively" and adaptable as a ready-made instrument for any inquiry into the allocation of all possible values, can and should be challenged—and in choosing the game-theoretical variant of strategic thought as the subject of his critique, Rapoport has certainly chosen the variant on behalf of which the strongest claims to logical completeness are made.

On one count, Rapoport seems to be quite in the wrong—not as to his purpose, which is to reaffirm the difference between estimates of probability based upon "objective" frequencies of events and those based upon "subjective" (i.e., personal and estimated) assessments; but as to his calculations in a particular example. He imagines the

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following game: "The deck consists of eight cards, namely, four aces and four deuces. After shuffling, you take two cards, and your opponent takes two. After seeing your hand but before the opponent sees his, you can offer a bet, giving or asking any odds you choose that your hand beats your opponent's. Aces are high; so the highest hand is two aces, the next is ace-deuce, and two deuces is the lowest hand. Suits do not count. If the two hands tie, you lose the bet. You have just drawn an ace and a deuce. What are fair odds? . . . To fix ideas, suppose we hold the ace of diamonds and the deuce of clubs" (pp. 26-27). At this stage, Rapoport correctly concludes that the chances of our opponent's holding a hand that ours would beat (viz., a hand of two deuces) is 1/5. He sets out the "fifteen possible hands" our opponent could hold, only three of which comprise two aces, and then supposes that a spy tells us that *one* of the opponent's cards is a deuce, but without telling us of which suit, and concludes that now ". . . the first three hands do not come under consideration. Only twelve hands are possible, and our hand still beats three of them. Therefore, if we know that the opponent has a deuce (but do not know any more), we should estimate the probability that we shall win our bet as 1/4 instead of 1/5" (p. 27). Next, he has the spy report that our opponent's previously mentioned deuce is the deuce of spades, and concludes that since now the opponent's "possible hands" are only five, of which two are pairs of deuces, "the probability that we shall win the bet becomes 2/5. . . . But if the change in odds is the same no matter what suit he reports, why should his report make a difference?" (pp. 28-29). Rapoport answers this question by saying that "The two-to-three offer was justified by a certain betting policy. . . . Thus it is not only probability that determines betting policy (how much to bet). Betting policy (*when* to bet) determines probability. In the case of a single bet, this probability is entirely in the mind of the policy maker" (pp. 29-30).

That last proposition is not necessarily true, and Rapoport's example in support of it contains an error. For as soon as we learn that our opponent's hand contains at least one deuce, even though we do not know the suit, we know that the chances that the opponent's other card is also a deuce are 2/5. That other card must be equi-probably one of three aces and two deuces. When we know he has a deuce, we know that (in terms of the example) it is *either* the deuce of spades, *or* of hearts, *or* of diamonds: the question of a fair bet boils down to that of the identity of his "possible other card," rather than of his twelve "possible hands." In fact, the information that he has at least one deuce does more than merely eliminate from the original fifteen possible

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hands the three all-ace hands: it determines, within the twelve remaining, three *alternative* sets of five which nevertheless have some overlap of membership, and indicates that the opponent's actual hand belongs to just one of those alternative sets.

The example is unfortunately chosen in another way. "Probability" in that kind of card game is as objective as it could be. We already have all the relevant information for determining what would be a fair bet in this case: nothing more would be added to our knowledge if from a pack of three aces and two deuces we made ten thousand draws of one of the cards. Furthermore, the bet is "fair" in the interpersonal sense that, having offered our opponent the odds, we would be rationally indifferent whether he *or* we wagered at those odds that his hand would beat ours. Indeed, we could offer him the choice of who should wager when we offered him the fair odds. If, as in the game described by Rapoport, our opponent has no such choice, then it will not necessarily be in our interest to offer him a fair bet. Rather, we should select the odds we offer him at the "*un*fair" extreme of a range bounded at one extreme by the fair odds, beyond which we should decide to make no offer at all, and at the other extreme by odds, *un*fair to him, beyond which—to the best of our knowledge—he will decline our offer. If haggling is allowed, our opponent would be rational to decline all our offers within the range until he had pushed us to the "fair" limit beyond which *we* would decline. But since such a haggling process should (if both parties are rational and have, in respect of the sums wagered, a "constant-return" utility for money and gambling) settle at an accepted offer of odds which coincides with a fair bet, then it is false that, as Rapoport concludes, "in the case of a single bet, this probability is entirely in the mind of the policy-maker."

There are indeed grave difficulties with the notion of the probability of a strategic or political event, but it is not always true that "betting policy (*when* to bet) determines probability." Rather, betting policy should be determined (i) by our preferences for money and gambling; (ii) by our estimate of the probability of any relevant decisive event (e.g., the turn of a card); and (iii) by our estimate of the "probability" or "likelihood" that our opponent will accept odds within a certain range. To both the second and the third of these determinants, information can be pertinent. To the second, information about frequencies, even when available, is not always necessary; but singular information—e.g., about the constitution of the pack of cards—can be both necessary and sufficient.

What information is pertinent to the third, the social or "personal,"

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determinant? For example, what kind of information is relevant to the likelihood that at least one of the present nuclear Powers will launch a nuclear attack, using most of its delivery vehicles, within the next hundred days? Let us at once agree with Rapoport that there exists no probability or improbability somehow residing in such an event; but let us not suppose that this is because no nuclear attacks have occurred, or are likely to occur in large enough numbers to justify a statistical estimate. Rapoport devotes a chapter to an account of an experiment in which pairs of college students at the University of Michigan were set to play the game of Prisoner's Dilemma several hundred times in succession. This game has been alleged to bear some resemblance to the nuclear dilemma (if both attack, both lose relatively heavily; if only one attacks, he gains and the other, correspondingly, loses even more heavily; if the pair cooperate, both gain, but only a little). The evidence of Rapoport's experiment suggests broadly that, after a stretch of unilateral attack, a majority of pairs "lock in" on cooperation, while a minority lock in on mutual attack: i.e., it suggests that the members of both majority and minority pairs "learn" about their opposite numbers' dispositions, including their dispositions to learn. But it gives much less guidance about how a pair, playing the game for the first time, would initially dispose their strategies. Obviously, we should rather want to know about the members of that particular pair, their characters and capacities, and about the particular pay-offs in the actual matrix they were to play. About the nuclear Powers, we want to know what they believe they can do to each other, what they think of their several prospects for staying in the advanced-weapons race, and how the leaders of each are disposed toward the use of extreme violence and toward the conduct of power-politics.

Now, it is no doubt possible, and may be demonstrably rational or "consistent," to impute, on the basis of such information, estimated prior probabilities to various courses of action, relevant to the provoking or launching of a nuclear attack, which each of the various Powers may undertake. If so, however, we should remember that each of the Powers, in their different ways, will be doing much the same thing in relation to each of the others' possible actions, so that the information that each has or thinks it has about the others will provide one of the determinants of or influences on its own action. (Incidentally, it will be most useful to know *how* much the same thing; do the Russians and the French, for instance, think about these things non-probabilistically, in an "either-or" fashion?) So the probability-estimates which we as

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onlookers impute to them should take cognizance of each one's predictions of the others' behavior, *and* of the others' predictions, *and*. . . . But it is extremely doubtful whether anyone has this kind, or the more obvious kind, of information about the characters and policies of Powers in anything like the quantity and quality worthy of delicate and subtle display as an array of prior probabilities. Rapoport is wise to consider the possibility that the notion of the "calculated risk" of nuclear war is "only eyewash": again, *not* because "a single man" (or a single Power) "is not a population," nor even because a check on such personal estimates of probability "can be made only if we agree on the class into which we shall put our unique event" (p. 99)—though on that difficulty Rapoport is astringently corrective of much shoddy thinking—but because we know very well that we don't have the information that might begin to justify the epithet "calculated."

On this theme, Rapoport is excellent: "Probabilities are often simply 'estimated,' and estimates are solemnly offered as if they were estimates of next week's price of wheat. These estimates lose all significance when we are dealing with events which are extremely improbable" (p. 102). He supplies a matrix in which the opponent's strategies are treated as "states of nature" and therefore as subjects for probability estimates. "Our" pay-offs are these: both cooperating, 10; we back down, he stands firm, minus 100; the reverse, plus 100; both stand firm minus 20,000: ". . . if we estimate as one in a thousand the chance that the other will be as stubborn as we are, the 'expected gain' (whatever it may mean in the present context) of standing firm is greater than that of giving in. But if we estimate that there is one chance in a hundred that the other will stand firm, then the 'expected gain' of giving in is greater. In this way either decision can be easily rationalized" (p. 104).

Notice that this is an objection about the *practical* difficulties of relying upon probability-estimates which are severally arbitrary, though doubtless capable, in principle, of being made jointly consistent. The present reviewer considers the objection both compelling and adequate; we do not need an additional objection-in-principle, which in any case is not evidently supplied by Rapoport's card-game example.

Very much the same applies to his treatment of the inadequacies of arbitrarily assessed, unidimensional utility scales. His following argument applies to the situation of decisions under certainty. *A fortiori*, it holds against decisions under risk, under uncertainty, and against the direct application of game theory to those strategic and political decisions which are under strict conflict-of-interest (where zero-sum

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games look deceptively promising) or under conflict-and-cooperation (where non-zero-sum games do): "If the decision-maker is a group (or a population) the problem of constructing a consistent rank order preference becomes still more difficult. Since such a scale is essential before a normative decision theory can be developed, we are forced to the conclusion that even in the context of decision under certainty, we have nothing approaching a usable and general normative theory of rational decision: Preferences cannot in general be unambiguously deduced from actual choices" (p. 72). Taken together, Rapoport's objections to unidimensional utility scales and to arbitrary probability estimates sufficiently refute the possibility of an applied science of strategy: we cannot have optimizing decision rules, except perhaps in limited and repeatable tactical situations (e.g., fighter plane combat). Rapoport is, however, anxious to reveal even more serious defects in strategic thinking, especially when it is designed to provide advice for governments.

Thus, in his Introduction, he begins by distinguishing "three modes of decision theory . . . the formal, the prescriptive (or normative), and the descriptive (or empirical)." The formal mode "is confined to the construction of a deductive apparatus to be used in deriving logically necessary conclusions from given assumptions." The prescriptive mode "is concerned with the determination of *optimal* decisions. It depends upon a set of given *goals*" (p. 5). Lastly: "A descriptive theory seeks to find principles which guide real people's decisions. It must therefore rely on *behavioral data.* Such a theory accomplishes its aims if it can say (and support the statement with empirical evidence) something like this: 'People make decisions, *as if* they were guided by the following such and such decision rules . . .'" (p. 6). Rapoport concludes his Introduction by remarking that it will sometimes turn out that the data required to construct a prescriptive theory upon the basis of a formal one will be unobtainable without a descriptive theory of decision.

This seems impeccably orthodox methodology; but two very different kinds of objection to it suggest themselves. Firstly, in respect of the *art* of inventing descriptive theories of the decision process and of the social and political system to which it gives rise: before testing an hypothesis which states that such-and-such decision rules appear to be acted on in political behavior, it is often a good idea to have elaborated one's hypothesis in some complexity—i.e., to have made a rather intricate model. Such models do not consist wholly of logical deductions from axioms: they must also set up hypothetical initial conditions,

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singularly describable. Decision theory and game theory, in their *strictly* formal sense, are powerful means for examining the *feasibility* of such models. For example, game theory can be useful in helping to decide whether it is feasible to attempt to test a model of coalitions sufficiently complex to be of interest in a real-life descriptive theory; sometimes we find that a model just complex enough to be interesting is far too complex to be testable. The present reviewer therefore finds it methodologically convenient to split the "formal mode" of decision theorizing into a strictly formal and purely general level, from which canons for model-construction can be derived, and a rigorous but partly singular or particular level, where one constructs and tests the models.

The game-theoretical matrix, then, probably never provides *directly* an hypothesis about strategic or political events in the real world, as some of the broader and more vulnerable of Rapoport's targets amongst the strategic thinkers have imagined. The use of game theory and its matrices, as some of us have come to realize, is to set a standard of explicitness and rigor in the discussion of acts that are competitive and, in a constrictive and almost obsessional sense of the term, "rational." In the place of hunches about the working of the balance of power, for instance, game theory provides an exact grammar which for the most part simply exposes the arbitrariness and untestability of our hunches: we now know what it would be like to have knowledge of these matters—and we know that on the whole we cannot have it.

Secondly, in respect of formal models' *suggestiveness* in a prescriptive or normative direction, Rapoport's methodology implies that both data obtained through descriptive investigation *and* formal models obtained deductively are together always necessary and sometimes sufficient for prescription. To be brutal, it is hardly ever the case that the most respectable combinations of behavioral data and formal theory are strictly sufficient for *optimal* decisions in politics. On the other hand, a clearly expressed formal notion, unsupported by data, can be *psychologically* "sufficient"; i.e., it may catch on politically. It will have Schelling's "salience." Thinking back over the history of nuclear policy since Churchill's coinage of the term "balance of terror," one is impressed by the attractive and organizing power that has been displayed by the strategists' models, distinctions—their very phrases. Through sheer elegance, and often without benefit of any "behavioral data" at all, they have had themselves adopted by the political "decision-makers," and at last by the military.

Now, that kind of thing seems inevitable in politics. If the world-political community does some day manage to fail-safe its destructive

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nuclear capacities, this will quite likely have come about by grace of some beautiful and suggestive ideas produced by disarmers like Rapoport, quite untested and without the help of "behavioral data." From Adam Smith through Marx and Keynes, the most exact and advanced of the social sciences has been "applied," not by virtue of exhausting all the alternatives (a necessary condition for optimizing, unobtainable in human affairs) but by incantation.

Nevertheless, the *succès d'estime* of a theory does not demonstrate its theoretical validity. It is to critics such as Rapoport that we owe our capacity to doubt and debate the notions that our leaders act on. Particularly apt is a remark at the end of the second Part of *Strategy and Conscience*, denying that it is ". . . a matter of indifference what values one puts into one's own matrix and what values one will assign to the payoffs of the other. The game one will play depends vitally (sometimes irrevocably) on the values one has put in. But in real life it is the way the game is played that reveals the values. How 'objective,' then, are the strategists' estimates if . . . the strategists themselves have made the game what it is?" (p. 194). That attack fails against the less activist of strategic thinkers—viz. against historians, who, though they have to impute valuations to their subjects, can have their imputations falsified by the evidence, and in any case are not playing any of the various "games" they describe. But it would seem to succeed against such powerful and responsible strategists as Mr. McNamara, who was recently reported as having answered the question of what American forces would be "enough" to secure her against Russia by writing out: "Enough = the amount required to deter a Soviet strike + the amount needed to minimize damage to this country in the event of a strike."[2] The equation-form looks at once quantitative, versatile, and firmly objective. In fact, it is soggy with qualitative assessments and valuations. The second of the "amounts" on the right-hand side might, from a Gaullist view, include and greatly exceed the first; from a Soviet view, it might negate the first by provoking a Soviet strike, or a move like missiles-to-Cuba: their perception of this authoritative American doctrine could induce unpredictable changes in their ordering of their own preferences, especially for varieties of weapons-system (Invulnerable second-strike? *Or* radical, inspected disarmament? *Or* the mounting of a huge first-strike force?). Of course, the Secretary of Defense and others of his subtlety and seriousness know very well that many such imponderable value-judgments inform their doctrines. They fall

[2] *New Yorker*, October 10, 1964, p. 102.

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into the bogus-quantitative manner from the prevailing myth that unidimensional "utility scales" measure ranges of intersubjective preference which are somehow objectively "there" in their own and the Soviet decision-makers' minds. As we have seen, the first two Parts of *Strategy and Conscience* systematically refute the claims to universality of the expected-utility decision rule relied on by "abstractionist" strategic thinkers, as the author calls them.

Indeed, his taking them so seriously is the main thing that worries one about Rapoport. Anyone who claims universality for that kind of thing is as mad as a Marxist-Leninist, and recognizably so. The methodology of Rapoport's Introduction is equally universalist, but fortunately he does not suppose that he has the theory his methodology requires. Here he is deceived by his own intellectual traditions. The man he should fear and oppose is the strategist with a particular argument, an apparently dominating strategy, to recommend. The form of such an argument is somewhat as follows: "Whatever other nations do, our nation is safer if it has a nuclear strike force under its own control than if it does not."

At any given time, that contention will tend to convince only some, and not all nations. But, on the whole, the more it convinces, the more it will tend to convince, for obvious reasons. The United Kingdom, fighting Nazi Germany, was the first to be convinced and the first to begin to succeed in the nuclear enterprise. Pacifists could perhaps argue that the MAUD Committee was wrong to have been convinced, even remembering the final solution to the Jewish problem, and the V-1's and V-2's. Americans and Russians were the next to be convinced. Against the Americans, pacifists may have had the strongest argument, though only until the Russians also had an effective capacity, for from then on, the freedom of several other nations seemed to depend on the nuclear capacities of the United States. Moral or pacifist arguments directed uniquely at French or at Chinese nuclear ambitions seem peculiarly unconvincing.

By some such path, the spread of nuclear weapons results from the structure of a system. Much worse consequences could have resulted: for instance, a pre-emptive or forestalling attack—in the worst case, simultaneous attempts to forestall by striking the first nuclear blow. Rapoport properly remarks that ". . . once these options are *considered*, they may be implemented, since they have a built-in self-propelled logic: He may, therefore I ought, therefore he will, therefore I must" (p. 107). But the "self-propelled logic" derives not from any considerations of optimality (in the sense defined by Rapoport) nor from

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exhaustion of all the possible alternatives. It derives, as he himself notices, from the seductions of the dominating strategy: "Recall that although prisoner's dilemma is a non-zero-sum game and is readily perceived as such, it is *strategically* indistinguishable from a zero-sum game in which both players have a dominating strategy. . . . This is the zero-sum trap. Strategic thinking seals this trap, because it seeks one strategic 'solution,' but there is no strategic escape from the trap" (*ibid.*). The first scholar to have demonstrated in detail the mechanism of the strategic trap was Morton Kaplan, in *System and Process in International Politics*, where he showed that from the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Hangman's Paradox considered together a model could be developed that would forewarn of the self-propelled logic that leads toward mutual attack.[3] Since Rapoport effects the same connection in a later work, one is surprised at his failure to acknowledge the pioneering work of Kaplan, a thinker very much in "the strategic mode."[4]

Now, is there really no strategic or political escape from "the trap"? There does seem to be an escape, comprising a number of steps: the "hot line" between Moscow and Washington, which enables "communication between the prisoners"; the building-up of invulnerable forces on both sides, which alters the pay-offs in favor of cooperation; and so forth. A serious difficulty remains: some of the moves, both bilateral and unilateral, that reduce the attractions of nuclear warfare for the two Super-powers have the unintended consequence of attracting more members into the nuclear clubs. Rapoport never gets this difficulty into focus because of his preoccupation with the two-person game and the Russian-American confrontation.

His psychological expertise, on the other hand, helps him bring to light a defect in strategic thinking of almost all varieties: the habit of regarding each Power as a single international "actor," and of attributing a rather jejune Hobbesian disposition to each of them. "The strategist will not get the sort of [psychological] knowledge he wants because he does nothing to inquire into its underpinnings, namely, the deep commitments of people . . ." (p. 124).

But even in this subject Rapoport has the defects of his qualities: while affirming that strategic and political acts are not the work of the abstractionists' utility-maximizing robots, but of flesh-and-blood politicians and administrators with deep personal commitments, he gives far too little weight to the political context that makes their acts and

[3] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), 191-244.

[4] Rapoport, "Systemic and Strategic Conflict," 361-65.

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thoughts something other than the simple expressions of their personal psychic dispositions. In the same way, while understanding that the greater part of the national leader's environment is formed by his people's corporate impulses, preconceptions, and character, he does not bring out how the latter, also, have their effects in a political context and (even in a totalitarian state) through political activity. Strategically oriented thinkers have erred in reducing political to strategic considerations—i.e., to the bare calculation of advantage in a conflict or cooperative-conflict situation. Rapoport errs in supposing that when he has put back the psychology, he has put back the politics as well. But the truth about international politics is not derivable only from a conjunction of the truth about strategy and the truth about individual and group psychology. To have politics in the conclusion, you must have had it in at least one of the premises.

His apparent neglect of the political level of analysis may help to explain the difficulty referred to earlier in this review—his contention that the determinants of systemic events "operate independently of anyone's rationally designed actions. . . ." In fact, the events of a political system are the effects—usually, though not always, conjoint—of rationally and individually designed political actions.

Conversely, any international system will tend to be a political system insofar as the leaders of nations are aware of their systematic interrelationships with each other. Again, Rapoport's focus upon just two Powers, the United States and the USSR, obscures his vision of the real world of multinational politics. (A two-person system is hardly political.) The vision of many strategic writers is obscured by the same bipolar restriction—a similarity that reinforces one's conviction that Rapoport's views are in many ways the mirror-image of committed American strategy.

Strategy and Conscience goes over much of the ground covered in Rapoport's earlier book, *Fights, Games, and Debates*;[5] the two books are even arranged in the same way. But the more recent one is the angrier work, and, largely because of its bipolar fixation, will probably date the more. The destructive criticism of the earlier parts, on the other hand, should remain a permanent contribution to the study of world politics: Rapoport has conclusively demonstrated that several analytic devices frequently employed by strategic thinkers are simply not cogent. This is a considerable scientific achievement.

[5] Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960.

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SARTRE ON COLONIALISM

By A. A. FATOUROS

Jean-Paul Sartre, *Situations, V: Colonialisme et néo-colonialisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, 253 pp. 12 francs.

IN the fifth volume of his collected essays, Jean-Paul Sartre has brought together thirteen pieces written during the last ten years and dealing with the problems of colonialism and decolonization. They range from prefaces or reviews of books to polemical articles and interviews on the Algerian question and French politics; as is to be expected, they vary widely in quality as well as importance. Some of them are perhaps better seen as documents, testimonials of Sartre's courageous stand against the policies of successive French cabinets toward Algeria. At a time when the majority of the French people and of their leaders were striving to avoid seeing or acknowledging the profound moral issues confronting them, Sartre's voice was among the few raised to point out the real problems, to remind Frenchmen of their own recent experience under the Nazis, and to warn them against imitating those Germans who "did not know" what was happening at Dachau and Auschwitz. At the time of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, Sartre did not let his commitment to Marxism and to the left still his voice or his conscience. During the Algerian war, in the late 1950's, he became once again the conscience and the voice of French humanism and French culture. He and his collaborators and friends kept up the intellectual (and sometimes material) contact between France, as a nation and as an idea, and her rebellious colonial subjects.

Whatever their historical significance, however, not many of these pieces would retain their interest or relevance, now that the hot war is over, if they were not important in other ways as well. To begin with, these essays constitute important materials for a study of Sartre's political ideas and attitudes in relation to his philosophy, on the one hand, and to his own *praxis*, on the other. Second, in these articles and prefaces Sartre exposes, expressly or by implication, some interesting and important views on colonialism and decolonization. It is this latter aspect that will concern us in the present article.

It should be stressed, at the outset, that Sartre's point of view is that of a political philosopher and activist. He is neither a political scientist nor an economist (though he does use, on occasion, Marxist economic arguments and is, of course, deeply concerned with the economic aspect of the problems he studies). It would thus be a mistake to treat

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his contribution in the strict terms of the social sciences. It is, moreover, important to note that the partial observations and theories expressed in this collection of essays acquire their full meaning only within the framework of Sartre's ontological and political philosophy, as exposed in his previous systematic works and especially in his *Critique de la raison dialectique*.[1] Sartre is a Marxist, albeit a most unorthodox one,[2] and his interpretation of colonialism is founded on Marxism.[3] Nevertheless, the present essay is not concerned with the Marxist view of colonialism as such, or Sartre's conception of it, but with the partial, perhaps incidental, but most illuminating insights which are to be found in Sartre's literary and political essays in the volume under discussion. It is legitimate for a commentator to care for the "insights" rather than the "systems,"[4] especially when, as in this case, concern with the systems would tend to obscure the partial but important insights. It is thus possible and, in our view, useful to take advantage of Sartre's profound understanding of human motivation and his acute analyses of persons and attitudes, and to ignore on occasion his own systematizations of the data he exposes.

At first approach, Sartre's analysis of colonialism seems to adhere to a concept which may be called the "objective" theory of colonialism. The term "objective" is used in this connection not in order to indicate that the theory itself is necessarily more disinterested or scientific than others, but in order to describe the very essence of the theory, according to which the destructive effects of colonialism are due to the objective characteristics of the system as such, not to the bad intentions or the weaknesses of the colonialists or their subjects. As Sartre states, in an essay characteristically entitled "Colonialism Is a System," there are no good and bad *colons*; there are *colons*, that's all (p. 27). The colonial system is led by its own internal necessity to corrupt and demoralize the colonized, to impoverish them, to destroy their social structures and disrupt their social relationships.

This necessity is in part economic. As Gunnar Myrdal, among others,

[1] Paris 1960.

[2] Thus, he accepts "historical dialectics" but rejects "dialectical materialism" (i.e., the applicability of the dialectical method to nature and the natural sciences). For a succinct exposition and defense of his views on this point, see his contribution to J.-P. Sartre, R. Garaudy, and others, *Marxisme et existentialisme—controverse sur la dialectique* (Paris 1962). A more complete and complex discussion is found in his *Critique de la raison dialectique* (cited hereinafter as *Critique*). See also Wilfrid Desan, *The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre* (New York 1965).

[3] See especially his discussion of colonialism in *Critique*, 669-88.

[4] In Justice Holmes's words, "Men's systems are forgotten, their *aperçus* are remembered" (*Holmes-Laski Letters*, ed. by Mark DeWolfe Howe, 1 [Cambridge, Mass., 1953], 277). And cf. *ibid.*, 300.

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has shown, the economic relationships established by the end of the nineteenth century between the colonial powers and their overseas territories led "necessarily"—that is to say, through the automatic operation of impersonal market forces—to a redistribution of power and material resources to the profit of the metropolitan powers and the detriment of the colonies, to the cumulative enrichment of the former and the consequent cumulative impoverishment of the latter. Once the system is established, it tends to move in this direction automatically, with no need for conscious malevolent decisions, or conspiracies, on the part of the persons involved.

Economic factors can also account in part for the initial motivation that led to colonial expansion. But, in the absence of a conspiratorial, and therefore subjective, interpretation of actions and attitudes, it is difficult to see how economic factors alone shaped the system that had evolved by the beginning of the twentieth century. Certain cultural and psychological factors, however, played an important part. The cultural arrogance and lack of understanding of the European nations and their colonial officials toward the social structures or the property systems of the colonized peoples, coupled with an unquestioned belief in the superiority of Western institutions and the Western way of thinking and acting, are (in most, though perhaps not in all, cases) sufficient to account for the actions that led to the disruption of tribal structures and traditions. The contact between cultures at different stages of economic and industrial development and with different hierarchies of values would have caused some such disruption, anyway. But the arrogance and lack of understanding (or of desire to understand) on the part of the colonial officials and their governments precluded any action that could have tempered the impact of the conflict between cultures.

As already noted, Sartre seems at first glance to accept, in the essays under discussion, such an objective approach to the problem, but he appears somewhat inconsistent in his analysis of the elements of the colonial situation. For instance, in describing nineteenth-century French policies in Algeria, he portrays government and big business as consciously and deliberately deciding, in order to serve their own interests and assure themselves of cheap labor, to expropriate the lands of the native population, to sacrifice to the *colons* the interests of that population, and to impoverish and demoralize its members. This is not an accidental lapse into a subjective or conspiratorial interpretation of events; Sartre's conception involves far more complicated considerations, which have been stated more explicitly in his *Critique de la*

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raison dialectique. It is not my intention to venture here into an exposition of the intricacies of the political philosophy that Sartre develops in this latest *magnum opus*. For present purposes, it is sufficient to state (with considerable oversimplification) that Sartre attempts, once again, to transcend the objective-subjective dichotomy and to perceive the actions of human beings, members of particular classes or groups, as products both of objective material forces and of more or less freely chosen intentions, transcending material conditions toward an end. It then becomes possible to attribute to the colonial powers or their officials deliberate intentions in regard to the actions which led to the disruption of the tribal societies or the demoralization of the native population. These views have to be accepted as given; it would lead us too far afield if we tried to discuss them in a philosophical or historical context.

Whatever the choices may have been at the time of the establishment of the colonial system, once it has been established it develops its own necessity and, in part, itself determines the intentions and attitudes of those involved in it, while at the same time limiting the effectiveness of any "abnormal" attitudes or intentions. Certain economic, political, and psychological necessities are thus created, by virtue of which the position of the colonizer is continuously strengthened and that of the colonized correspondingly weakened. The interests of the two groups develop in constant reference and opposition to one another. The *colon* (or, for that matter, the Mississippi white) is thus right when he says that only he "knows" his "opponent": Both *colon* and colonized are creations of the colonial system; they are blood brothers, created by the same process, the one a mirror image of the other. A necessary condition for the existence of each is the existence of the other.

The situation in the Union of South Africa shows clearly the ultimate deadlock to which the system itself is bound objectively (i.e., automatically) to lead. Professor C. A. W. Manning has pointed out recently that the attitude of the Afrikaners is not, in its basic quality, very different from that of any nationalist group.[5] And it is true that, in this context, it is not particularly important whether "nationalism" rather than "racism" lies at the root of the *apartheid* policies. In the case of any minority encircled by a majority of another race, the "collective selfishness" which is nationalism will tend to acquire a racist tinge. But it is most important to note that, while nationalism is typically the wish to exclude others (who are different in language,

[5] "In Defense of Apartheid," *Foreign Affairs*, XLII (October 1964), 140.

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culture, or origin) from a group's "own" territory, colonial racism is predicated on the continuing domination of the white minority over the native majority. While the chauvinist's ideal, at its extreme, is the total elimination of his enemies, the colonialist cannot and does not wish the extermination of the colonial subjects, for it is their presence that gives him his special status.[6] The colonial system has thus brought into existence a situation where, more and more unavoidably, any gain by one side means not merely a loss by the other, but the destruction of its very humanity.

One has to go a step farther and, with Sartre, admit that colonialism, as a system intended to be permanent, and the colonial attitude itself, can only be founded on a denial of the humanity of the colonized. The basic attitude involved here is the same as in the case of slavery; in its essence, it is but an extension of a fundamental human attitude. Perceiving other persons as objects rather than subjects, or, in Kantian terms, as means and not ends, is a common way of mankind, perhaps *the* common way. It is only by a conscious effort that one grasps the fact of man's social condition or accepts the moral or religious prescriptions that command the abandonment of this attitude. The colonizer, therefore, has only to let himself go, to convince himself that the prescriptions in question do not, for one reason or another, apply to the colonial subjects. His situation and attitude have definite similarities with those of all masters in relationships of domination: the attitude of the medieval lord toward his serfs, or that of the nineteenth-century employer toward his employees. There are, however, important differences of degree between these cases and modern colonialism. Moreover, there exists a far-reaching difference in the overall social and moral context: whatever the case in past centuries, the colonialist's denial of the humanity of his subjects stands today by itself as an extreme case. Sartre seems to underestimate these differences. He stresses instead, by implication in this volume of essays and explicitly in his *Critique de la raison dialectique*, the similarity between the employer-employee relationship under capitalism and the relationship between the colonialist and the native subjects. This fundamental similarity cannot be denied, but the differences between these relationships should not be disregarded, either. Indeed, the similarity is so basic[7] that dwelling on it does not seem to advance significantly our insight into the colonial relationship itself.

[6] This is, of course, one of the fundamental differences between modern (nineteenth-century) colonialism and the acquisition of overseas territories in previous centuries.

[7] For instance, one might use similar terms with respect to the relationship between

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The peculiar characteristic of the colonial relationship of modern times is not the fact of man's exploitation of man, nor the ambiguity in the parties' perception of one another. These are common, if not trivial, phenomena found in many human relationships. What distinguishes colonialism is the fact of the meeting, under specific historical conditions, of two cultures at different stages of economic and intellectual development, at a time of dynamic expansion for the dominant culture and of increasing democratization within it. That the colonizer is alien, in mentality and culture and attitude, and that he intends to remain so, are the central elements of the colonial condition. In the absence of these elements, one may have other kinds of domination and/or exploitation, but not what in modern times is known as colonialism.[8] The increasing democratization of the dominant culture itself, and especially the recognition of the common humanity of all its members, on the basis of certain increasingly general criteria (i.e., not class or caste, or even culture), is another element of particular importance. The fundamental contradiction in colonialism is that while retention of its mastery by the dominant group depends on its refusal to assimilate or be assimilated by the dominated, its own culture places it under increasing pressure to admit the human status of anyone meeting certain general, more or less biological, criteria and thereby to accept him as entitled to treatment in accordance with certain minimum standards.

The outcome, under these conditions, may now seem preordained. In actual fact, however, the members of the dominant group (i.e., the "whites" or "Europeans")[9] sought doggedly to escape from the con-

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lovers. Sartre's own description of the essential contradictions inherent in this relationship is surely one of his most imaginative and penetrating contributions to our understanding of the human condition. See Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant* (Paris 1943), 431ff.; or *Being and Nothingness*, trans. by H. Barnes (New York 1956), 364ff.

[8] In this connection, see the interesting, though somewhat hasty, comparisons between nineteenth-century European colonialism and the colonial, or imperial, expansion in Greek and Roman antiquity and at the time of the conquest of the New World, in J. Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-government* (London 1960), 6ff.

[9] And it is clear that all the Europeans in the colonies were members of the dominant group and profited from its position. On this point, Sartre seems to fall into an attitude of "bad faith" (in his own sense of the term) when he attempts to exonerate "the petty civil servants or European laborers" who, he claims, cannot be considered as *colons*, since they are "victims as well as innocent beneficiaries of the regime" (p. 27n). This statement is most surprising. Is Sartre implying that executioners and victims have to be distinct persons and to belong to different classes, or is it that being a victim makes one necessarily innocent of victimizing others? In *Portrait du colonisé précédé du portrait du colonisateur* (Paris 1957), 18-22, Albert Memmi points out that there is no innocent *petit colonisateur*, since all Europeans in the colonies are privileged members of the ruling group, regardless of their relative

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sequences of the system's fundamental contradiction and to uphold the *status quo*, from which they had so much to gain. The very intensity of their attempts at self-justification indicates clearly that they were aware of their fundamental lack of legitimacy; in Memmi's words, "Deep within himself, the colonialist pleads guilty."[10] To escape this nagging self-doubt, they sought to ignore and deny the human status of the colonized. As is to be expected from the philosopher who described so masterfully the concept of "bad faith,"[11] Sartre's perceptions of the attitudes and processes involved are sharp and illuminating.

One way of refusing to recognize the humanity of the native is to emphasize the differences which separate him from "us." In the preface written for a book of photographs of China by Henri Cartier-Bresson,[12] Sartre exposes unmercifully how our conception of the picturesque and exotic serves to justify our treatment of the natives as objects, rather than as human beings. It is a masterful essay whose main thrust is fortunately unaffected by Sartre's apparently unquestioning confidence in the beneficial effects of the Communist victory in China. "In the origins of the picturesque, there is war and the refusal to understand the enemy. . . . The attitude in principle has not changed much: the natives are being killed less frequently, but they are being despised *en bloc*; this is the civilized form of massacre" (p. 8).[13] The Chinese photographed by Cartier-Bresson are not picturesque. They are individuals and, surprisingly, they do not look alike; they do not look Chinese enough, because they look too human. The poor in the pictures look too much like our own; after all, "Of all the things in the world, poverty is the most equally distributed" (p. 11). Again and again, the experiences of the Second World War, of misery, pain, and death (all "existential marginal experiences," as another existentialist philosopher, Karl Jaspers, would point out) come to life through the con-

social or economic status within the group itself. Sartre himself may have changed his mind on this point since 1958, when the essay quoted from above was first published. In *Critique de la raison dialectique*, he now stresses the solidarity of the *colons* as a group, as against the colonized, without stating or implying any qualification exempting a particular class or group.

[10] Memmi, 79.

[11] Sartre, *L'Etre et le néant*, 85ff.; Barnes trans., 47ff.

[12] "D'une Chine à l'autre," *Situations, V*, 7-24.

[13] One may note, in passing, Sartre's insistence on the importance and historical precedence of military conquest of colonial or semi-colonial territories. This view, which may be attributed to his concern with the French experience in Algeria and elsewhere, is not necessary to his main thesis and tends to oversimplify a complex and diverse historical record. Whether political or military domination preceded economic domination is not particularly important. It is the continuing relationship between all the various forms of domination that should be of greater concern.

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templation of these photographs from the distant Orient. The dead body of the little Chinese child, left in the street wrapped up in the traditional red sheet, cannot somehow be seen as poetic and picturesque when it brings back the image of the dead Neapolitan child lying in a huge bed among the ruins. The two experiences, which we have been conditioned to treat as wholly alien to one another, are now blended and lend emotional color to one another, in the same manner in which Nevers and Hiroshima become a single city and a single experience in Alain Resnais' *Hiroshima, mon amour*. "This album is a death-notice: it announces the end of tourism," wrote Sartre. "It informs us . . . that misery has lost its picturesque character and will never find it again" (p. 17). He was certainly too optimistic. He underestimated, for once, man's ability to forget or rationalize his own experiences and to regard those of others as external to himself and therefore boring or merely "interesting" objects of attention (but not concern). Still, this essay offers an insight into our own nature and attitude that cannot easily be forgotten.

If treating the native as picturesque is not enough, he can be dismissed in a more "rational" manner. One hardly needs to refer to the elaborate historical or pseudo-philosophical theories about the superiority of the Aryan race that were developed in the nineteenth century and had their explosive political aftermath in the Europe of World War II. Their more banal counterpart is the stereotype of the "native" which generations of colonial officials and settlers have presented as an objective picture of reality.[14] Its individual features are often contradictory: the native is both lazy and restless, simple-minded and sneaky; brave, because of his lack of feeling, and at the same time cowardly; innocuous and criminally inclined. The coherence of the picture lies in its justification of the European's superiority. The very similarity of the descriptions of colonized peoples who differ profoundly from one another in many respects is an indication of the picture's degree of realism.[15] Still, even well-intentioned "scientific" observers have been taken in sometimes, and have dressed up such descriptions

[14] For an excellent discussion of colonial stereotypes, see Memmi, 90ff., 105ff., and *passim*. And cf. Sartre, *Critique*, 344ff. (note).

[15] Almost identical stereotypes have been (and to some extent still are) current in the United States with reference to Negroes. This is not surprising. The condition of the Negro in the United States has been, in the past, very similar to that of the natives in Africa and Asia, especially in its psychological and sociological aspects and, in some respects, in its economic aspects as well. Some of the psychological similarities remain today, but there is increasing differentiation in other respects, which is due in part to the acquisition of national independence by the previously colonial territories, and in part to the increasingly social and economic character of the civil rights struggle in the United States.

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in scientific terminology, without considering the extent to which the colonial situation itself was at the root of the features they were talking about.[16] There is a warning in this: to the extent that our political science and our anthropology rest on earlier descriptions and observations which disregarded or minimized the effects of the colonial condition, they are in need of a cautious but far-reaching reconsideration and reassessment.

If the native still does not seem different, and therefore non-human, enough, more direct measures can be taken. Now that most colonial territories are independent states which, to our ill-concealed satisfaction, do not manage to behave themselves very correctly, it is perhaps in bad taste to remind ourselves of the part that violence and terror, physical and mental, have played in creating the colonial system. In fact, although with wide variations in degree, violence has been an unavoidable feature of colonialism.[17] Violence, however, involves a vicious circle as well as a contradiction. The colonial justifies his use of violence on the ground that the native is different (that is to say, non-human), but the act of violence itself results "objectively" in the dehumanization of the victim, both in his own eyes and in those of his oppressor. The colonial himself loses some of his humanity; he becomes less and less human by his own standards (or, at least, by those of his culture) as he redoubles his efforts to dehumanize the native. At the same time, violence is in itself contradictory: it involves inherently a recognition of the victim's humanity, of his possibility of choosing and acting freely. The extreme of violence is death, but this involves a negation of the oppressor's purpose, which is, in the colonial situation, the exercise of control over the victim. By its very nature, violence is bound to frustrate its own ends.

Thus, all the methods by which the colonialist seeks to deny the human status of the native prove ultimately inadequate. His compatriots in the metropolitan territory begin to realize the contradiction and to press toward the abolition of the system. The colonized subjects themselves, in the period since World War II, have been able to exercise their own pressures directly (through armed insurrection)

[16] See, on this point, the interesting, though unfortunately too brief, discussion of pre-independence "scientific observations" on Algerian criminality, in the chapter "De l'impulsivité criminelle du Nord-Africain à la guerre de libération nationale," in Frantz Fanon, *Les damnés de la terre* (Paris 1961), 224ff. Fanon, by profession a psychiatrist, was greatly admired by Sartre, who wrote the preface to the above-mentioned book; reprinted in *Situations, V*, 167-93.

[17] For some tendentious and uneven but often illuminating comments on this subject, see Fanon, "De la violence," *Les damnés*, 27ff.; and cf. Sartre's comments in his preface, *Situations, V*, 175ff.

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or indirectly (through various demands and through exploitation of the Cold War). The cost of colonialism has thus increased and this raises more pressures favoring its demise. The white settlers in the colonial territories, the military, and all those whose interests are immediately affected are caught in the middle. To cope with the contradiction between colonialism and democracy, they develop a split personality, holding to the metropolitan values and the politics of equality, while continuing to impose a system of oppression (however qualified) in the colonies. A schizophrenic attitude of this sort cannot form the basis of a stable system; one set of values has to be given up. Some of the *colons*, recognizing this, accepted the point of view of the natives and, where necessary, supported their demands or even fought on their side. Others, unable to stand the weight of their contradictory attitude, broke down. (In the cold, professional understatements of the psychiatrist, which enhance the horror of the tale, Fanon has described the "case" of a police inspector in Algeria, whose "job" of torturing prisoners had begun to affect his private life and behavior.)[18] Finally, where the intransigent *colons* and colonial officials were particularly strong, the "necessity" for bloody oppression in the colonies led to a threat to the democratic institutions of the metropolitan regime itself.

The liquidation of the colonial system in its traditional form does not put an end to its consequences and effects. The system has marked indelibly the social and economic structures and the very mentality of the peoples who lived under it. They are now its creations even more, perhaps, than they are creations of their precolonial conditions and traditions. Thus, the consequences of colonialism carry over into decolonization. This latter term itself is ambiguous. It is used sometimes to refer to the very fact of acquisition of independence. More often, a certain duration is implied: the period of decolonization starts before independence and ends when the country has acquired full political, economic, and even cultural freedom. Decolonization is thus seen as a process, with a partly normative content. In this sense, decolonization and development are synonymous; what is now implied is not only the elimination of foreign influence but also the development of a national character, the creation of a new society.[19] The aftereffects of colonialism determine the extent and the manner in which this movement will proceed.

[18] Fanon, "Guerre coloniale et troubles mentaux, Série A," *Les damnés*, 192ff.; and cf. *Situations, V*, 200-202.

[19] See the forceful discussion by A. ben Salah, "Significations et perspectives de la décolonisation," *L'Esprit*, XXV (1957), 891ff.

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As Albert Memmi has pointed out, during the colonial period the colonized peoples were placed "outside history."[20] They have been transformed into irresponsible spectators who are unconcerned about the consequences of their actions and attitudes because they are not allowed to affect their own (or anyone else's) condition. The passage into "responsible nationhood" is a shock that is intensified by the fact that the colonial regime has undermined the self-confidence of its subject peoples. These peoples have been presented, for generations, with the European model of society and with a degrading portrait of themselves drawn by the colonialists. However much they may reject this portrait, some self-doubt remains, and it provides additional inducement to imitate the European way of life and thought. Their realization that full adoption of this model is impossible is sometimes taken as proof of their own inferiority, rather than as an indication that a new, original way, peculiar to the peoples concerned, must be evolved. In Sartre's words, "The condition of being a native (*l'indigénat*) is a neurosis the *colons* have introduced and maintained in the colonized with their own consent" (p. 181).[21]

Finally, the colonial regime has left a tradition of treating violence as the foundation of authority. For the colonial subject, violence is an integral part of the legal order. The symbol of the state is the soldier or the policeman, with whom the only communication possible is predicated on violence. After independence, it is difficult to uproot this attitude toward authority (or, better, toward "the authorities"). Further, the ex-colonial subject has learned by experience that violence is an effective tool for the achievement of his own ends. During the struggle for independence, violence proved a successful means (often the only successful means) of national achievement and self-realization. Such experiences create difficult problems for the new legal orders, which are, as a rule, already weak and lacking in effectiveness.

Not only such negative factors, but also the positive elements operative during the process of decolonization owe their existence or their particular form to the colonial system. For any state, but especially for the new ones, no single element is more important than the existence of a national consciousness, of a sense of national unity and integration. In the ex-colonial territories, this consciousness was created in the process of rejecting the colonial power's domination; nationalism has

[20] Memmi, 121ff.

[21] There is a significant similarity between Sartre's observations in this connection and Stanley Elkins's perceptive discussion of the effects of slavery on personality (Stanley Elkins, *Slavery* [Chicago 1959], 81ff.).

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thus become synonymous with anti-colonialism. Sartre places special emphasis on this process, which he sees and describes not only as a psychological datum, but also in its concrete historical context. He points out that there is a direct correlation between the intensity of the struggle for independence and the degree of national integration that the new state achieves. In the Congo, independence was granted after a minimum of struggle.[22] There was no serious rebellion, violent or otherwise. There was no lengthy struggle against the colonial power in which the educated elite could fight at the side of the peasants and the tribal chiefs, and during which ties of common interests and mutual respect could be forged. In short, there was no integrating experience which could create a national conscience. The political chaos that followed now seems inevitable. The well-intentioned but ineffectual Lumumba found himself representing national unity and centralized authority in a country which was not ready for either. Moreover, the native majority, still clinging to tribal structures, resented the sudden emergence, as a governing elite, of the few "evolved" natives, whose main representative was Lumumba. In the past, this minority may have been regarded proudly as symbols of the natives' ability to emulate the Europeans, but there was no permanent bond between them and the masses, and when they were installed in power, their legitimacy derived from the Belgians rather than from their own people.

In Algeria, on the other hand, the long struggle for independence brought together peasants and city-dwellers, elites and masses, university graduates and illiterates.[23] They fought together, suffered together, discovered one another's qualities and faults. Each abandoned some prejudices and understood better those of the others. As a result, among the problems Algeria may be facing today, lack of national unity is not the most acute.

Another aspect of decolonization which Sartre discusses, albeit incidentally and inadequately, is the phenomenon of neo-colonialism. Though a term having wide currency in recent years, neo-colonialism is difficult to define.[24] It is generally used to describe the current attempts (actual or alleged) of the developed countries to dominate and control the "emerging" states (as well as all other economically underdeveloped countries), chiefly through economic rather than mil-

[22] See "La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba," *Situations, V*, 194-253.

[23] Cf. Sartre, "Les damnés de la terre" (preface to Fanon's book), *ibid.*, 167-93; and see also Fanon, 111ff. For a description of the Cuban revolution in similar terms, see Sartre, *Sartre on Cuba* (New York 1961), 47-61.

[24] For a helpful but frustrating attempt, see Mario Rossi, *The Third World* (New York 1963), 73-75.

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itary or purely political means. The reality of such attempts, as well as the danger that they represent to the new states, cannot be disputed. What is difficult to determine, however, is the relationship between such conduct and the colonialism of the past century. Sartre's attitude on this point reflects both his belief that all kinds of capitalist exploitation form a continuum and his disregard of the differences between various kinds of domination. However, the attempt to dominate and, in a broad sense, to exploit other states is nothing new, either in substance or in form. Even if one accepts as characteristic features of neo-colonialism all the phenomena described in Sartre's books,[25] one has to admit that they can also be found, separately or together, in the past. The differences in economic strength and in the level of economic development between the states involved; the use of economic instruments, such as grants of military and economic aid, private investment, and trade; a dominant nation's attempt to capture, by outright bribery or offers of support, the good will of the ruling classes in a less-developed country—these have been secondary characteristics of the struggle for domination among competing states ever since Greek and Roman antiquity. Colonialism, old-style, did exhibit a combination of features peculiar to itself: outright domination, based on physical power, exerted by an alien group on groups differing from it in culture and stage of economic development; affirmation of the racial superiority of the dominant group; and use of a double standard in the relations between members of the two groups. These features are not found in neo-colonialism. Recognition of this fact is, indeed, implied in the colonial territories' unanimous option for the "political kingdom" rather than for economic and social improvement under colonial tutelage.[26] This setting of priorities implies that political independence itself offers a possibility for national economic and social development which is absent under the colonial regime. Therefore, even if one accepts, in defining neo-colonialism, the Marxist or near-Marxist views of the intensity, ruthlessness, and so forth, of the capitalist drive for domination, one would still have to admit that political liberation—however nominal—does make a difference.[27] The quality of the struggle for economic development changes—though, of course, the

[25] Especially in *Sartre on Cuba*, 24-43, and "La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba," 244-45.

[26] Sartre himself refers to the Algerian rebels' assertion that even if they were happy under the French bayonets, they would still fight for independence (p. 26).

[27] "The worst decolonization will always be superior by far to the best colonization. The difference between decolonization and colonization is not a matter of degree . . ." (Aimé Césaire, "L'homme de culture et ses responsabilités," *Présence Africaine*, N.S., No. 25-26 [1959], 118).

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struggle is not won merely by virtue of liberation, and many dangers remain. One may say, using Sir Henry Maine's terminology, that the relations between developed and underdeveloped countries have now passed from the stage of status to that of contract. The latter stage presents serious dangers of its own for the weaker parties, but it also makes possible, though it does not guarantee, a radical improvement in their position.[28] The use of the term "neo-colonialism" tends to mask the essential qualitative differences between the state of affairs before and after liberation. It is, of course, true that many of those who use this term are happy to encourage such a confusion.

This volume of essays demonstrates once again Jean-Paul Sartre's ability to understand and analyze human relationships and situations. At first reading, one is struck by his penetrating insights and illuminating juxtapositions. Often expressed in deliberately paradoxical forms, his views shake people out of their complacency and reveal, in flashes, truths and ideas usually concealed under journalistic banalities or scholarly verbiage. But while the insights remain bright and penetrating, on closer examination one feels a certain uneasiness, a sense of incompleteness which is not cured by the author's politico-philosophical generalizations and systematizations. The feeling is even stronger when one reads Sartre's treatment of some of the same issues in his *Critique de la raison dialectique*.

A useful clue to the source of this uneasiness can be found in a work for which Sartre himself wrote a very favorable review. In his *Portrait du colonisé*, Albert Memmi gives an arresting description of the predicament of the "colonist of good will"—that is to say, the colonist who refuses to acquiesce or participate in the exploitation and debasement of the colonized.[29] His refusal to accept the colonial situation places him outside the society of his own people, but it does not make it possible for him to join the society of the colonized. Not only does he

[28] The suggestion of an analogy to the developments within the Western national legal orders in the past three centuries is implied in the use of this terminology. From the status order, with its inherent formal and factual inequalities, the Western societies passed into the contract stage, where the formal principle of equality before the law obtains, eliminating formal inequalities, but allowing free play to the factual inequalities of power, wealth, etc. As a result of (formal) political equality, however, Western societies have moved toward the welfare state—that is, the utilization of legal, social, and political institutions to counterbalance and compensate for the inequalities of fact. With the passing of colonialism, the international society seems to have reached the contract stage; it may be seen today as making tentative and somewhat unconscious steps toward the stage beyond. For some related observations, see A. A. Fatouros, "International Law and the Third World," *Virginia Law Review*, L (June 1964), 783ff.; and, for a similar interpretation, see B. V. A. Röling, *International Law in an Expanded World* (Amsterdam 1960).

[29] Memmi, 29-61.

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find that he is not fully welcome there, but he is also repelled by some features of that society (its religiosity, perhaps, or a tendency to violence, its narrow nationalism, or its totalitarian attitudes) which are contrary to his own intellectual approach and to his democratic, usually left-wing, beliefs. (Memmi uses the terms "colonist of good will" and "colonist of the left" almost interchangeably.) Even if he is prepared to compromise and, despite his beliefs, collaborate with the colonized, he rightly suspects that he has little influence on them, and that he will have no place in the independent state once it is achieved. He is thus left outside any really important social or political grouping (or he is accepted only on sufferance) and he is doomed to total ineffectiveness. Neither his silence nor his action seems to help and he is bound, sooner or later, to leave the colony.

Sartre's own situation bears a striking similarity to that of the unlucky colonist. Since he is in the metropolis, of course, he faces no dilemma of silence or departure. But, like the colonist, his fundamental situation is uneasy and contradictory. He is on solid ground when he rejects and criticizes most destructively the colonial position. But when he moves to join the other side, his step is far more uncertain. It is not merely a question of politics; the issue goes far deeper. In the last analysis, the ex-colonial subject has a choice between accepting or rejecting European civilization, regardless of its political or ideological label, since he himself is, at least in part, outside it. Sartre has no such choice; he comments and criticizes from inside Europe and, by choice, from inside a particular section of European culture—namely, Marxism. Try as he may, he cannot place himself outside it. In his preface to Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre* (pp. 167-93), Sartre faces the problem squarely: when Fanon says that Europe is done for, Sartre points out, this is not a warning, nor is it the prelude to some good advice (as it is when a European makes the same statement); it is a factual statement, a diagnosis by someone who is not part of the sick body. Fanon himself, a West Indian with a French education, states this point clearly. He addresses his "comrades": "Let us decide not to imitate Europe. . . . If we want to change Africa into another Europe . . . then let us trust the Europeans with the destinies of our lands. They will do a better job than the best equipped among us. But if we want humanity to advance one step, if we want to bring it to a level different from that to which Europe has brought it, then we must invent, we must discover. If we want to respond to the expectations of our peoples, we should search elsewhere than in Europe. . . ."[30]

[30] Fanon, 240, 242. Also cf. *ibid.*, 73-74.

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But where is this "elsewhere"? What are the traits of a non-European approach and what are its practical results? Some Africans, particularly politicians, have tried, with varying degrees of lack of success, to provide an answer to this question. Neither Sartre nor Fanon really tries to do so. Worse still, while they make clear at the beginning that by "Europe" they mean the whole European culture, as the argument goes on they narrow down their rejection, so that in the end it seems to include only the Western capitalist democracies. The Soviet Union, and Marxism, manage somehow to escape.[31]

The fundamental question is thus left unanswered. The dogmatic Marxian systematizing which Sartre offers in order to "explain" the situation of the colonial or ex-colonial territories is patently inadequate. Despite repeated qualifications and reservations, his self-conscious application of Marxian formulas to African conditions gives far from satisfactory conclusions. Sartre "explains" Lumumba's actions and policies with a good deal of sympathy and understanding. But he also criticizes him for being a Jacobin and not a Marxist, without even attempting to show whether or how his being a Marxist would have changed anything in the Congo's situation. Sartre's sympathy and psychological insight contrast sharply with the doctrinaire formulations, which appear superimposed and irrelevant.

The aftertaste of these essays is thus mixed, and there is a good deal of bitterness and disappointment in it. On reflection, their most positive contribution, in addition to the partial insights already emphasized, is perhaps Sartre's affirmation of the necessity of looking at colonialism from a human point of view, as an incident in human relationships. Such an approach does not replace, of course, the approaches of the political scientist, the anthropologist, or the economist, but it complements them in certain important ways. In its absence, our understanding of the present attitude of the peoples in the ex-colonial territories, and of the social and political processes there, is incomplete and frequently distorted, since the phenomena we are dealing with have their roots in human attitudes and motivations, in attempts or failures of men to communicate, and in specific interactions between individuals and between groups of people.

A corollary to this affirmation is the belief that an objective, rational, and balanced point of view is not necessarily always the most appropriate when dealing with such issues. To be calm and objective in

[31] This does not mean that Sartre has not quite often criticized the Soviet or official Marxist viewpoints. We are concerned here only with his position on the colonial issue and the confrontation with the "third world."

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the face of a monstrous phenomenon that was somehow treated as trivial only a few years ago is not necessarily a sign of impartiality—or perhaps impartiality itself is not an appropriate attitude in this matter. The issues that arise are vital; our whole conception of ourselves and of humanity is involved. On reading Sartre's essays, even the more topical ones, one cannot fail to notice how their emotional appeal, their intensity of tone, do not blunt, but sharpen their intellectual impact. This is in part due, of course, to the fact that emotion is superimposed on rigorous analysis and is not a substitute for it. But the emotion comes through, even where the analysis fails.

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CONTENTION AND MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By KENNETH N. WALTZ

F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963, 416 pp. $6.95.

Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, New York, Random House, 1962, 310 pp. $4.50.

THE idea that peaceful adjustment of the relations of states may result from contention among them Claude believes to be hopelessly outmoded. The presence of nuclear weapons means that any equilibrium of states, however stable it may seem, is not nearly stable enough. The task of the theorist and the statesman alike is to introduce order from above, to replace the "invisible hand" by which adjustments are contrived in systems of self-regulation with something a little more substantial. Here the juxaposition of our two authors enlivens the subject. F. H. Hinsley considers the notion of spontaneous equilibrium to be a liberating idea. He applies the eighteenth century's beautiful system of natural harmony to the world of the present and is delighted with the result. Though large-scale war would now be devastating, we need not worry. Nuclear power is absolute and nuclear states, competent to control the instruments of power at their disposal, deter each other absolutely.

The character of an international system depends upon the number of great states that exist, the capabilities with which they are endowed, the ambitions they may entertain, and the nature of relations among them. Variations in these factors, which are central in any theory of international politics, determine the stability of the international equilibrium and at the same time make the managerial task more or less pressing. Because of the assumptions that each author adopts, both of the books under review are unevenly developed. In neither of them is sufficient effort made to weigh the importance of all of the factors and to establish relations of cause and interdependence among them.

I. Modern States and Nuclear Weapons

Hinsley places great emphasis upon the peaceful proclivities of the modern state. In earlier periods, a portion of the populace sometimes

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goaded its government to war. Since late in the nineteenth century, he observes, this has no longer been the case. In all states, totalitarian and democratic alike, the opinions of the people, dedicated to peace, have constituted an impediment to war which the ruler bent upon war has had to overcome before he could commit his armies to battle. Hinsley places even greater emphasis on "administrative" barriers than he does on popular restraints. "Contrary to a cherished belief of internationalists . . . states as organizations, as cabinets, as civil services with civil service committees, as comprehensively competent but also immensely complicated structures of power, were less and less the causes or the instigators of violence and war, if ever they had been, and were becoming more and more disposed to shift to avoid these things, even as they were becoming more and more capable of doing so" (p. 288). The judgment is judiciously illustrated by citing the case of Baldwin's Britain between the two wars, but Hinsley also applies it to Hitler's Germany and to Stalin's Russia. He has echoed, apparently unconsciously, the earlier opinion of Max Weber, and applied it to a different purpose. He who seizes control of a state by revolutionary force or military occupation, Weber had reasoned, is confronted by a bureaucratic apparatus that is immensely difficult to move. "The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery." The answer, he suggested, is that "such control is possible only in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical specialists. Generally speaking, the trained permanent official is more likely to get his way in the long run than his nominal superior, the Cabinet minister, who is not a specialist."[1] The "political master," no matter how he has come to power, "finds himself in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the expert. . . ." Weber concluded that modern bureaucracy "makes 'revolution,' in the sense of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible. . . ."[2] But, as has often been suggested and as Hitler's career has illustrated, the charismatic leader playing upon mass irrationality, employing instruments of terror, and displaying a contempt for the expert may well subvert the bureaucracy and bend it to his will.[3] If, as Hinsley asserts, the checks upon Stalin's and Hitler's "uses

[1] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. by Talcott Parsons (New York 1947), 338.

[2] *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London 1947), 232, 230.

[3] The point is nicely made by Frederic S. Burin, "Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A Reconsideration of Weberian Theory," in Robert K. Merton, Alisa P. Gray,

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of power were still immensely greater than those which all earlier despots had faced" (p. 285), so were the means available to them for overcoming these checks. Even if the modern state as such is peaceful, evil men are able to make war. While Hinsley has drawn attention to important tendencies that are often overlooked, in the end he reaches an unduly optimistic conclusion.

The conclusion is required for the case he is making. If the political leader is the instrument of his peacefully inclined people and is restrained by a corps of cautious bureaucrats, we can count on leaders to behave intelligently, whether or not they are wise. The intelligent policy for a nuclear state is always to refrain from using force.

The second great source of restraints Hinsley finds in the existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, he writes, "constitute for the first time a true deterrent, one that will never have to be relied upon so long as it exists—and this is likely to be for ever" (p. 347). Countless commentators have worried about the escalation of violence from the conventional to the nuclear level, about nuclear war coming by accident, about the irrationality of statesmen compounded by the possible rationality of an irrational policy, about nuclear war by preemption, about the delicacy of the balance of terror and the dangers of nuclear diffusion. Hinsley dismisses all of such worries. We need not be concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear diffusion, for the possession of great power will render its holders responsible (p. 355), which is possibly true but surely not self-evidently so. Nor is he concerned that innovations in weaponry may have destabilizing effects. If nuclear weapons are absolute, then among those states that have them differences of strength are inconsequential. To increase the destructive power of nuclear weapons beyond their "present awesome limits, as opposed to improving the means of delivering them to their targets, is a pointless operation." Apparently it is also pointless to worry about improvement of delivery systems or means of defending against them, for Hinsley immediately goes on to say: "Pass beyond this Great Power barrier, as states will do in future in increasing numbers, and you are a Great Power; and although some Great Powers are more powerful than others, all inhabit a territory in which the only defeat that can be inflicted by one upon another is a diplomatic defeat in a war of nerves—and in which all are or will become aware of this fact" (pp. 354-55). There is nothing between the holocaust, of

Barbara Hockey, Hanan C. Selvin, eds., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), 33-47.

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which nuclear states will be sufficiently wary, and diplomatic maneuver, which is a harmless sport.

The thought that has occurred to others Hinsley apparently considers to be trivial: that if the powers in possession of sophisticated systems of nuclear weapons find themselves stalemated at the strategic level, the very condition of stalemate may tempt them to pursue whatever objectives they may have in other ways. Some states will exhaust their capabilities if they choose to build strategic nuclear systems and thus be disadvantaged if military competition should turn in part upon other means. Differences in power among nuclear states would still matter; the possibility of using force to secure the ends of the state would continue to exist. Hinsley offers little evidence to support his contrary opinions. The evidence he does offer turns out to be appallingly wrong. Anxious "to evade the technical deterrent," governments, he says, listened "to theorists who misguidedly urged the development of tactical atomic weapons. . . ." Because of the danger that the tactical use of nuclear weapons may lead to all-out nuclear war, they were quickly "persuaded . . . to retrace their steps" (p. 348). One may then wonder why Secretary McNamara announced in November of 1963 that the tactical nuclear strength of the Alliance "has been increased, on the ground in Europe, by more than 60% in the last two years."[4]

Finally, wedding his notions about the state to his misunderstanding of nuclear deterrence, Hinsley argues that precautions "taken against accidents with the nuclear weapons—against those accidents that might arise from faulty radar, the mad second-lieutenant or the thoughtless Prime Minister—have become so complex that the procedure for reaching a decision to use the weapons is already too complicated to be operated even in the retaliatory role to which the weapons have been confined." This is a daring conclusion to have reached by "reading between the lines of newspaper accounts. . ." (p. 348). The checks, as he notices, are designed to make the system proof against accidents. They are also, as he chooses not to emphasize, designed to assure that the ultimate decision to use them will remain in the hands of the head of the government. Only if one believes that the logic of deterrence is invincible and the state omnicompetent does it follow that a system designed to ensure that only calculated use can be made of nuclear weapons should make any use of them at all impossible.

[4] Secretary of Defense McNamara, speech to the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1963; quoted in William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York 1964), 310.

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II. International Equilibrium

In more general terms, Hinsley is persuaded that in some eras the international balance is relatively even and that peace is a product of the equilibrium's stability. In other periods, marked by an imbalance of states, violence and war inevitably occur. In most of the nineteenth century, the international equilibrium was stable; therefore, war was rare, and those wars that did occur were limited. From the 1890's to the end of the Second World War, a time of transition, the relations of states were characterized by extreme imbalance among them. But nowhere does he make clear why in the 1930's, for example, with half a dozen great powers in the world, shifts in the alignment of nations did not bring balance out of national disparities in power, nor indeed does he make clear what the imbalance was. Winston Churchill has described the failure of the Western democracies in the middle 1930's as being a failure to use wisely a superiority of power that lay in their hands. This is obviously not the imbalance Hinsley has in mind. Under what international conditions will the greatest efforts to achieve a satisfactory balance be elicited and be most likely to succeed? Hinsley gives little help to anyone seeking an answer. How the possibilities of adjustment are affected by variations in the number of powers that exist and the extent of differences in strength among them does not interest him. Reflecting on the causes of wars, he finds their origins in the uneven development of states, which necessarily produces imbalances among them.[5]

He seems to be optimistic about the chances of peace only where equilibrium is tantamount to fixity, which will exist when states happen to achieve parallel development of industry, technology, and political organization. While this is an important factor, other conditions are important as well. Because his analysis is elliptic, he slips into the habit of simply assuming that when peace has prevailed, equilibrium has been achieved. Peace among major states has prevailed since the Second World War as "the new balance . . . has been completing itself among them" (p. 350). Why did peace prevail before the balance was completed? He argues that "since 1946 war by design and war by miscalculation have both been ruled out because the Great Powers have become acutely aware of the fatal consequences

[5] Cf. F. H. Hinsley, "The Development of the European States System Since the Eighteenth Century," in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th Series, 11 (London 1961), 79. His conclusion is essentially the same as Halévy's, and his analysis has the same merits and defects. See Elie Halévy, *The World Crisis of 1914-1918* (Oxford 1930).

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for themselves of using [nuclear] weapons, and—except in retaliation against their use—have determined not to use them" (p. 348). But until sometime in the early 1950's the Soviet Union did not possess nuclear weapons systems. Deterrence in the years immediately following the war must have depended upon other means, and peace between the most powerful states must have rested on other conditions.

Hinsley is confident that the present international equilibrium will endure. His state of mind is interesting; what would be more interesting still—a careful specification of the factors upon which his confidence is based—is often lacking. He proclaims in his subtitle that the marriage of theory and practice will be consummated in the pages of his book. In fact, he does not even have them living in sin. He seeks to make "a first effort" to raise the study of international relations "to a more scientific level" (p. 6). His method, advertised as being interdisciplinary, is in fact almost wholly historical, and the amalgamation of "findings" scarcely detectable. Part I, "A History of Internationalist Theories," reads very much like the writings of the rationalist seekers of peace of a generation or more ago, of men like F. M. Stawell and A. C. F. Beales—with this major difference: where they were optimists to the point of utopianism, Hinsley's writing is suffused with an ironic and effective skepticism. Theories penned in the seventeenth century are, he says, still accepted despite their earlier demolition by Jean Jacques Rousseau and by others. But the theories he has in mind are largely theories of international organization in forms which, despite his assertion, are no longer widely accepted by students of international relations. Part III is a consideration of international relations and organizations in the twentieth century. Just as early in the book he deftly dispatches some corpses, here, with a brevity that would be pleasing if the analyses and judgments were not already thoroughly familiar, he underscores the weakness of the League and the United Nations and reviews the causes of two world wars.

Hinsley's bow to theory and to science appears merely as a nod to current fashion, for early in the book one learns that old theories are obsolete, and one reads nowhere in his pages of new ones to replace them. The promised effort to delineate theory and illuminate practice by carefully identifying important factors and rigorously examining their relations of cause and interdependence gives way to a combination of common sense and history. His impressive knowledge of history is brilliantly deployed in Part II, wherein he interprets the diplomacy of the modern state system. Without a serviceable theory or a detailed and reliable knowledge of the present interrelations of policy and

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power, his attempt to describe the bases of the current balance and estimate its stability gains little from previous chapters. In the end, even one who agrees with his specific conclusions will be made uneasy by the ground upon which he rests them.

Equilibrium is an important problem for both authors, though neither of them deals with it well. Hinsley is so sure of a happy international outcome that he does not examine carefully enough the conditions that may underlie it. Claude is so certain that contention among states will destroy them that he fails to ask whether variations within a laissez-faire system may not alter both the importance and the possibility of accomplishing managerial tasks. He declares, without analyzing the proposition, that "a balance of power system requires that effective power be diffused among a substantial number of major states" (p. 90). Yet he concludes at once that the world is bipolar and that "the balance of power system exists by default" (p. 93), which is enough to make one despair. His low expectation of stability in a bipolar world results from focusing upon one means of adjustment only: the opportunity of nations to change partners according to the stately rhythm of an eighteenth-century minuet as variations occur in the fortunes and forces of each of them. Overlooking other important means of adjustment, he assumes that the one means presently unavailable is in fact indispensable. Two states are too few to permit adjustments to take place, and were there a larger number of states, the international equilibrium would anyway be unreliable.

Claude distrusts the "invisible hand" that supposedly contrives order among freely contending units. He has not sufficiently appreciated that the "invisible hand" is a metaphor intended to suggest that harmony in competition is a possible result of contention rather than itself being a cause of the outcome (pp. 88-89). But is the economist's metaphor of the "invisible hand" one that applies at all in the realm of politics? "We may," according to Bertrand de Jouvenel, "hold the view that economic activities tend to combine harmoniously: we can not hold it in the case of political activities."[6] Though many students of politics concur in the judgment, its acceptance is not justified. There are two questions involved, and both of them are important. First, is it possible for a competitive political system to be self-equilibrating? Second, with specific reference to international relations, can we live with the harmony that the contention of states may produce? A

[6] Bertrand de Jouvenel, "On the Nature of Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 776.

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condition comparable to one that is described as harmonious within an economy will be widely deplored as dangerously discordant and destructively unstable if it prevails among states in the world. An economic system is said to be functioning satisfactorily if equilibrium at a high level of factor employment prevails. Harmony is taken to be not only consistent with, but in part dependent upon, the periodic disappearance of some of the constituent units of the system, only to have them replaced by others. In a system of economic competition, it is desirable that the inefficient be driven to the wall. Each firm seeks to promote its own interests, but the constructive result of competition transcends the interests of the separate units. Firms that are proficient survive, while others, less skillfully managed, go bankrupt. The disappearance of the relatively inefficient, forced by the operation of the system itself, is a condition of the good performance of the economy. If the efficient who are too small and too weak to stand up to their stronger competitors also disappear, that is merely unfortunate.

Both the economic and international political systems of competition involve possibly destructive conflict. In international politics, if an aggressive state becomes strong or a strong state becomes aggressive, the weak will presumably suffer. In the international system, few states lose their lives; in a free economy, many firms do. In the economic realm, harmony is defined in terms of the overall result achieved, while the units of the system are constantly in jeopardy. Although the constructive purpose of the contention of economic units is quite easily seen, it is difficult to argue that states collectively are better off because of the competition they engage in. In the age of Social Darwinism, the invigoration of states that was thought to result from competition among them was often applauded. The triumph of the strong was an indication of virtue; if the weak succumbed, it was because of their vices. In international politics, discord is said to prevail because we are no longer content that the international system be perpetuated but are necessarily obsessed with the fate of the units that make up the system. Differences in the incidence of destruction and "death" do not account for the reluctance to refer to international politics as a harmonious realm, while economic systems of competition are often so described. Instead, one may conclude, the standards of performance now applied to international political systems are higher, or at least widely different. As John Maynard Keynes once remarked, those who believe that unhampered processes of natural selection lead

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

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to progress have not counted the costs of the struggle.[7] In international politics, we often count nothing but the costs of the struggle.

In describing harmony and discord in economic and political activities, de Jouvenel has distinguished between types of activities that do or do not "combine harmoniously," and has thereby drawn attention to some important differences between economic and political life. He has unfortunately obscured the equally important distinction between regulated and unregulated competition. Economic systems of free enterprise are ordinarily hedged about in ways that channel men's energies constructively. One may think of anti-trust laws, pure food and drug standards, securities and exchange regulations, laws against shooting a competitor, and rules forbidding false claims in advertising. Much the same can be said of political competition within a well-ordered state. The loss of an election may destroy the political career of a candidate; the loss of successive elections may result in the disappearance of a party. In England, the Liberal Party has flickered on the verge of extinction. Some may shed a nostalgic tear, but grief has been limited by the emergence of the Labour Party and its ability to perpetuate a condition of political competition. And the competition is, perforce, carried on without violence.

In the relations of states, with competition unregulated, war will occasionally occur. Though in one of its aspects war is a means of adjustment within the international system, the occurrence of war has often mistakenly been taken to indicate that the system itself has broken down. At times, as during much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, war was tolerable, since, being circumscribed, it was of limited destructive effect. The costs of war now appear to be frighteningly high. Since the most impressive of large and complicated self-regulatory systems have operated only within a contrived order, Claude would seem to be on firm ground in asserting that "the management of power is the real issue" (p. 7). He is saying that with power internationally uncontrolled it is unreasonable to expect that the peaceful adjustment of the relations of states will be produced by the independent policy of each of them without the operation of war as a means of regulation. This would be to ask for much more from the international political system than has ever been expected in domestic economics or politics. But in describing expectations this way, it is at once implicitly assumed that war and the risk of war are more painful to bear than the costs of constructing and sustaining

[7] J. M. Keynes, "The End of Laissez-faire—II," *New Republic*, XLVIII (September 1, 1926), 37.

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systems of management would be and that managerial functions are now very badly performed.

III. International Society and International Management

Power, which Claude defines as "essentially military capability" (p. 6), is a means sometimes used in an effort to accomplish a purpose. Management requires both a manager and an entity susceptible to being managed. It is difficult to understand what is meant by the management of power, even power defined as military force, for power and force are not entities. Military forces can be managed, though often with difficulty even by the state whose instruments they supposedly are. The management of power in international relations requires at a minimum controlling the military forces that are at each state's disposal. International management may in some sense be required, yet it is not clear that if the requirement were fulfilled we would be any better off. We know the evils of the system we have lived with and can only imagine those that would exist in a noticeably different world. There is a frightful danger of war among states coexisting in anarchy. Except by an uninteresting process of definition—effective management of power would mean the absence of organized violence—it does not follow that more management necessarily means a lesser possibility of war.

Claude has posed the international problem in Hobbesian terms: if life is to be preserved, power must be managed—in this case, the military forces disposed of by states who are in close association without really forming a society. By the logic of Hobbes, men give up their freedom to get all they can in exchange for the security of what they may already possess, but the dominant end of men—self-preservation—remains as the motive power of their actions. Decisions of the sovereign that bring the existence of a man or the security of a group of men into jeopardy will naturally be resisted.[8] The relation of ruler to ruled then resolves itself into a question of power. Claude, like Hobbes, isolates one big fear, the fear of death, and proposes one big remedy, central control. If the remedy were successfully applied, the

[8] "If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey. . . . When therefore our refusal to obey, frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained; then there is no liberty to refuse: otherwise there is." Further: "If a monarch, or sovereign assembly, grant a liberty to all, or any of his subjects, which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the grant is void. . . ." (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. by Michael Oakeshott [Oxford, n.d.], ch. 21, pp. 142, 144.)

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result would be purely Hobbesian: a relation between the governors and the governed, based on force and utility, wherein the superior do what they can, the inferior suffer what they must, and quiet prevails so long as resistance can be contained or the inferior are sufficiently pleased with the benefits they receive to remain acquiescent.

A tolerable world is often said to be one in which the pressing danger of war is absent and still the freedom of states is preserved. Freedom entails self-dependence. But the self-dependence of states means that each state must develop and maintain the power upon which its security rests. Each state's quest for security must then render all states insecure. The dilemmas of international politics are cruel, and every imagined escape from them poses difficulties and dangers as great as those that now exist. States cannot entrust the management of power to a central agency unless that agency is competent to protect its client states. The more powerful the clients and the more the power of each of them appears to be a threat to the others, the greater must be the power that is lodged in the hands of the manager. The establishment of a manager of power would then invite the states to use their own power in a struggle to control the central agency.

In a society of states with little coherence, weak attempts to manage international affairs from the center have little influence over the activities of the separate states, especially those of great power. Thus Claude finds that a collective security system, where the most powerful states requiring management also serve as the managers, resolves itself into a balance-of-power system with which it is substantially identical (pp. 123-33); and Hinsley dismisses the thought that international organization can accomplish anything of importance. For the most part, both of them eschew the notion that the Third World chorus chanting in the General Assembly words sometimes intended to moderate the policies of the great powers can have a useful effect. To manage power, power is required.

If important political functions must be centrally performed and if there is practically no society upon which agencies of central control can be erected, then a manager possessed of great power is at once badly needed and impossible to find. It is now often argued that the sharp horns of the Hobbesian dilemma are being blunted by the growing interdependence of states. According to Claude, for example, "the affairs of nations have become and bid fair to become more and more tightly interwoven" (p. 276). Interdependence that locks national interests so closely together that separation is self-evidently destructive of all good things may increase the chances of peace. Short of that

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threshold, the new form of the old argument that war will not occur because it does not pay brings little comfort. If interdependence is growing at a pace that exceeds the development of central control, then interdependence may increase the occasions for war.

It is, one should add, not even clear that the interdependence of states has increased overall. The present relation of the underdeveloped countries to the states that constitute the Development Assistance Committee is less close than was the old imperial tie. For most states, foreign trade as a percentage of national income is smaller now than it was fifty or sixty years ago. In 1913, imports and exports combined represented almost 60 per cent of Great Britain's national income, more than 40 per cent of Germany's and France's, almost 30 per cent of Italy's, and almost 14 per cent of Russia's and America's.[9] Most of the great powers of the day were also great traders; economically they were closely knit together. Germany, for example, in the years preceding the First World War was Britain's second-best customer, both as a source of imports and as a market for exports. The high degree of interdependence in these cases may have been unusual; even exceptional interdependence, far from leading to the unity of great-power contenders, did not prevent them from fighting a bloody war.

It may be argued that because trade has increased in absolute amount while declining in proportion to production, some sectors of national economies have become closely entwined without regard for political boundaries. Undoubtedly so in some cases, but the two greatest powers in the world today, both of them large in extent and industrially developed, trade little with each other or with the rest of the world.[10] Beyond that, where there is interdependence it can now more easily be broken. Technological and other advances make quite easily possible the development of substitutes for most items of import, or, putting it differently, large and economically well-developed countries, the very ones that are crucial in a system of balance, can more quickly move toward an autarkic condition. It is also doubtful that foreign travel and cosmopolitan contact loom any larger now than they did earlier, for one must bear in mind that the number of people influential in government has also increased in the meantime.

The myth of increased interdependence may be important in its own right, but one should also look at the reality. Where there is

[9] Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," *World Politics*, XIII (January 1961), Table 2, 275.

[10] For 1957, imports and exports as a percentage of national income: United States, 9.2 per cent; Soviet Union, 4.9 per cent (*ibid.*).

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firm expectation of peace, as there has been among Western European states since the war, interdependence easily grows; where the expectation is lacking, as it has been between the United States and the Soviet Union, interdependence develops more slowly. In speaking of the interdependence of states, the fear of military loss often looms larger than the hope of economic gain. If we do not succeed in living peacefully together, we may all be buried in a common grave. Consciousness of the nuclear danger may sharpen the desire to eliminate it, but it does not provide the means of doing so. Nor are alliances any longer as important to the mightiest of nations as they were to all of the great powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Economically and militarily, the interdependence of states has declined.

It is scarcely relevant to argue that the growing interdependence of global society provides the basis for the establishment of a world management when deep ideological and other cleavages separate those states whose powers the world management would have to contain. Claude asserts that "the proposition that states must, in their own interest, react in some responsible way to the reality of their common interest in the ordering of relationships among themselves" cannot legitimately be questioned (p. 277). But since not all states do react in this way, and no state always does, the proposition *must* be questioned. Since interdependence has developed nowhere near to the point of producing a global community, unless it be a community of fear, international control, if it is to operate, must be based on a mechanistic balance. It may indeed be that neither man's wit nor nature's contrivance is adequate to produce a world reliably at peace. So one must suspect and, being suspicious, proceed to ask if it is possible to combine whatever benign results history has produced with a little human contrivance in order to make a presently supportable peace somewhat more secure. Who will do the contriving? Claude, when he comes to grips with the problem of international management, concentrates on world government, which he has rightly termed "utopia." Since there are important managerial tasks to be accomplished and no present or likely future agency to perform them, his quest should sensibly have become a search for a surrogate of government.

In the absence of an authoritative manager, the performance of management functions is difficult to discern. In a sector of the economy, one may prefer that many firms roughly equal in size compete with each other, within rules laid down by the government. Where

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there is no single agency to make rules and enforce them, smaller numbers of units and greater imbalances between the few strong and the many weak may be preferable. When two states overshadow in power all others, can they not manage to get along both with each other and with the rest of the world somewhat as oligopolists manage their markets, make serious and often successful efforts to avoid destructive price wars among themselves, and buy out or ignore the smaller firms whose efforts can do little more than annoy them?[11] From this perspective, two adversary-partners, the Soviet Union and the United States, deter each other and, with a reluctance born of mutual suspicion, impose a measure of control—or seek to manage—situations of danger whose unfavorable outcomes would grossly damage both of them.

Any one of several firms that dominate a field will have more to say about all of the matters that affect it than will one wheat farmer among thousands. Oligopolists may prefer duopoly while differing as to which two of several firms should survive. Duopolists may prefer monopoly or conceivably wish that worries about the management of markets were shared by a wider circle of firms. The possibilities are not fewer but more numerous in international relations than in a constricted segment of the economy precisely because there is no single authority who can impose from above limitations upon the transformation of the system. The principal entities that constitute the international system are also its managers. They try to cope with the affairs of each day; they may also seek to affect the nature and direction of change.

If the international system cannot be transcended, it may be useful to ask if it can be transformed. Direction can be imparted in ways that may be useful, though they fall short of the governmental type of control that the presence of a legally competent manager would provide. If the amount and type of direction and the degree of self-regulation existing in a bipolar world are insufficient, is there the possibility of changes in the international system which states that presently exist can hope to produce? An imbalance of international forces may lead to the opportunity of one state to dominate, singly or in combination with others—that is, to use its own power to control the use of power by other states. At times this has been the half-articulated dream of American policy. Robert W. Tucker has discerned it in the threat of massive retaliation, the message conveyed

[11] Cf. Roger D. Masters, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 789-90.

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being: cross the line we have drawn—or, in more general terms, violate the rules we have laid down—and you will be erased.[12] More recently, Senator J. William Fulbright and other artificers of an Atlantic imperium have aspired to a condition of world hegemony that would provide the material basis for managing the world without having achieved world government in form. "If the West goes on to realize its fullest possible strength in an Atlantic partnership, it can," the Senator has recently written, "bring about a decisive shift in the world balance of power and permanently foreclose the possibility of significant Communist expansion."[13] More recently still, President Johnson has described the purpose of American military strength as being "to put an end to conflict."[14]

If one believed that a world in which a single state or grouping of states enjoys hegemony would promise a greater stability than one in which two or more powers contend, he might then favor efforts to construct an Atlantic imperium. There are questions to be answered, some of which theoretical analysis can hope to illuminate. A few can be briefly suggested. To construct an Atlantic imperium without first achieving political unity in Western Europe would require the United States to bring European states separately, successively, and reliably under its influence. Efforts to do so might themselves provoke European states to seek political union more diligently. Should the unity of Europe ensue, for this reason or for others, one might then hope, as many Americans have, that a Western European State would reliably cooperate with the United States and that Western hegemony would then be assured.

There are other ways to contrive changes that would affect both the conditions of international equilibrium and the possibilities of world management. One of them has just been suggested. If hegemony is undesirable, an equilibrium of states the best we can hope for, and a condition of bipolarity incompatible with the operation of a balance of power, would then a world *à trois* be preferable? If it would be, then it is apparent, without repeating what has already been said, that some actions can be taken by the United States to widen the circle of great powers.

IV. Conclusion

The theoretical enterprise, if it is to be forwarded, must rest on a broad-

[12] Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine* (Baltimore 1960), 190-93.

[13] J. William Fulbright, *Prospects for the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 27.

[14] "Excerpts from Speech to Coast Guard," *New York Times*, June 4, 1964.

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er view of possibilities and a more thorough and systematic analysis of conditions than either author has undertaken. While men of affairs have wondered what a new international order, if there is to be one, will look like and have sought to affect the outcome, few theorists have analyzed the good or bad results that could be expected to ensue from one transformation or another of the international system. It is disappointing that neither Claude nor Hinsley has done this. Both of them trench into most of the ground that a theory of international relations must cover. In neither book, however, does one find a careful consideration of the different degrees of stability or the various possibilities of establishing international control that are likely to result from variations in the nature and number of major states in the world. One would have expected from Hinsley a better-informed and more thorough analysis of the factors upon which a peaceful equilibrium may rest and a systematic consideration of how changes in these factors would be expected to affect the prospects of peace. From Claude one would have hoped for a more imaginative identification of the different possibilities of managing, coping, and contriving in international politics under conditions where no single, formal, adequately equipped managerial agency can exist. Many of the interesting and important questions have been left aside by both authors.

Since the relation between theory and practice is one of their major concerns, the omissions are serious ones. They have arisen directly from the perspectives and methods of the authors. Hinsley believes that serviceable international principles and a pervading sense of collectivity will not be revived "until men have assimilated the lessons of the past fifty years of international struggle on a world scale . . ." (p. 271). The truth of the statement, if any, must rest on a psychological theory of politics, which is nowhere adumbrated. Claude explicitly rejects the present possibility of a general theory of international politics and argues that "human wisdom tends to consist of assembled snippets," that theory-building should be thought of "as a process marked by eclecticism and revisionism, rather than as a kind of creative spasm . . ." (p. 273).[15] But without a wider theory, how can one know which snippet will be of strategic theoretical importance or figure out how one factor should be related to another, weighed in importance, and assessed for effect in the decisions that leaders of states must constantly

[15] The distinction is unwarranted. Contrast Thomas S. Kuhn's profound examination of accumulation, crisis, and spasmodic creativity in the natural sciences, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago 1962), esp. secs. 9, 10, 13.

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make? Only with theoretical conceptions more widely drawn and more systematically developed than either author has done can ends be compared and empirical investigations undertaken, models experimented with mentally, common sense adduced, and the sociology of international relations usefully studied.

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